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ABSTRACT
The decline in flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) to Latin America and the Caribbean which began in
2000 grew even sharper in 2002.  This trend reflects a  major change in the world and regional economies.
At the regional level, it is associated with greater instability, slow economic growth and the approaching
completion of the privatization process.  National crises such as those experienced by Argentina, Uruguay
and Venezuela made investors become more risk-averse.  Sluggish growth in demand in the United States
economy hurt investment in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, where the transnational
corporations that employ efficiency-seeking strategies are concentrated.  The global and regional situations
had a less adverse effect on FDI in the countries of the Andean Community, where the primary sector
predominates, but instability in the Mercosur countries diminished their attractiveness for transnational
corporations implementing market-seeking investment strategies.
This publication is composed of three chapters.  The first provides a broad review of FDI trends in Latin
America and the Caribbean.  The second offers the reader a comprehensive discussion of investment flows
to the Andean Community countries.  The third analyses flows from transnational banks to the banking
sector in the region and assesses what types of effects their strategies are having on the region.
10 ECLAC
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The annual publication Foreign Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2002
Report consists of three chapters. The first chapter examines global and regional FDI
trends in terms of their geographical and sectoral distribution and looks at the various
modalities of such flows, as well as the major foreign companies operating in Latin
America and the Caribbean. The principal corporate strategies driving FDI in the region
are also analysed. The second chapter focuses on the experience of the Andean
Community, a subregion which has, for the most part, maintained existing levels of
FDI inflows, while most others have not. The final chapter deals with financial services,
interpreting the new situation in the region in the context of changes in the international
market, national policy initiatives and the new corporate strategies of the principal
transnational banks operating there.
The regional outlook
The worldwide downturn in FDI flows continued in
2002 (-27%). Many factors were involved in this result.
Among the more prominent were the sharp decline in
the share prices of many transnational corporations
(TNCs), mainly those associated with the new economy,
the steep drop in privatizations and acquisitions of
international assets and the downward spiral in the
amount of financing generally available to TNCs. All
these factors combined to curb the international
expansion of these firms. Their impact on the United
States market and on United States TNCs was
particularly detrimental to Latin America.
This time, unlike the situation in 2001, FDI flows to
Latin America and the Caribbean slid more sharply than
those to other areas (-33%). Moreover, contrary to the pattern
observed in 1998-2001, as of 2002 the net transfer of FDI
resources would no longer compensate for the negative net
transfer of financial resources, as it had since the Asian and
Russian crises of 1997-1998. And indeed, the net outward
transfer of financial resources swelled to the equivalent of
more than 4% of Latin America's GDP in 2002, while the
net inward transfer of FDI resources fell to less than 2%.
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Source: ECLAC, based on official figures.
a The net transfer of resources equals net inflows of capital (including non-autonomous capital and errors and omissions) minus the
balance on the factor income account (net profits and interest). Negative amounts indicate transfers of resources abroad.
b Equals net foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows minus net profit remittances.
c Equals the net inflow of capital other than FDI minus net interest payments.
Among the primary causes of this downturn in the
region were increased instability, slower economic
growth and the apparent end of the cycle of
privatizations. Specific crises, such as those in
Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela, were also conducive
to increased risk aversion and reduced foreign
investment, all of which tended to heighten uncertainty
on the part of foreign investors.
The downward trend in FDI inflows was quite
uneven, however, as it varied from one subregion to the
next (see table 1) and reflected different factors and
corporate strategies.
Table 1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET INFLOWS OF FDI, BY SUBREGION, 1990-2002 a
(Millions of dollars)
1990-1994b 1995-1999b 1999 2000 2001 2002c 2002d
1. Mexico and the Caribbean Basin 6 846 15 229 17 984 18 263 29 465 17 753 -40%
2. South America 8 956 45 375 70 236 57 320 39 555 26 649 -33%
- MERCOSUR plus Chile 6 114 35 590 61 881 48 468 30 723 19 420 -37%
- Andean Community 2 843 9 786 8 355 8 852 8 832 7 229 -18%
3. Financial centres 2 506 8 914 19 810 18 855 14 993 11 788 -21%
Total 18 308 69 518 108 030 94 438 84 013 56 190 -33%
Source: ECLAC Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, Division of Production, Productivity and
Management, on the basis of figures obtained from International Monetary Fund (IMF) balance-of-payments statistics and
from national institutions in the countries. The figures for 2002 are estimates based on information from each country's
central bank. The information on financial centres was supplied by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), which, in turn, based its figures on the OECD countries' records of outflows to tax havens. The figures are
updated annually to reflect governments authorities' own revisions of their statistics. They differ from those given in the
ECLAC publication Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2002 (LC/G.2153-P),
Santiago, Chile. United Nations publication, Sales No: S.01.II.G.182, because the latter considers investment in the reporting
economy minus direct investment abroad by residents.
a Equal to net inflows of direct investment in the reporting economy minus capital outflows from the same foreign firms.
b Annual average.
c Estimates.
d Percentage variation with respect to the preceding year.
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Mexico and the Caribbean Basin saw their average
annual FDI inflows more than double from US$ 7 to
US$ 15 billion between the first and second halves of
the 1990s; in 2002, inflows were down sharply from the
preceding year's level, but were similar to the average
for the late 1990s. The huge 2001 inflow of US$ 29.5
billion was largely accounted for by a single operation
(Citicorp's purchase of Banamex for US$ 12.5 billion).
This subregion is where efficiency-seeking strategies on
the part of TNCs are most evident in Latin America, and
it was therefore adversely impacted by the recession in
the United States market, which reduced demand for the
goods produced by the subregion's export platforms. This
cyclical downturn was most strongly felt in Mexico,
whose international competitiveness was also threatened
by an appreciating currency, and resulted in the loss of
over 200,000 jobs in the maquila industry and the shift
of several plants from Mexico to Asia. This attests to the
fact that international competitiveness (defined as world
import market share) based on efficiency-seeking FDI
can be lost just as fast as it is gained. The question is
whether the host country is upgrading into higher value-
added activities or simply pricing itself out of the market.
In Mexico, it was primarily in relatively unsophisticated
activities (such as the production of footwear, apparel,
furniture and some electrical and electronics goods) that
jobs were lost. Elsewhere, such as in the automotive
industry, some switching of sales from the United States
to the national market took place. Nevertheless, it was
mainly new FDI in services –not manufactures– that kept
the level of FDI inflows in 2002 at high historical levels.
New investment in services was concentrated in financial
services, followed –at a distance– by transportation,
communications and retail trade.
FDI inflows to Central America and the Caribbean
Basin between 2000 and 2002 more or less maintained
the levels reached between 1995 and 1999. However, they
did decline by 13% in 2002 compared to the previous
year. This drop was concentrated more in the Caribbean
countries, especially the Dominican Republic, than in
Central America, where FDI inflows rose considerably
in Costa Rica and fell substantially in Guatemala.
South America's average annual FDI inflows
increased by a factor of five between the first and second
halves of the 1990s, rising from US$ 9 to US$ 45 billion.
These inflows peaked in 1999 at over US$ 70 billion
and declined sharply and steadily thereafter, reaching less
than US$ 27 billion in 2002. This subregion is where the
use of market-seeking and natural resource-seeking
strategies by TNCs is most pronounced in Latin America.
The outcomes of these strategies in the Andean Community
and in MERCOSUR and Chile differed, however.
In the Andean Community, where natural resource-
seeking strategies are more common,  this  type  of FDI
–which, by its very nature, is a higher-risk activity– was
less affected by the global downturn, since it was linked
to improved access to hydrocarbon reserves. Average
annual inflows increased more than threefold, from under
US$ 3 billion to almost US$ 10 billion between the first
and second halves of the 1990s, and remained at more
than US$ 8 billion a year thereafter, experiencing a
decline in 2002 (-18%, which was considerably less
severe than the downturn for the region as a whole),
owing primarily to the situation in Venezuela. Most of
this investment was in the hydrocarbons industry, as
investment in minerals fell off considerably. Thus,
natural-resource-centric FDI in the Andean Community
did not suffer as big a slump as did other types of FDI in
the rest of Latin America.
It was the MERCOSUR countries and Chile that saw
the largest increase in average annual FDI inflows –from
US$ 6 billion to almost US$ 36 billion– between the
first and second halves of the 1990s and the sharpest
decline in the new millennium, as FDI plunged from
over US$ 60 billion in 1999 to under US$ 20 billion in
2002. In this subregion, in which the use of market-
seeking strategies by TNCs is most pronounced, FDI
inflows were stalled by the economic crises in Argentina
and Uruguay, the completion of privatization processes
and slower growth in Brazil and Chile. There was a steep
decline in the acquisition of local assets by TNCs,
especially in services such as telecommunications,
financial services and retail commerce, which had
previously driven FDI inflows. In fact, in some countries,
such as Brazil, national firms became more active in
acquiring assets in such sectors as the financial services
and beer industries. TNCs adapted as best they could by
shutting down or by rationalizing or restructuring their
operations. In Argentina, some firms (such as Crédit
Agricole and ScotiaBank) left the country, while others
(such as a number of subsidiaries operating in
infrastructure services) implemented crisis-management
measures, including the stoppage of payments. In Brazil,
several automotive firms attempted to shift sales from
the national or subregional markets to the world market.
In general, MERCOSUR lost its attractiveness for
market-seeking investors.
In the case of Chile, FDI inflows dropped off steeply
as the cycle of mining mega-projects came to an end and
the number of acquisitions in services declined. The
Chilean authorities sought to give new impetus to foreign
investment by way of two initiatives: a policy of presenting
Chile as a platform for operations in the rest of South
America, and the signing of free trade agreements with
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important trading partners such as the European Union,
the United States and the Republic of Korea.
Finally, the situation in the region's financial centres
was also one of growing uncertainty. As has generally
been the case, little is known about the exact significance
and final destination of these financial flows. An initiative
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) to limit the use of these financial
centres for purposes of tax evasion could severely reduce
FDI inflows in the near future.
The above considerations suggest that both cyclical
and structural factors were involved in the decline in FDI
flows to Latin America and the Caribbean. The efficiency-
seeking FDI that has normally been channelled into
export platforms in Mexico, Central America and the
Caribbean was hard hit by cyclical factors, such as the
recession in the United States market and, in the case of
Mexico, the revaluation of the peso. This led to the
postponement of investments, plant closures and massive
lay-offs. Some of the more simple assembly activities
were relocated to lower-cost sites, especially China and
other Asian host countries. This kind of shift does not
appear to have occurred in more sophisticated activities,
such as the automotive and electronics sectors, that
employ more highly skilled labour, however. This more
structural aspect suggests that the requisite policy
response is not simply to wait for the United States market
to recover, but rather to promote a continual upgrading
of local assembly and manufacturing processes in order
to improve their international competitiveness and thus
set the stage for an  upward trend in wages. This
represents the "high road" in terms of the development
strategies of countries hosting components of
internationally integrated production systems. The "low
road" is to attempt to resist change by way of wage
repression, reduced social security benefits, competitive
devaluations and over-dimensioned incentives.
Another example is the case of the MERCOSUR
countries. Clearly, the outlook for the domestic markets
of Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay deteriorated in line with
the deepening of the Argentine crisis. This cyclical
downturn has scared off new foreign investments, while
existing FDI –both in sectors governed by special
arrangements, such as the countertrade provisions
established for the automotive industry, and in other
manufacturing activities– has tended to shift to export
markets beyond MERCOSUR. The sources of existing
FDI in services do not usually have that option, and the
typical response is either to implement severe cost
reduction measures until better times come along or to
look for a way out. The second option has become more
common in Argentina's financial services sector.
Finally, the natural resource-seeking FDI most
commonly found in the Andean Community typically
takes the form of long-term higher-risk projects which
do not react as fast to cyclical factors once they have
been launched. This has been true of a number of
hydrocarbons projects in the Andean Community, such
as those dealing with gas pipelines in Bolivia, petroleum
pipelines in Ecuador, the Camisea gas fields in Peru, etc.
Thus, both cyclical and structural elements help
explain the downturn in FDI, with the weight of each of
these factors varying according to the corporate strategies
that drive the FDI flows in question.
FDI in the Andean Community
One of the defining ideas of the Andean integration
scheme in the early 1970s was a common foreign
investment code, known as Decision 24. This code
embodied a restrictive FDI policy which included an
approval process contingent on developmental
considerations, sectoral restrictions (especially in certain
natural resources and most services), a fade-out mechanism
for foreign owners of manufacturing firms, technological
provisions favouring national companies in their
negotiations with TNCs, limits on payments (profit
remittances, interest payments and royalties) and the
prohibition of access to local financial markets. This policy
eventually evolved into one of the divisive elements in the
integration scheme, and in the late 1980s it was set aside
by an Andean Community decision that authorized more
open and autonomous national policies. The Andean
countries are now endeavouring to take a unified stance in
their negotiations on the investment chapter of the Free
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) initiative. It remains
to be seen what this will mean in practice, however.
The Andean countries have been relatively successful
in attracting FDI more recently, accounting for 13% of
the FDI that entered Latin America between 1990 and
2001. Annual inflows stabilized at around US$ 9 billion
during 1998-2002. Those inflows have gone primarily to
natural resources (especially hydrocarbons) and services
(particularly financial services, telecommunications and
transportation) (see table 2). Most of the FDI comes from
the United States and Spain, and most of the exports
generated by such FDI go to the United States market.
The principal owners of the biggest foreign companies,
by sales, are Telefónica de España, BellSouth and
Telecom Italia in telecommunications, AES Corporation
and Endesa-España in electricity, ExxonMobil and
ChevronTexaco in petroleum, Grupo Minero México and
Newmont Mining Corporation in mining, General
Motors, Ford and Toyota in the automotive sector, and
Coca-Cola and Danone in food products.
Foreign investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2002 15
Table 2
ANDEAN COMMUNITY: CUMULATIVE FDI INFLOWS, BY SECTOR, 1992-2001
(Percentages)
Bolivia Colombia Ecuador Peru Venezuela Andean
 Community
Natural resources 53.6 17.9 81.7 7.8 34.4 30.1
- Mining 5.6 9.4 - - - -
- Petroleum and gasa 48.1 7.8 80.7 7.5 33.0 29.3
Manufactures 9.1 21.2 6.2 6.3 28.9 14.4
Services 43.9 60.9 12.0 38.9 24.1 36.4
- Electricity, gas and water - 17.1 - 9.1 0.8 6.4
- Commerce - 5.2 4.9 3.5 2.5 3.4
- Transportation and communications - 10.1 2.3 15.9 2.1 6.7
- Financial services - 24.3 - 9.1 17.8 15.3
- Other services - 4.2 4.8 1.3 0.9 4.6
Other -6.7 - - 47.0b 12.5 14.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: ECLAC, Information Center of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies of the Division of Production, Productivity
and Management, on the basis of figures provided by the Andean Community and the member countries' central banks.
a
 In Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, mining and the extraction of hydrocarbons are grouped together in a single category.
b In Peru, the statistics compiled by the National Commission on Foreign Investment and Technology (CONITE) differ significantly
from those of the Central Reserve Bank of Peru. The Andean Community has corrected the CONITE figures so that they reflect
actual, as opposed to registered, FDI. One effect of this revision is that almost half of total inflows cannot be classified by sector.
In spite of relatively strong FDI inflows, the
international competitiveness of the Andean countries
has deteriorated. This trend is associated with the fact,
on the one hand, that the sectoral specialization of FDI-
related export activities focuses on natural resources, the
least dynamic element of international trade, and on the
other, that FDI in services has not produced significant
exports. The overall world market share of Andean
Community exports declined from 1.3% to 0.9% between
1985 and 2000, while the Community's share of the most
dynamic part of international trade –non-resource-based
manufactures– barely moved at all, edging up from
0.14% to 0.18%. In part, this is because the types of
export-oriented FDI that are most attracted to the Andean
Community reinforce that area's strong specialization in
natural resources and natural-resource-based
manufactures, which have traditionally made up over
90% of the value of total exports (petroleum –both crude
and refined– alone makes up 60% of the total). This
subregional specialization in natural resources varies
across the Andean Community, being higher in Venezuela
and Ecuador and lower in Colombia. Moreover, the
Andean countries have not been able to take advantage
of their preferential access to the United States market.
Natural-resource-seeking corporate strategies have
traditionally been the type of strategy relied upon the
most by TNCs operating in the Andean Community. To
a certain extent, the ambivalent and changing stance on
FDI policies adopted by governments in the subregion
has been reflected in their experiences with TNCs in
natural-resource sectors. Several hydrocarbon TNCs
(Exxon, Texaco, Mobil and Royal Dutch Shell) had
established a strong presence in the Andean subregion
–except in Bolivia, where the State company had
controlled activities since the early 1950s– before
discontent with the apparently meagre national benefits
derived from these activities led to a wave of
nationalizations in these countries, with the exception of
Colombia. In Colombia, the existence of a policy dating
back to 1974 of employing association contracts in the
petroleum sector enabled the country to avoid the policy
flip-flops of its Andean neighbours. The subsequent
Andean experience with State-led hydrocarbons
development also entailed a number of problems in
relation to State petroleum companies' investment levels
and indebtedness in a few countries. Then, in the 1990s
a series of privatizations took place (in Peru and Bolivia,
in particular), and concessions and contracts of association
were used to open the sector up to foreign investors. Two
important phenomena have been witnessed in recent
years: on the one hand, reserves of both petroleum and
natural gas have increased substantially thanks to
increased exploration efforts and, on the other, production
of petroleum peaked in 1997-1998, whereas the output
16 ECLAC
of natural gas continues to rise. Both TNCs and State
companies have played an important role in hydrocarbons
exploration, production and exports in the Andean
Community. While the role of TNCs has increased in
recent years, State companies continue to be the principal
agents in most of these countries, which may explain
why subregional projects have not been major recipients
of FDI in this sector.
FDI in services grew significantly in the 1990s.
While most of the FDI has gone to the same sectors
–financial services, telecommunications, transportation
and electricity– national experiences in the Andean
Community have been varied. The privatization of State
assets has produced some of the biggest foreign
companies in the subregion, such as CANTV of
Venezuela (Verizon and Telefónica de España), Telcel
of Venezuela (BellSouth), Telefónica de Perú (Telefónica
de España), Electricidad de Caracas of Venezuela (AES
Corporation) and EMGESA of Colombia (Endesa-
España). The acquisition of local banks by foreign
investors has also been a factor in FDI inflows. In very
few of these services has the establishment of a
subregional strategy been a significant element in this
respect, however.
This leads to the surprising conclusion that the
integration of the Andean market itself has not proved to
be a major inducement for FDI in natural resources,
services or, in fact, manufactures. The original integration
scheme was based on the idea of restricting FDI to
activities not undertaken by local companies. These firms
were intended to be the principal beneficiaries of the
Andean Pact, and this rationale was what gave content
to the Pact's restrictive FDI code. The outcome of the
subsequent volte-face of FDI policy was not a single,
more liberal regime for the promotion of FDI from a
subregional market perspective, but rather five distinct
FDI policies which failed to take the widened market
explicitly into account. In fact, to this day, the principal
attraction of the Andean Community member countries
continues to be the oldest corporate strategy in the region,
the one that seeks natural resources. FDI in services has
a number of diverse determinants. This explains, to a
great degree, why FDI has not played a significant role
in the industrialization of the subregion or in the
improvement of the region's international
competitiveness.
FDI in financial services
The 1990s witnessed a strong increase in the
presence of foreign banks in financial services in Latin
America, which expanded from an average of less than
10% of total assets in 1990 to over 50% in 2001. This is
attributable to the interaction of three groups of factors:
increased competition in the international market for
financial services, national policies that have facilitated
the entry of foreign banks and new corporate strategies.
The transnational banks that spearheaded the effort to
achieve this stronger presence were seeking to improve
the competitive position of their universal services (and,
hence, their long-term profitability) by means of an
international expansion to and throughout the region.
Governments of the region, for their part, were seeking
to deepen and modernize the financial services available
in their economies by improving microeconomic
efficiency (profitability, efficiency and liquidity) and
macroeconomic efficacy (availability and cost of credit,
and systemic stability). In the end, both transnational banks
and governments were disappointed to a certain degree.
The experience provides some important lessons, however.
The international market factors involved in this
expansion included a host of elements, ranging from the
initiatives taken to open up and liberalize financial
services in the United States and European markets
–coupled with the World Trade Organization's Fifth
Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services–
to the new regulations and norms for supervision
promoted by the Bank for International Settlements,
technological change and new instruments (securitization
and derivatives). This combination of factors spurred
global competition among transnational banks.
National policies in Latin America reflected these
trends, albeit with some lag. The first generation of
reforms in the region was aimed at reducing the role
played by State banks in credit allocation, deregulating
interest rates, reserve requirements and other credit
allocation instruments, and opening up the sector to
foreign banks. The second generation of reforms focused
more on the new regulatory and supervisory
requirements, institutional development and systemic
stability.
These tendencies in the international market and in
Latin America led transnational banks to adopt changes
in their corporate strategies. The heightened competition
prompted them to search for scale advantages through
the provision of universal services (all market segments)
and greater global coverage (a broader geographical
presence). This played out in a huge wave of acquisitions
in the industry and, within that context, Latin America
looked very attractive to a number of such investors.
It was primarily a small group of large universal
service banks that made these huge investments in the
region. SCH (US$ 16.4 billion), BBVA (US$ 9.6 billion)
and Citigroup (US$ 12.5 billion just in Mexico) led the
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way, mainly by purchasing local banking networks (see
figure 2). Others used strategies that called for the
establishment of a broad geographical presence solely
in the corporate segment (FleetBoston and Scotiabank)
or that restricted their presence to the major markets
(HSBC and ABN AMRO).
Figure 2
MAJOR FOREIGN BANKS IN LATIN AMERICA, BY SHARE












































Source: Salomon Smith Barney, Foreign Financial Institutions in Latin America, 2001; Equity Research, Latin
America, and annex table A.III.2.
In terms of results, these foreign banks' entry into
financial services in Latin America substantially
increased their participation in most countries and
allowed them to become the dominant force in several
nations (see table 3). In most instances, this contributed
significantly to the deepening and modernization of
financial services. Nevertheless, these transnational
banks were disappointed by the returns on their
investments, since the positioning phase was soon
followed by a significant downturn in the
macroeconomic performance of most of the countries
they were operating in. The ultimate impact of this
increased foreign participation in the financial services
sector is as yet unclear. No doubt this new competition
has had a favourable impact on the efficiency of local
banks' operations, since -as local banks were obliged
to rise to the standard of efficiency set by the foreign
entrants- no statistical differences are to be found
between the two in terms of performance. Nevertheless,
this greater efficiency and the increased presence of
foreign banks have not translated into a reduction in
the cost of financial services. Worse still, the presence
of foreign banks has not resulted in the availability of
more credit or increased stability in these national
financial systems. It is still too early to draw definitive
conclusions in this regard, but the fact remains that the
entry of transnational banks into financial services in
Latin America has yet to produce the hoped-for effects
–in the quantities desired– for either the transnational
bank investors or the host governments.
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Table 3
FOREIGN BANK'S SHARES OF TOTAL ASSETS OF LATIN AMERICAN
BANKING SYSTEMS
(Percentages)
1990 1994 1999 2000 2001
Argentina 10 18 49 49 61
Brazil 6 8 17 23 49
Chile 19 16 54 54 62
Colombia 8 6 18 26 34
Mexico 0 1 19 24 90
Uruguay 4 7 33 40 61
Venezuela 1 1 42 42 59
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects and Key Policy Issues,
Washington, D.C., 2000; Bank for International Settlements (BIS), "The banking industry in the emerging market economies:
competition, consolidation and systemic stability", BIS papers, No. 4, Basel, 2001; Salomon Smith Barney, Foreign Financial
Institutions in Latin America, November, New York, 2001.
The way forward
The longer-term profile of the downward trend in
FDI inflows suggests that FDI policies must be adapted
to the new situation and be focused on improving the
results. This might be a good time for governments of
the region to review their foreign investment policies with
that aim in mind. It would appear that the period of
plentiful and "easy" FDI has come to an end. During
that period, the liberalization, opening and deregulation
of the economy were often sufficient to attract huge
inflows of FDI. From a macroeconomic perspective, it
made sense to follow a policy of "the more FDI, the
better". After all, increased inflows of FDI made life
easier for economic teams accustomed to foreign-
exchange starvation.
The new and harsher environment in which more
–and increasingly sophisticated– host countries compete
for smaller global FDI flows suggests that the Latin
American countries must upgrade their FDI polices and
institutions in order to compete more successfully. This
will entail graduating from a "beauty contest" approach
designed to attract all potential FDI based on a country's
image and moving on to a developmental, targeted
approach that calls for the definition of national priorities
and the adoption of more active policies to identify, attract
and consolidate the types of FDI that will have the desired
impact. This will require a shift of focus away from a
macroeconomic balance-of-payments approach and
towards a more meso- or microeconomic approach
directed at improving competitiveness, deepening
clusters, integrating industrial processes, extending
production linkages, improving human resources and
business development skills, etc. In other words, the
emphasis must shift from quantity to quality. This will
require much more highly sophisticated institutions and
more professional staff to successfully identify, attract
and consolidate the kinds of FDI that will directly
contribute to the attainment of national development
goals within an environment marked by stronger
competition for smaller overall FDI flows.
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I.  REGIONAL OVERVIEW
A. RECENT TRENDS IN FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
Global flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) retreated
for the second year running in 2002 as a direct result of
three main factors: steep falls on world stock markets,
which reduced the value of merger and acquisition
operations; a drop in the number of cross-border
transactions, which had been a major component of FDI
during the boom years of the 1990s; and restricted access
to enterprise financing. These factors, in turn, are related
to the conclusion of an expansionary phase in various
activities, especially those with ties to the information and
communications technology industries, which had been
the powerhouse of worldwide economic growth in recent
years. In these new circumstances, many firms made
radical changes to their global strategy, slimming down
their investment plans and no longer focusing on size and
market share instead, they have adopted a strategy based
on the strict control of expenditure and investments.
Although these global trends contributed to the
reduction in FDI flows to Latin America and the
Caribbean (which diminished for the third straight year
in 2002), this decline was also compounded by national
and regional factors that influenced the investment
decisions taken by transnational corporations (TNCs).
When foreign firms were investing in Latin America
in the 1990s, international and regional conditions were
very different from those which began to emerge around
2000: the world economy was growing, and an intensive
process of international mergers and acquisitions was
unfolding; at the regional level, monetary variables were
more stable and growth was reviving. Since then the
situation has changed radically: growth in the
international economy is currently weak, and the region
has slipped into recession. Notwithstanding this general
picture, the mix of external and domestic factors has had
heterogeneous effects on the strategies of foreign firms
and on FDI flows in different parts of the region.
In Mexico, despite an overvalued currency which
inflates costs for TNCs operating in that country, FDI held
steady at about US$ 14 billion (similar to the average for
the second half of the 1990s), as funds channelled into the
financial sector compensated for faltering investment in
the maquila export industry. TNCs also curtailed their
maquila investments in Central America and the Caribbean
pending an economic recovery in the United States.
The reasons for dwindling levels of FDI in South
America include recession and greater economic and/or
political instability. Such factors made themselves felt to
varying degrees in the different South American countries.
The privatization of public-sector assets in the subregion,
which attracted large volumes of FDI in the 1990s, has
now run its course, and the few attempts made to privatize
State assets in 2002 have encountered fierce political
resistance and have been either cancelled or postponed.
Against this background of recession and instability,
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investors grew more cautious about their enterprises in
South America, especially in the case of foreign firms that
had invested to gain access to national or subregional
markets. This contrasted with investments in natural
resource exploitation, primarily in the Andean Community
countries, which stayed more or less at their 2001 level
except in Venezuela, where they fell considerably.
The following two sections offer an assessment of
the trend of global and regional FDI flows in 2002. This
is followed by an analysis of the various strategies
deployed during the year by TNCs with investments in
Latin America and the Caribbean, to provide a complete
picture of FDI behaviour in the region.
1. Foreign direct investment worldwide
In 2002 global FDI flows contracted sharply for the
second year running. Having experienced their steepest
fall in three decades in 2001 (51%), direct investment
flows dwindled by a further 27% in 2002 (see table I.1).
According to preliminary figures from the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
worldwide FDI for 2002 is estimated at US$ 534 billion.
For the first time ever, a developing country (China) heads
the list of FDI recipients worldwide, pushing the United
States into second place (UNCTAD, 2002a).
As was the case in 2001, the fall was steeper in
developed countries than in developing ones (31%
compared to 23%), although the general trend also
concealed glaring disparities between individual
countries. For example, capital inflows plummeted by
about 78% in the United Kingdom and 65% in the United
States, whereas increases were recorded in 10 other
developed countries. Among developing regions, there
were steep falls in Africa (65%) and Latin America
(32%), but a more gentle decline in Asia (12%).
According to UNCTAD, this disparity is explained
by the fact that the worldwide economic slowdown has
pitted TNCs against fierce competition in smaller
markets, forcing them to cut production costs. One way
they have done so is by geographically redistributing
labour-intensive activities –a policy exemplified in Latin
America and the Caribbean by the closure of several
maquila enterprises in Mexico and their migration to
China. Data from the National Institute of Statistics,
Geography and Informatics (INEGI) reveal that
Mexico’s maquila industry shed over 200,000 jobs for
this reason.
Table I.1
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF NET INWARD FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, 1996-2002
(Billions of dollars)
1990-1995a 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 b
World total 225 386 478 694 1 088 1 492 735 534
Developed countries 145 220 268 484 838 1 227 503 349
    Western Europe 87 116 138 275 507 832 336 ...
       European Union 84 110 128 262 488 809 323 ...
         Germany 4 7 12 25 55 195 32 ...
          France 16 22 23 31 47 43 53 ...
          United Kingdom 17 24 33 74 88 117 54 12
    Other European countries 3 5 10 13 19 24 13 ...
    Other developed economies 58 104 130 210 331 395 167 ...
         Canada 6 10 12 23 24 67 27 ...
         United States 41 84 103 174 283 301 124 44
         Other countries 11 10 15 12 23 28 15 ...
Developing countries and economiesc 74 153 191 188 225 238 205 158
    Latin America and the Caribbean 22 50 73 85 108 94 84 56
    Africa 4 6 11 9 13 9 17 6
    Asia and the Pacific 48 94 106 96 103 134 102 90
       China 19 40 44 44 40 41 47 50
Central and Eastern Europe 6 14 19 23 25 27 27 27
Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, Division of Production, Productivity and
Management, on the basis of figures provided by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). For
Latin America and the Caribbean, figures up to 2001 are taken from balance-of-payments statistics published by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). Estimates for 2002 for Latin America and the Caribbean come from national agencies in each country.
a Annual average. b Estimates. c The component figures are not consistent with the total because the statistics for Latin
America come from a different source.
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As stated in ECLAC (2002), the shrinking of global
FDI flows in recent years reflects the economic slowdown
across the globe, particularly in the United States, which
was accompanied by less vigorous investment and a drop
in corporate profits. This gave rise to widespread and
sustained falls in share prices on financial markets
worldwide (a trend that had begun in 2000 but quickly
gathered momentum in 2002), together with a substantial
reduction in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. It also
restricted firms’ access to financing –a situation that was
later aggravated by bankruptcies and accounting scandals
in a number of TNCs that had been leading absorbers of
financial resources in the 1990s.
Today, major uncertainties have arisen as to the
future course of the United States economy and its ability
to continue acting as the powerhouse of worldwide
economic growth, as it did throughout the 1990s. As the
behaviour of that economy strongly influences future
investment decisions, it warrants careful analysis in order
to understand it better.
In the 1990s, macroeconomic performance in the
United States shattered the paradigms existing up until
that time: robust economic growth was shown to be
compatible with low levels of inflation and
unemployment. Some specialists saw this as
fundamentally due to microeconomic factors, reflecting
the impact of the latest technological revolution on
corporate productivity, which made it possible to
maintain profit margins without raising prices. According
to this thesis, a twin technological-liberal revolution had
given rise to profound industrial change, raising the
United States economy’s growth potential and giving
birth to a “new economy”.1
The conclusions of that analysis were consistent with
the presence of another element believed to have made a
major contribution to the vigour of the United States
economy, namely a sharp rise in the investment rate. This
was fuelled not only by domestic capital, but also by the
large volumes of FDI that TNCs channelled into the
United States in order to ride the wave of rapid growth
in the world’s most powerful economy. In the 1990s the
United States was the world’s leading FDI recipient. In
addition, thanks to major technological advances, the
information technology and  telecommunications sectors
became a major focus of investment, absorption of state-
of-the-art technologies and job creation, generating
powerful forces that stimulated and intensified the
ongoing globalization process. Nonetheless, estimates
show that productivity increases failed to keep pace with
the volume of capital being invested, which led to
cumulative over-investment during the period.2
Equity and bond markets played a crucial role in
financing this investment boom in the United States,
which was boosted by the liberalization of capital flows
in the 1990s. The amount of capital raised by firms
through share issues, whether quoted on stock markets
or not, is estimated at approximately US$ 270 billion in
2000 in the United States alone –in other words, seven
times the amount raised in the late 1980s. A large portion
of these funds was channelled into “new economy”
sectors. In addition, the share of bonds in firms’ liabilities
increased at the expense of bank credit.3
Given that over half of all families in the United
States owned shares quoted on the stock market and that
such shares accounted for a large proportion of pension
fund asset portfolios, burgeoning share indices generated
wealth effects, fuelling a consumption boom that
outpaced the growth of real wages. Expanding demand
encouraged firms to undertake further investment,
thereby creating a spiral of rising asset values and
financial liquidity that drove up share prices, especially
in “new economy” sectors (see figure I.1). Against this
backdrop, business modernization and consolidation also
continued apace, further boosting FDI flows worldwide.
1 Fierce controversy continues to rage over this point; see Gordon (2000), Oliner and Sichel (2000) and Jorgenson (2001).
2 As Brender and Pisani (1999 and 2001) point out, the structure of these investments revealed an increase in the share of information
technology and telecommunications products in firms’ capital expenditure. As the prices of such products fell in relation to those of other
capital goods, this component probably increased even more substantially in volume terms.
3 Between the early 1980s and the late 1990s, the share of bonds in corporate liabilities grew from 26% to 32%, while bank credit shrank
from 27% to 23% (Brender and Pisani, 2001).
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Figure I.1
UNITED STATES: INDICATORS OF STOCK MARKET TRENDS, 1991-2002
(1991=100)
4 See The Economist (2002a), Le Monde (2002a and 2002b) and El País (2002b), among others.
5 See The Economist (2002b), The Economist, Business Special (2002) and Le Monde (2002b).













































Note: Nasdaq: Index of share prices among technology firms. Dow Jones: Index of share
prices on the New York Stock Exchange.
While optimists interpreted this rise in share prices
as reflecting the vigour of the new economy, more
cautious analysts feared that it largely represented a
speculative bubble. There was a glaring mismatch
between expectations of very high financial yield and
the economic return on capital, which trended downward
in the United States in the second half of the 1990s.
Nonetheless, the powerful and sustained investment
wave forced firms to borrow excessively, and this did
not yield good results. Faced with the imperative need to
grow share values and keep market expectations high,
many firms engaged in accounting manoeuvres to
enhance their balance sheets –including corporations
such as Enron, Global Crossing, Adelphia, Dynegy, Tyco
International, Imclone, Qwest, WorldCom and Xerox.
These firms were subsequently indicted for a number of
criminal offences, such as the creation of off-balance-
sheet entities to conceal multi-million-dollar losses,
manipulation of results, accounting fraud, privileged use
of internal funds and exploitation of insider information.4
The crisis of corporate governance that broke out in
the United States extended to “financial watchdogs” such
as auditors, banks and regulatory authorities. The most
notorious case involved Arthur Andersen LLP –one of
the world’s five biggest accounting firms and auditor to
Enron, Global Crossing and WorldCom. The sight of
executives from Arthur Andersen LLP being put on trial
for obstruction of justice triggered a mass exodus of the
firm’s international clients and partners and brought its
activities to a halt.5 The world’s largest brokerage
bank, Merrill Lynch, negotiated an agreement to pay a
US$ 100-million fine in response to allegations that its
experts had deceived investors by encouraging investment
in stocks which they talked down in private. The firm is
currently facing numerous lawsuits filed by investors
whose interests were damaged.6 Several banks also
suffered major credibility crises, especially those which,
like Citigroup, had become integrated groups in the late
1990s, capable of providing financial services of all kinds
under the “universal bank” model (see chapter III of this
report). This prompted the Attorney General of the State
of New York, Eliot Spitzer, to negotiate an agreement
between the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
representatives of stock markets and state regulators, aimed
at reforming investment practices and imposing penalties
totalling US$ 1.4 billion on investment banks involved in
these activities. The agreement was signed in December
2002 (see OAG, 2002).
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These events seriously undermined confidence in the
system as a whole. Having originally been confined to
information technology and telecommunications stocks,
the fall on the stock market began to spread to other
sectors in 2002. Share price indices in many developed
countries retreated to their levels of four, five or even six
years earlier. For example, by September 2002, the Dow
Jones industrial index had dropped to August 1998 levels;
the Nasdaq, to its level of August 1996; London’s FTSE
International index (the “Footsie”), to early-1996 levels;
the CAC 40 in France, to its mid-1997 level; and
Germany’s Dax, to where it had been in late 1996.
As their share prices plummeted on the stock market,
firms also saw their profits and investment capacity
wither. It became harder for them to obtain financing in
a climate of strong risk aversion among investors and
growing mistrust of the veracity of corporate balance
sheets and the forecasts made by financial analysts.
Banks, which were also affected by the crisis, tightened
restrictions on their loans; investors, alarmed by major
bankruptcies and the collapse of the telecommunications
sector, demanded increasingly tough conditions on
lending to firms.
Until 2000 the main selection criteria used for equity
or bond purchases related to the general situation
prevailing in the sector and the size or profitability of
the firms in question. Today, however, investors are more
concerned about a firm’s debt status. Previously
permissive risk-rating agencies have become very strict.
While the most prestigious large corporate groups, with
assured yield and high liquidity, have no great problem
in obtaining financing, the situation is much more
difficult for other firms, especially those in the
communications and information technology industry.
Restricted access to financing, compounded by the
global economic slowdown, has radically altered firms’
policy: as mentioned above, they have stopped competing
on the basis of size and market share and have adopted a
policy of strict control over expenditure and investment.
One sign of this is the steep decline in FDI flows
worldwide, a phenomenon that is largely due to the
drying up of mergers and acquisitions (mainly cross-
border operations), which were the largest component
of FDI in the 1990s. The total value of mergers and
acquisitions announced between January and September
2002 was US$ 902.848 billion –down by 33% from the
figure for the same period of the preceding year (see
América Economía, 2002b).
In short, FDI was affected both by short-term factors
–mainly the economic slowdown in the United States and
other leading industrialized economies– and by structural
factors, such as the cyclical downturn in the information
technology and communications industry. In addition, the
institutional crisis of corporate governance in certain large
TNCs undermined confidence among many investors
(individual and institutional alike), who are now very
cautious about using their savings to fuel a renewed
expansion of large corporations. This distrust, combined
with the reduced availability of global financing, has
further dampened of FDI flows to the region.
2. Foreign direct investment in Latin America and the Caribbean:
recent inflows and trends
In 2002 FDI flows to Latin America and the Caribbean
fell by 33% in comparison to the 2001 figure, dropping
from US$ 84 billion to US$ 56.2 billion. This latter
figure was below the average for the second half of the
1990s (see table I.1 and figure I.2). In contrast to what
had happened in 2001, however, this time the decline
in investment flows to the region was proportionally
greater than the one observed worldwide. Thus, the
downward trend in the region not only persisted for the
third straight year, but became much steeper in relation




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET INWARD FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
BY SUBREGION, 1990-2002 a
(Billions of dollars)
Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, Division of Production,
Productivity and Management, on the basis of figures from balance-of-payments statistics published
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national agencies in each country. The figures for
2002 are estimates based on information from the countries’ central banks. The information on
financial centres was provided by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), on the basis of outflows to tax havens reported by members of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). For those countries, figures for 2002 are estimates
made by the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies. The figures presented are updated
annually according to government authorities’ revisions of their statistics. They differ from the figures
given in the Preliminary overview of the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2002,
published by ECLAC, since in the latter net FDI inflows are taken to be investment in the reporting
economy minus direct investment abroad by its residents.




The context in which FDI flows take place in the world
economy continued to have repercussions throughout the
region, but with differential effects between countries
where TNCs have pursued efficiency-seeking strategies
(such as Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean) and
those where they have focused on raw materials and market
expansion (South America). This is discussed below.
(a) FDI in Mexico, Central America and the
Caribbean
In Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, FDI
was hit particularly hard by the slump in United States
demand for articles assembled in the subregion. Mexican
industry also became less competitive as a result of the
peso’s revaluation. Nonetheless, a large part of the
extraordinary drop in inflows to this country (see table
I.2) can be explained by the exceptional level of net
inward FDI in 2001 as a result of the US$ 12.5-billion
purchase of Banamex by Citigroup. This transaction was
described in detail in last year’s report (see ECLAC,
2002). Had it not been for this exceptional amount, FDI
flows to Mexico in 2001 would have broadly matched
the levels recorded in recent years.
According to information from Banco de México
(BANXICO), FDI inflows in 2002 amounted to US$
13.626 billion –down by 45% from the previous year’s
figure, but above the annual average for 1996-2000. The
volume of FDI remained significant, especially in
comparison to its levels in many other countries of the
region. Nonetheless, the composition of these flows has
changed in recent years. After the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed, FDI tended to
target the manufacturing sector, but in the late 1990s the
proportion absorbed by this sector began to decline and,
despite a slight recovery in 2002, has not managed to
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Among manufacturing activities, the assembly industry
has been a powerful magnet for FDI since the mid-1990s.
The economic slowdown in the United States, compounded
by the loss of competitiveness in Mexican industry, hit
employment in this sector particularly hard. The number of
workers employed in maquila activities, which in October
2000 had risen to a record 1.347 million, had dropped back
to 1.089 million by September 2002. Exports from maquila
enterprises displayed a similar trend (see figure I.3).
Nonetheless, since March 2002 there has been a slight upturn
in employment and a more positive trend in exports than in
2001, when sales abroad fell by 3.3%.
Table I.2
MEXICO, CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET INWARD FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT BY COUNTRY, 1990-2002 a
(Millions of dollars)
1990-1994 b 1995-1999 b 1999 2000 2001 2002 c
Mexico 5 430 11 184 12 478 14 192 24 731 13 626
Central America 577 2 039 2 180 1 961 2 018 1 730
Costa Rica 222 481 620 408 454 642
El Salvador 15 282 216 173 268 278
Honduras 41 120 237 282 195 179
Guatemala 88 213 155 230 456 110
Nicaragua 19 166 300 265 132 170
Panama 192 777 652 603 513 350
Caribbean (excluding financial centres)  839  2 006  3 326  2 110  2 716  2 397
Anguilla 10 28 38 39 28 35
Antigua and Barbuda 35 27 37 33 54 41
Aruba 38 150 392 -228 -324 -53
Barbados 11 15 17 19 18 18
Belize 14 23 47 18 34 33
Cuba 7 10 9 -10 5 1
Dominica 17 24 18 11 14 14
Grenada 18 32 42 37 34 38
Guyana 69 63 48 67 56 57
Haiti 0 11 30 13 3 8.0
Jamaica 124 285 524 468 614 535
Montserrat 7 3 8 3 4 5.0
Dominican Republic 171 594 1 338 953 1 198 850
Saint Kitts and Nevis 22 33 58 96 83 79
Saint Lucia 42 53 83 49 51 61
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 22 62 56 28 36 40
Suriname -38 -13 -62 -148 -27 -79
Trinidad and Tobago 270 605 643 662 835 713
Mexico, Central America and Caribbean 6 846 15 229 17 984 18 263 29 465 17 753
Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, Division of Production, Productivity and
Management, on the basis of figures from balance-of-payments statistics published by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and national agencies in each country. The figures for 2002 are estimates based on information from the countries’
central banks. The information on financial centres was provided by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), on the basis of outflows to tax havens reported by members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD). For those countries, figures for 2002 are estimates made by the Unit on Investment and Corporate
Strategies. The figures presented are updated annually according to government authorities’ revisions of their statistics.
They differ from the figures given in the Preliminary overview of the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2002,
published by ECLAC, since in the latter net FDI inflows are taken to be investment in the reporting economy minus direct
investment abroad by its residents.





MEXICO: IMPORTANCE OF THE MANUFACTURING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES SECTORS
AS DESTINATIONS FOR FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
(Percentages)
Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs, National Foreign Investment Commission, Informe estadístico sobre el
comportamiento de la inversión extranjera directa en México (January-September 2002).
7 See the statement by Mr. Luis Ernesto Derbez, Mexico’s Secretary of the Economy (www.terra.com.mx), 29 July 2002.
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Given the problems facing the industrial sector in
general  and maquila businesses in particular, in July 2002
the government of Mexico created a Competitiveness
Council with the aim of stabilizing employment and
speeding up the creation of new jobs that would generate
both greater value added and better productivity, so that
wages could be increased.7 Special action plans were to
be drawn up for 12 branches of production, including
the automotive, electronics and maquila export industries,
along with the agricultural sector and the textile and
clothing industry. In October 2002, the Ministry of
Economic Affairs also introduced changes to the
temporary merchandise imports, setting out specific
requirements that replace the agreement previously in
force with the United States. The new rules facilitate
maquila operations by allowing the tariff-free importation
of inputs on a temporary basis, while extending the term
of the agreement.
The bulk of FDI in services in 2002 continued to be
channelled into the financial sector. The largest such
operation was the US$ 1.131 billion paid by the Hongkong
and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) of the United
Kingdom for a 99.2% stake in the Bital Financial Group,
Mexico’s fifth largest bank. This acquisition raised foreign
ownership of the Mexican banking sector to over 90%.8
In brief, negative factors notwithstanding, in 2002
FDI in Mexico broadly maintained its level of previous
years. As mentioned above, however, the composition
of flows has changed, with investment in services
overtaking investment in manufacturing. The admission
of China into the World Trade Organization (WTO) has
further undermined the competitiveness of Mexico’s
maquila sector, whose productive processes use simple
technology, and has forced the remaining sectors (those
using more advanced technology) to make up for lost
markets and defend the market shares they achieved in
Canada and the United States during the 1990s.
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Figure I.4



























































Source: National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics (INEGI).
Foreign direct investment flows to the Central
American and Caribbean countries slid by an estimated
13% in 2002 because of the international economic
situation and, fundamentally, the sluggish recovery of
the United States economy. As in Mexico, these
circumstances led to cutbacks in the manufacturing
investments being made in the Dominican Republic and
several Central American countries, such as El Salvador,
Guatemala and Honduras. Investments in the tourism
sector (which recently has absorbed large amounts of
FDI in the Caribbean countries) receded after the terrorist
attacks of 11 September 2001. Financial centres apart,
FDI in this subregion is concentrated in just a few
countries, the main recipients being the Dominican
Republic, Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and Honduras, in that
order.
In 2002 FDI flows to Central America shrank by
14%, with those aimed at manufacturing for the export
market falling most sharply. A notable exception to this
trend was Costa Rica, which recorded a 29% increase in
FDI as inflows to the manufacturing sector doubled, from
US$ 231 million in 2001 to US$ 484 million in 2002
(Inter-Agency Group on Foreign Direct Investment,
2002). As will be discussed in section B of this chapter,
Costa Rica’s free zones received some greenfield
investments in the manufacture of components and
assembly of equipment in the telecommunications and
tyre sectors. In El Salvador, a new foreign clothing firm
was established.
Over the past decade, FDI in Costa Rica has risen
steadily and substantially, turning that country into one of
the primary beneficiaries of the Caribbean Basin Initiative
(CBI) in terms of FDI flows. Most of these flows go to the
manufacturing sector; in fact, between 1995 and 2002,
this sector absorbed 65% of the total. In 1997 the tourism
sector began to attract a significant amount of FDI,
accounting for 12% of such investment between 1995 and
2002. Most manufacturing investment focuses on the free
zones, specifically in the electronics, textile and clothing,
metallurgical, medical products, agro-industry and
jewellery sectors, which offer skilled human resources and
free-zone incentives. The United States is the leading direct
investor in Costa Rica, followed by Mexico; between 1995
and 2001, these two countries accounted for 66% and 10%,
respectively, of Costa Rica’s total FDI, although in 2002
the European Union countries supplied 37%, while the
United States share fell to 38%. Foreign investment flows
have had an evident effect on the structure of Costa Rican
exports, since they have facilitated diversification into a
wide range of industrial products, including high-
technology products, mainly for the United States market.
In the Caribbean countries, FDI shrank by an
estimated 12%. Most net inflows of FDI in the Caribbean
(excluding financial centres) are concentrated in Jamaica,
the Dominican Republic and Trinidad and Tobago. This
trend has become more pronounced over time: while these
three countries received 67% of net inflows between 1990
and 1994, the percentage rose to 74% between 1995 and
1999 and to 88% between 1999 and 2002 (see table I.2).
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FDI in the Dominican Republic has been channelled
primarily into the industrial free zones, in response to
tax incentives and low-cost labour; the electricity sector,
especially since the privatization, in 1999, of a number
of generators and distributors; tourism; and
telecommunications. In the industrial free zones, the
leading sector is clothing; among the Caribbean and
Central American countries, the Dominican Republic
ranks first in terms of the volume of  clothing exports to
the United States market.
In Trinidad and Tobago, the hydrocarbon sector has
been the major focus of FDI ever since the authorities
decided to provide incentives for natural gas exploration
and production by private companies. The latter started
making sizeable investments in the mid-1990s and
discovered large natural gas reserves, which spurred
investments in related activities (gas liquefaction plants,
petrochemicals, thermoelectric power plants, etc.) (see
ECLAC, 2002).
Jamaica has received copious amounts of FDI in the
service sector. The 2001 privatization of the electricity
and energy firm Jamaica Public Service Company
(JPSCo), purchased by Mirant Corporation of the United
States, increased the flow of FDI to the electricity sector.
The liberalization of telecommunications, which
culminated in March 2003 with the abolition of the
monopoly previously held by the United Kingdom firm
Cable & Wireless in the long-distance segment, has
opened up new opportunities in this sector which have
recently attracted a number of foreign firms interested
in the mobile telephone market. Other foreign companies
have positioned themselves as Internet service providers
and have installed call centres. In addition, the
restructuring of the financial system beginning in 1997
led to the purchase, in 2001, of Union Bank9 by RTTB
International –Trinidad and Tobago’s largest bank– and
to the privatization, in March 2002, of National
Commercial Bank Jamaica Limited, which was
purchased by Advantage Investment Counsel Limited
(AIC), a Canadian investment firm.10 The tourism sector,
which had traditionally been run by local businesses, has
become one of Jamaica’s biggest absorbers of FDI in
recent years, largely as a result of generous government
incentives. Considerable incentives have also been
applied in other areas, such as textiles, agriculture and
mining (bauxite and aluminium), and have attracted more
FDI in these sectors.
Investment in Caribbean financial centres was also
sharply down in 2002 (to US$ 11 billion, compared to
US$ 15 billion in 2001). Noteworthy in this connection is
the initiative launched by the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD),11 urging the
countries where these financial centres are located to
intensify cooperation on tax matters, restrict distortionary
practices and make the tax treatment of capital flows more
transparent, thereby enhancing competition in the global
financial market. To date, the vast majority of financial
centres, both in the Caribbean and elsewhere in the world,
have been actively implementing this initiative to eliminate
harmful tax practices –as explicitly defined in the
initiative– by April 2003.
Some Central American and Caribbean
governments are taking special steps to counter the
reduction in FDI flows. Guatemala, for example, is
implementing a wide-ranging privatization policy, while
Costa Rica is trying to boost FDI by developing high-
technology and infrastructure industries. El Salvador
is attempting to position itself better in sectors such as
agriculture, call centres, electronics and apparel. To this
end, for the past two years a new agency, the Investment
Promotion Office (PROESA), has been promoting the
development of new areas of investment, which has
resulted in the installation of 58 new firms, creating
20,000 direct jobs. Puerto Rico, meanwhile, is
implementing a strategy with similar objectives,
involving an investment programme that includes tax
concessions.
To summarize, the Central American and Caribbean
countries (except Costa Rica) saw FDI flows slacken,
especially in the clothing manufacture and tourism
sectors. A number of governments have adopted special
measures to reverse this trend (including policies on
privatization, infrastructure development and new
industries), while others have sought to better position
themselves in the integrated international systems of
TNCs.
(b) FDI in South America
Although the unfavourable international situation
aggravated the recessionary climate that had prevailed
in South America since the Asian crisis, it was the political
and economic upheaval in Argentina that most strongly
influenced FDI in this subregion. The deteriorating
situation in that country in 2002 had major repercussions
9 Union Bank was the result of a merger among five commercial banks, four merchant banks and four finance companies under the restructuring
process in the banking system.
10 AIC paid US$ 134 million for the State’s 75% stake; the remaining 25% is owned by small-scale shareholders (Bloomberg).
11 See OECD (1998).
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on the other members and associate members of the
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR). To varying
degrees, these countries suffered from sharp contractions
in the volume of trade (particularly Brazil, Uruguay and
Chile), exchange-rate volatility, heightened country risk
and a sharp reduction in migrant remittances (which
strongly affected Bolivia and Paraguay).
The recessionary climate, compounded by monetary
and exchange-rate instability, made investors more
cautious. This was felt especially among foreign firms
that had invested to gain access to national or subregional
markets –the hardest hit being those with little or no
chance of refocusing their activities on extraregional
exports.
At the same time, the international economic
situation was further disrupted by the protectionist
policies emerging in the United States, which led to the
imposition of new import restrictions in 2002.12 On the
other hand, the South American countries negotiated new
trade agreements aimed at opening up alternative outlets
for their exports. In 2002 Chile signed a free trade
agreement with the European Union,13 and in December
signed a similar accord with the United States. Brazil
also negotiated a separate agreement with the United
States on trade in textiles, and signed an agreement with
Mexico covering the automotive sector.
Privatizations, which fuelled much of the FDI flow
to South America throughout the 1990s, are now facing
increasingly hardened and sometimes violent political
resistance. This has made it difficult to divest the few
assets still owned by the State (in Bolivia, Ecuador,
Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay).
In sharp contrast to this generally negative FDI growth
panorama, investment flows to the Andean Community
countries were relatively stable except in Venezuela (see
table I.3), largely reflecting the keen interest shown in their
oil and gas reserves by the corresponding TNCs, as detailed
in chapter II of this report.
Table I.3
SOUTH AMERICA: NET INWARD FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, 1990-2002 a
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
1990-1994 b 1995-1999 b 1999 2000 2001 2002 c Variation
 2002/2001 (%)
Argentina 3 027 10 599 23 988 11 657 3 214 1 003 -69
Bolivia 85 711 1 010 725 662 612 -7
Brazil 1 703 19 240 28 576 32 779 22 636 16 566 -27
Chile 1 207 5 402 8 988 3 639 4 476 1 603 -64
Colombia 818 2 788 1 468 2 280 2 328 1 950 -16
Ecuador 303 639 648 720 1 330 1 335 0
Paraguay 99 185 94 119 79 80 1
Peru 801 2 350 1 939 662 1 064 1 943 83
Uruguay 78 164 235 274 318 168 -47
Venezuela 836 3 298 3 290 4 465 3 448 1 389 -59
Total 8 956 45 375 70 236 57 320 39 555 26 649 -33
Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, Division of Production, Productivity and
Management, on the basis of figures from balance-of-payments statistics published by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and national agencies in each country. The figures for 2002 are estimates based on information from the countries’
central banks. The figures presented are updated annually according to government authorities’ revisions of their statistics.
They differ from the figures given in the Preliminary overview of the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2002,
published by ECLAC, since in the latter net FDI inflows are taken to be investment in the reporting economy minus direct
investment abroad by its residents.
a Net inflows of direct investment in the reporting economy minus capital taken out of the country by the same foreign firms.
b Annual average.
c Estimates.
12 These include an increase in United States agricultural subsidies, higher tariffs on imported steel and threats of non-renewal of trade
agreements with countries of the region involved in disputes with United States TNCs (see the description of Ecuador’s case in chapter II),
among other measures.
13 This agreement has not yet been ratified by the respective legislatures of the 15 countries members of the European Union.
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Brazil continued to receive large FDI inflows in 2002,
which confirmed its position as the region’s leading
recipient. These flows remained strong despite fears of
possible contagion from the crisis in Argentina –Brazil’s
main trading partner in MERCOSUR– and despite the
uncertainty surrounding the elections, which in October
confirmed the Workers’ Party candidate as the nation’s
new president. An estimated US$ 16 billion entered the
country in 2002; although this figure was down by 27%
from the previous year, an appreciable proportion
corresponded to greenfield investments, as can be inferred
from the fact that there were few privatizations, mergers
and acquisitions.
While Brazil continues to be viewed by foreign
investors as a country with great business potential,
willingness to invest in it over the next few years will
depend on a revival of the domestic and MERCOSUR
markets and on the country’s management of its
domestic and external debt, stabilization of monetary
variables and enforcement of clear rules of the game
for FDI.
The pattern of sectoral flows in the first nine months
of 2002 (see table I.4) confirms the persistence of a break
in the trend prevailing until 2000, whereby FDI flows
were concentrated in the service sector. Thus, having
accounted for 81% of the total in 2000, direct investment
in services represented only 59% in January-September
2002 –similar to the figure for 2001. The manufacturing
sector, meanwhile, continued to expand its share of FDI,
accounting for 37% of total flows.
Table I.4
BRAZIL: SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, 1996-2002
(Percentages)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 a
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Primary sector 1.4 3.0 0.6 1.5 2.2 7.1 2.9
   Petroleum extraction 0.6 0.1 0.1 1.1 1.6 6.5 2.2
   Other 0.8 2.9 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7
Manufacturing sector 22.7 13.3 11.9 25.4 17.0 33.3 37.2
   Food and beverages 2.4 2.1 0.6 4.5 3.3 2.7 11.3
   Automobiles 3.7 1.5 4.6 6.6 3.2 7.4 10.6
   Chemicals 2.9 2.4 1.5 4.6 3.7 7.3 7.8
   Machinery and equipment 2.3 1.3 0.8 0.3 1.9 1.6 1.5
   Electronic and communications equipment 0.8 1.2 1.1 1.9 2.2 5.5 0.5
   Other 10.5 4.8 3.4 7.4 2.7 8.7 5.5
Service sector 75.9 83.7 87.5 73.1 80.8 59.6 59.9
    Postal and telecommunication services 8.0 5.4 11.0 28.3 36.5 19.6 25.6
    Electricity, gas and water 21.2 23.2 9.5 10.8 9.9 6.9 9.2
    Commerce 8.2 6.2 9.4 10.6 5.5 7.8 8.3
    Financial intermediation 5.0 10.4 25.4 8.0 21.4 10.1 6.4
    Business services 26.3 34.9 26.7 12.1 2.7 3.3 4.1
    Other services 7.2 3.5 5.4 3.3 4.8 12.0 6.3
Source: Central Bank of Brazil.
a
 For the period January-September 2002.
14 According to data from the Central Bank of Brazil, these flows amounted to US$ 961 million in 2000, US$ 1.55 billion in 2001 and
US$ 1.568 billion between January and September 2002.
15 See Secretaria de Comércio Exterior, Balança comercial (trade balance figures published by Brazil’s Ministry of External Trade), September 2002.
Within the manufacturing sector, the automotive
industry has been absorbing increasing volumes of
investment in recent years.14 This seems to be related to
automotive firms’ new strategy of exporting to countries
outside the subregion, similar to other industrial
segments, especially agro-industry. In the past year,
currency devaluation has enabled export firms to lower
their wage costs and raise profit margins, thereby
providing an additional incentive for their export
orientation. In some cases it proved necessary to expand
productive capacity to satisfy demand from new markets
(see the discussion of corporate strategies in section B
of this chapter). An analysis of target markets for
Brazilian exports in 2002 confirms that this new strategy
is in operation: in January-September,15 exports to
MERCOSUR countries plummeted by 54%, while those
to Mexico increased sharply (26%), as did those to other
countries within and outside the region.
The major expansion in Brazil’s exports to Mexico
represents a trend that is likely to be strengthened by the
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bilateral agreement signed between the two countries in
2002. A key element of the negotiations was the
agreement reached on the automotive sector, under which
Brazil will be able to export to Mexico to meet demand
in that market for vehicles and parts in the popular
consumption segment (small engines).
The drop in the proportion of FDI in the service
sector is the result of several factors. Firstly, there is
the effect of the devaluation of the real on interest
payments by public utility firms that have large debts
in dollars; this raises costs in relation to their income in
local currency. Secondly, the financial difficulties facing
firms were aggravated by crises in their parent
companies, which engendered an unfavourable climate
for investment. Thirdly, foreign operators have been
16 The aim of PPT was to convince private operators to build 49 thermal generators, 44 of which would be gas-fired; the programme guaranteed
that gas would be supplied at subsidized prices. In view of the disappointing response by private-sector investors, inter-ministerial resolution
PPT 176, adopted in June 2001, set a guaranteed price for gas and granted exchange insurance for PPT projects that used Bolivian gas and
that came on stream by 30 June 2003 (see Oil & Gas Journal Latinoamérica, 2002).
dissatisfied with regulation in the electricity sector; this,
together with the firms’ financial problems, has led
several of them to divest all or part of their assets in the
subregion (see section B of this chapter). Nonetheless,
FDI was more buoyant in the generating segment than
in the electricity sector as a whole, thanks to incentives
granted in February 2000 under the Priority Programme
on Thermoelectric Power (PPT) and strengthened in
June 2001 by inter-ministerial resolution PPT 176.16
Lastly, in the financial sector, the problems international
banks face in competing with the local banking system
have discouraged foreign investment in this sector, to
the point where the leading local banks are now actually
acquiring assets from their international competitors
(see box I.1).
Box I.1
BRAZIL: LOCAL BANKS LEAD THE WAY IN BANK CONSOLIDATION
In sharp contrast to the trend in the
rest of the region, local banks in Brazil
are leading the consolidation process
in the banking sector. Although
numerous acquisitions have been
made in this sector in the past two
years, foreign banks, which had been
very active in this regard five years
earlier, have been conspicuously
absent from this latest campaign.
Some of them have even featured
among the sellers.
The implementation of the Real
Plan, which defeated hyperinflation and
succeeded in stabilizing the economy
for a while, was followed by a period of
consolidation in the banking sector.
Several foreign players, such as the
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation (HSBC) of the United
Kingdom, ABN-AMRO Bank of the
Netherlands and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya
Argentaria (BBVA) of Spain, had made
a number of acquisitions, and it was
expected that the privatization of
Banco do Estado de São Paulo
(BANESPA), which was taken over in
late 2000 by Spain’s Banco Santander
Central Hispano (SCH) for US$ 3.6
billion, would usher in a new era of
foreign domination of Brazilian banks.
Nonetheless, probably owing to
financial instability, foreign banks have
not made major acquisitions in Brazil in
the last two years. By contrast, local
institutions, especially retail consumer
banks, have snapped up several recent
opportunities.
Two local banks, Banco Brasileiro
de Desconto S.A. (BRADESCO) and
Banco Itaú, have embarked upon a
race to acquire financial assets in
Brazil, at times even buying out their
foreign competitors. Among such
purchases, early in the year
BRADESCO paid US$ 570 million for
Banco Mercantil de São Paulo, in
which Citibank had also shown
interest, and US$ 434 million for the
automobile loan business belonging to
Ford Motor Company in Brazil. It also
acquired Investimentos DTVM, the
local subsidiary of Deutsche Bank,
which handles about US$ 1.1 billion in
investment funds and portfolio
management. Lastly, in late January
2002, it made a successful US$ 76-
million bid in the auction of Banco do
Estado do Amazonas (BEA).
The main rival of BRADESCO,
Banco Itaú, is also pursuing an active
acquisitions policy. Having already
acquired Banco do Estado de Minas
Gerais (BEMGE) in 1998, in late 2000
it was awarded the privatization of
Banco do Estado do Paraná
(BANESTADO) for US$ 869 million,
fending off competition from two foreign
banks: SCH and ABN-AMRO Bank. In
December 2001 its US$ 274-million bid
won the battle for Banco do Estado de
Goias (BEG), in which BRADESCO
was also interested. In May 2002 it
took over the private banking portfolio
of the Brazilian subsidiary of  Brascan,
a Canadian conglomerate. Lastly, in
November 2002, it paid US$ 922 million
for a 97.75% stake in the investment
bank BBA Creditanstalt, which included
a 47.79% holding owned by Germany’s
HVB Group. This acquisition made Itaú
Brazil’s largest investment bank.
These two rivals, BRADESCO and
Itaú, are also pursuing other
privatizations and have qualified to bid
for Banco do Estado do Ceará (BEC)
and Banco do Estado do Maranhão
(BEM). In addition, Banco Itaú has
expressed interest in the privatization of
Banco do Estado de Santa Catarina
(BESC) and BESC S.A. Crédito
Imobiliário (BESCRI). It also recently
announced its desire to acquire banking
assets in Argentina.
As a result of this lengthy
consolidation process, the total number
of banks operating in Brazil has shrunk
from 240 in 1994 to under 170 today.
Consolidation is also taking place in the
related businesses of asset
management and consumer credit. For
example, Deutsche Bank sold its 49.9%
stake in its recently launched personal
finance business, MaxBlue, to Banco do
Brasil. UBS Warburg of Switzerland sold
its asset management portfolio to BNP
Paribas of France, and Lloyds TSB of
the United Kingdom sold its Brazilian
asset management business to Itaú.
All these acquisitions were driven by
the importance of scale in the banks’
strategies and by the defensive tactics
they have had to adopt (see chapter III
of this report).
Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, Division of Production, Productivity and Management.
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Lastly, FDI in Brazil’s primary sector continues to be
dominated by oil extraction, which had been partially opened
up to foreign capital in 1999. Flows to this sector usually
relate to fees for exploration, development or production
concessions in petroleum areas auctioned by the National
Petroleum Agency (ANP); in addition, some flows represent
investment commitments agreed upon with ANP. The
reduction in direct investment flows in 2002 compared to the
previous year’s level does not signal a slowdown in activity
by foreign firms in the sector, but reflects the exceptionally
large amount of FDI received in 2001. A sizeable proportion
of that year’s FDI figure was related to the purchase of assets
belonging to Petróleo Brasileiro (Petrobras) by Repsol-YPF
of Spain, as part of an asset swap whereby the latter ceded
assets it held in Argentina in exchange for Petrobras assets in
Brazil (see ECLAC, 2002).
In Argentina, FDI inflows shrank for the third
straight year, dropping to US$ 1 billion, which is below
the average for 1990-1995. This trend is closely related
to the acute economic and political crisis the country
has endured for the past few years. The deepening
recession, which began in 1999 and culminated in 2001-
2002 with financial crisis and the end of the convertibility
regime, has radically altered the parameters on which
the FDI boom was based in the 1990s.
Insurance against exchange-rate risk –which is what
the convertibility regime essentially represented–
disappeared when the peso was devalued (by about 70%)
and a floating exchange rate was adopted. In response to
the economic emergency, privatized public utility charges,
which previously had been dollarized and indexed to
inflation in the United States, were frozen in local currency
terms. Total banking freedom was abruptly ended as tight
restrictions were placed on deposit withdrawal. The Central
Bank banned the payment of dividends abroad and
required exporters to convert their foreign-exchange
earnings in Argentina.17 Lastly, exports, which previously
were not taxed, are now subject to a levy to offset the
windfall benefit they have received from the change in
relative prices caused by devaluation. This measure was
also adopted to prevent supply shortages on the domestic
market. On top of all this, the size of the domestic market
shrank substantially, directly affecting firms’ sales.
This panorama, which differed radically from the
one prevailing in the 1990s, had repercussions on the
activities and strategies of foreign firms operating in the
country. Of these, the worst hit by the crisis were firms
serving the domestic market, such as financial and non-
financial services; those that had expanded in Argentina
during the 1990s largely on the back of foreign-currency
borrowing (such as Repsol-YPF);18 and a number of public
utility firms. As a result of the crisis, five foreign-bank
branches, out of a total of 12, were taken over or brought
under the control of local private or State banks,19 while
several privatized public utility firms are no longer receiving
support from their respective parent companies and have
declared a suspension of payments (see table I.5).
This situation highlights the shortcomings of
regulatory bodies and risk-rating firms that failed to
perceive the fragility of an expansion financed almost
exclusively by borrowing. They mistakenly believed that
the prestige and reputation of parent companies offered
sufficient guarantees. For example, in January 2001,
when the deterioration in Argentina’s economic situation
was already evident, Standard & Poor’s rated an
unguaranteed syndicated loan of US$ 108 million for the
firm Aguas Argentinas as risk-free for investment. In
April 2002, however, the firm suspended payments and
the loan was downgraded to the worst risk category
(default grade “D”). The total external debt of
corporations operating in Argentina is currently estimated
at US$ 45 billion, half of which is owed by foreign firms
(see The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002c).
Foreign firms that produce tradable goods and are
not shackled by a high level of borrowing have been better
able to withstand the crisis. Such firms do not have to deal
with the expiry of onerous foreign-currency liabilities, and
some of them have the option of redirecting their sales to
external markets, taking advantage of the changed structure
of relative prices produced by the devaluation (see section
B of this chapter).
The policy of indiscriminate liberalization applied
until 2002, which was accompanied by strong incentives
that enabled foreign firms to earn attractive profits,
proved to be unsustainable in the long term. Curiously
enough, the foreign firms that today are either suspending
payments, closing subsidiaries or facing financial
difficulties operate in the very sectors that sent the most
income abroad in the 1990s: privatized public utilities
and petroleum (see table I.6).
17 In the case of oil companies, this requirement applies to only 30% of their exports.
18 For details on the problems experienced by Repsol-YPF since the Argentine devaluation, see ECLAC, 2002.
19 Scotiabank Quilmes, a subsidiary of Canada’s Bank of Nova Scotia, was closed down for 20 weeks until September 2002, when its branches were
divided between two local banks: Bansud-Macro and Banco Comafi. France’s Crédit Agricole owned three banks in Argentina (Banco Bisel,
Banco Suquía and Banco de Entre Ríos (BERSA)), which were taken over by the State-owned Banco de la Nación Argentina (BNA). Lastly, in
October 2002 an agreement was reached for Argentina’s Banco Patagonia to take control of Banco Sudameris Argentina S.A., a subsidiary of the
Italian group Intesa BCI. Patagonia’s Argentine shareholders will hold 80% of the equity, with Intesa BCI retaining the remaining 20%. In
contrast to the other two cases, in this case the Italian bank did not totally abandon the business, but remained as a minority partner.
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Table I.6
INCOME SENT ABROAD BY FOREIGN FIRMS IN ARGENTINA, BY SECTOR, 1992-2001
(Millions of dollars)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 1992-2001
Petroleum 385 326 465 445 479 376 306 999 2 093 1 164 7 039
Mining -1 -10 -3 -4 -12 -8 -27 18 31 13 -2
Manufacturing 458 616 820 507 522 903 595 -175 -156 -358 3 734
  Agro-food 239 213 272 315 129 290 275 365 229 61 2 387
  Automotive 116 173 253 -166 -40 -37 -189 -467 -496 -388 -1 241
  Chemicals, rubber and plastic 136 257 288 330 399 399 295 -56 -14 -41 1 993
  Other -33 -26 8 28 34 251 214 -17 125 10 595
Non-financial services 223 461 699 830 696 840 1 068 656 322 206 6 002
  Electricity, gas and water -13 200 297 423 377 500 579 546 570 304 3 784
  Commerce 108 107 234 140 105 58 170 37 -76 -87 796
  Transport and communications 128 154 168 267 214 282 320 73 -172 -11 1 422
Banks 71 204 -150 164 52 122 229 135 208 242 1 277
Other 60 127 99 25 113 137 209 24 -92 260 959
Total 1 196 1 724 1 930 1 967 1 851 2 369 2 380 1 658 2 406 1 527 19 009
Source: International Accounts Office, Argentine Ministry of Economic Affairs and Public Works and Services.
Table I.5
ARGENTINA: FOREIGN PUBLIC UTILITY FIRMS THAT DECLARED SUSPENSIONS OF PAYMENTS IN 2002
Firm Sector Foreign investor Country of origin Ownership
share %
Aguas Argentinas Sanitation Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux France 39.9
Aguas de Barcelona Spain 25.0
Vivendi France 7.5
Anglian Water United Kingdom 4.3
Autopistas del Sol Highway infrastructure Áurea Spain 45.0
Impregilo Iglys Italy 18.3
Dragados Dycasa Spain 6.5
CIESA a Gas transportation Enron United States 50.0
EASA b Electric power EDF Internacional France 100.0
IEBA c Electric power United Utilities United Kingdom 45.0
IMPSAT d Telecommunications Morgan Stanley United States 16.0
British Telecom United Kingdom 20.0
Crédit Suisse Switzerland 1.0
Metrogas Gas distribution BG Group United Kingdom 38.3
Repsol –YPF Spain 31.7
Telecom Argentina Telecommunications Telecom Italia Italy 27.4
France Telecom France 27.4
TGN Gas transportation TotalFinaElf France 19.2
CMS Energy United States 12.9
Petronas United Kingdom 12.9
Transener S.A. Electric power National Grid United Kingdom 27.6
Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, Division of Production, Productivity and Management, on the
basis of information published in the specialized press.
a
 CIESA: Compañía de Inversiones de Energía, 70% owner of Transportadora Gas del Sur (TGS).
b
 EASA: Empresa Electricidad Argentina S.A., 51% owner of Electricidad del Norte (Edenor).
c
 IEBA: Inversora Eléctrica de Buenos Aires.
d
 IMPSAT ceded its shares to suppliers.
Of all the South American countries, Chile has
shown the greatest macroeconomic stability. Despite the
small size of its market, it was one of the largest recipients
of foreign investment in the 1990s. In 2002, however,
investment flows plummeted to US$ 1.603 billion, which
was 64% lower than the 2001 figure.
 The main beneficiary sectors continue to be mining;
electricity, gas and water; and financial services.
According to official data for the first half of 2002, the
United States has regained its status as the main source
of investments, accounting for 30% of the total, after
several years of dominance by Spanish investors.
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In one of the few acquisitions carried out in 2002, Banco
Santander Central Hispano (SCH) paid US$ 680 million to
the Central Bank for a 35.4% holding in Banco Santiago.
With this acquisition, SCH increased its total stake to 80%
and began the process of merging the two banks. This
merger, which exemplifies the Spanish banks’ aggressive
policy of penetration in Latin America, created the biggest
financial institution in Chile (see chapter III of this report).
Another major operation was the takeover of
Compañía Minera Disputada de Las Condes S.A., owned
by ExxonMobil of the United States. This mining company
was acquired by Anglo American of South Africa for about
US$ 1.3 billion,20 in a move that significantly increased
the scale of Anglo American’s operations in Chile –it
already owned the Mantos Blancos and Moly-Cop Chile
mines, and had a 44% interest in María Inés de Collahuasi.
This operation revived a perennial debate in Chile
concerning the role of TNCs and the relevant regulatory
frameworks in the non-renewable natural resource sector.
This was because ExxonMobil, in all the years it was
running the mine, never declared an accounting profit
and thus did not pay the corresponding taxes. Under the
Chilean tax system, mining companies, like firms in other
economic sectors, only pay tax on their accounting
profits. This enables them to extract mineral resources
and pay dividends abroad without any tax liability until
they fully amortize all the capital invested (see
Moguillansky, 1999, and Moussa, 2001).
Given the general slackness of FDI flows, the
authorities have attempted to distance Chile’s image from
that of its crisis-stricken neighbours and to shore up the
country’s ability to attract foreign capital. The measures
deployed to achieve this include a programme to attract
high-technology investments (see ECLAC, 2002, chapter
I), progress in the promulgation of laws on public share
offerings, the removal of obstacles to capital entry and
the promotion of Chile abroad.
The authorities hope that these policies, in
conjunction with the free trade agreements signed in 2002
with the United States (after more than 10 years of
negotiations), the European Union and the Republic of
Korea, along with other bilateral agreements already in
force, will give significant impetus to the materialization
of greenfield investment in Chile. In January 2003 the
government launched a campaign headed by the Foreign
Investment Committee and the Production Development
Corporation (CORFO) to promote a programme known
as “Chile: A platform for new markets”, aimed at
encouraging TNCs to choose Chile as the hub for their
operations in the region. For this purpose, it suggests
that TNCs could share services, call centres, technical
and administrative support facilities and software
development, among other activities. Under this same
policy, in November 2002 the Chamber of Deputies
passed a tax bill granting exemption from income tax to
foreign-owned firms that invest from Chile in other
countries. Among other aims, the new tax regulations
are intended to eliminate double taxation on TNCs that
choose Chile as a platform for regional investment.
In contrast to the pattern prevailing in the rest of the
region, FDI in the Andean Community countries either fell
much more slightly, remained stable or even grew,21 except
in Venezuela, where FDI flows plummeted by 59% between
2001 and 2002. In Colombia, investments dropped by 16%
compared to the previous year’s level (which was half the
average decline in South America); inflows slipped by 7%
in Bolivia, held steady in Ecuador and jumped by 83% in
Peru. This performance is mainly attributable to large-scale
projects undertaken in the hydrocarbon sector, reflecting
the interest shown by transnational oil companies in those
countries’ extensive hydrocarbon reserves. In the case of
Peru, the sharp increase in FDI flows also reflects the
purchase of the Backus brewery by Bavaria of Colombia
and the Cisneros group of Venezuela (see annex table A.I.1
and chapter II).
To summarize, considering the region as a whole, in
2002 FDI continued on the downward trend it had begun
in 1999, only this time the decline was steeper. Investment
levels fell particularly sharply in Mexico, Central America
and the Caribbean. In Mexico, the extent of the fall largely
reflects an exceptionally high inflow in 2001 related to
the BANAMEX takeover by Citigroup. The slump in
manufacturing investment as a result of the cyclical
downturn in maquila production was offset by new
acquisitions in the financial sector. Meanwhile, financial
centres continued to receive flows of transitory investment,
albeit in smaller amounts, in line with the depressed level
of transactions in the region. In South America, investment
flows dwindled in response to the Argentine crisis and its
repercussions throughout MERCOSUR, but this was partly
offset by investments in the hydrocarbons industry
(especially in Andean Community countries), since the
behaviour of this sector tends to be independent of the
specific situation in Latin America at any given time.
20 Since this was a transaction between foreign shareholders, it does not affect net FDI inflows.
21 See chapter II of this report.
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B. FDI STRATEGIES, AGENTS AND MODALITIES
1. TNC strategies in Latin America
As described in previous reports, TNCs deployed three
clearly distinguishable strategies in Latin America in
the 1990s (see box I.2). Firstly, United States
corporations (which account for the majority of TNCs),
along with Japanese and European enterprises, pursued
an efficiency-seeking strategy in Mexico, Central
America and the Caribbean by taking advantage of
lower labour costs and the modernization of processes
for assembling a variety of goods (automobiles,
electrical and electronic products, clothing) for sale in
the Canadian and United States markets. As discussed
below, in 2002 these firms were hit particularly hard
by the slump in United States demand, and this has
discouraged the investment process, albeit perhaps only
temporarily. As a result, FDI aimed at assembly
manufacture has faltered. In addition, TNCs in South
America have maintained their traditional strategy of
seeking raw materials and markets. Radically changed
circumstances in the subregion compared to those
prevailing in the 1990s, and the absence of the factors
that fuelled investment during that period
(privatizations, confidence in the favourable impact of
economic reforms and high growth expectations),
confronted firms with new structural conditions and
forced them to rethink their investment strategies. As a
result, 2002 saw the confirmation of a process that had
begun the preceding year,  with FDI becoming
increasingly oriented towards manufacturing for export
outside the region, as a defence mechanism in response
to a depressed domestic market.
Box I.2
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: STRATEGIES OF TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS IN THE 1990s
Corporate strategy
Efficiency-seeking Raw materials-seeking Market access-seekingSector (national or subregional)
Primary Oil/gas: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Trinidad
and Tobago and Venezuela
Minerals: Argentina, Chile and Peru
Manufacturing Automotive industry: Mexico Automotive industry: Argentina and Brazil
Electronics: Mexico, Central Agro-industry: Argentina, Brazil and
America and Caribbean countries Mexico
Apparel: Central America and Chemicals: Brazil
Caribbean countries, Mexico
Services Financial: Argentina, Brazil,  Chile, Colombia,
Mexico, Peru and Venezuela
Telecommunications: Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and
Venezuela
Electric power: Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia and Central American countries
Natural gas distribution: Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia and Mexico
Retail trade: Argentina, Brazil, Chile and
Mexico
Source: ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, Division of Production, Productivity and Management.
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(a) Efficiency-seeking firms targeting Mexico,
Central America and the Caribbean
In Mexico, TNCs were badly hurt by the slump in
demand from the United States (the main destination for
Mexican exports), and also by the loss of international
competitiveness caused by the revaluation of the local
currency. The effect of these factors varied between
sectors, with segments that use relatively low levels of
technology and labour skills suffering the most. These
included firms making footwear, textiles and clothing,
furniture, and certain electrical and electronic products.
In response to this situation, many firms cut hours and
laid off a large proportion of their workforce, although
in some product categories there were a significant
number of business closures (see figure I.5).
Figure I.5
MEXICO: REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS AND WORKERS EMPLOYED
IN MAQUILA EXPORT ACTIVITIES,  JANUARY 2001-OCTOBER 2002
(Percentages)
22 See INEGI (www.inegi.gob.mx/difusion/).
Source: ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, on the basis of
National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics (INEGI)
(www.inegi.gob.mx/difusion/).
Figure I.5 highlights the scale of job losses in the
electronics sector compared to the relatively small
number of businesses that actually closed down. In this
sector there is a clear distinction between enterprises that
assemble technologically more complex products and
those that manufacture inputs or simpler articles using
low-skilled labour. In the first group, the proportion of
establishments that closed was 6.6% and there was no
overall reduction in employment, which means that some
firms pressed ahead with their expansion policy by
absorbing laid-off workers. In the second group, the
number of establishments shrank by 11% and
employment, by 33%.22
Firms in the electronics sector that were forced to
shut down operations in Mexico include Canon (Japan),
which moved its Tijuana printer plant to Thailand and
Viet Nam, and Philips Electronic N.V. (Netherlands),
which in June 2002 announced that it was phasing out
its production in Mexico over a three-month period and
moving those activities to China. Several other firms
followed in their footsteps, including Alps Electronic,
which laid off 1,700 workers; Casio Computer, which
laid off 700; and Sanyo, which laid off 320 (for further
details see The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002g;
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Nonetheless, the comparative advantage of strategic
proximity to the United States market continues to entice
TNCs that make mid-level- and high-technology final
products. Some of these firms adopted the tactic of cutting
back production while they waited for the United States
economy to recover –examples include Ford Motor,
Scientific-Atlanta and Hewlett Packard (see The
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002f and 2002g). In the
automotive segment, several firms announced new
investment projects, including DaimlerChrysler and
Toyota (automobiles) and Michelin and Firestone
(tyres).23 Even Ford Motor, which had announced a 17%
cut in its production in Mexico in 2002,24 is planning
investments of US$ 1.8 billion to expand operations at
its pressing and assembly plant located in the State of
Sonora (El Universal, 2002d).
The automotive industry in Mexico staged a recovery
in 2002, as growing domestic demand took up the slack
from weaker exports. Between January and October, the
production of automobiles for the domestic market grew
by a cumulative 11% compared to the same period of
2001, while production for export fell by 5.3%. This
resulted in a 0.4% variation in output overall (AMIA,
2002).
If this trend is confirmed, it will represent a change
in the structure of Mexican exports, with labour-intensive
product lines declining and those that make more
intensive use of technology and human capital increasing.
The Central American countries likewise
experienced a downturn in flows to the export
manufacturing sector, but there were also greenfield
investments in some sectors, including the opening of a
subsidiary of the United States-based Merrimac
Industries in Costa Rica. This firm designs and
manufactures components and assemblies for third-
generation wireless telecommunications, which are used
in the aerospace and defence industries and for
commercial applications. In El Salvador, a new
transnational clothing manufacturer, Trims International,
is about to set up operations in the Santa Tecla Free Zone,
with the aim of making clothing under the full-package
modality.25
(b) Raw materials-seeking TNCs
As mentioned earlier, in contrast to the downward
trend in investment flows globally, FDI aimed specifically
at raw materials extraction in the region stayed at about
the same level recorded the preceding year. This primarily
reflected investments in the hydrocarbon sector (oil and
natural gas), especially in the Andean Community
countries. There were no major investments in the mining
sector, in contrast to what had happened in 2001, when
development of the Antamina mega-project had been
completed. This copper and zinc mine in Peru involved
a total disbursement of US$ 2.25 billion, making it the
biggest mining investment worldwide between 1998 and
2001.
FDI in extractive activities is usually aimed at
extraregional exports. Natural gas is an exception,
however, since its particular transport conditions allow
for investments aimed at a local market (see ECLAC,
2002). Investments in extractive activities are capital-
intensive and, except in the natural gas segment, have
few linkages with local economies. Accordingly,
domestic conditions in the host country tend to have little
effect on investment decisions.
Moreover, given the strategic nature of
hydrocarbons, TNCs tend to invest even in
circumstances that would normally be considered
hostile to FDI. In Latin America and the Caribbean,
such factors include the dominant position held by the
incumbent State firm, the requirement to act in
partnership with the public sector, the fact that FDI can
only enter marginal fields or exploration zones and the
existence of political instability or armed conflict.
Lastly, the current geopolitical situation in the Persian
Gulf, which is heightening the uncertainty of supply
and pushing up the price of oil, has strengthened TNCs’
interest in investing in other parts of the world with oil
potential.
23 In early 2002 DaimlerChrysler decided to shift production of its PT Cruiser model from Austria to Mexico and to invest some US$ 300
million in the course of the year to expand its plant in Toluca in central Mexico (Gestión, 2002a). Toyota, meanwhile, announced in
September 2002 that it would invest US$ 140 million to install a new assembly line in its Tijuana plant, which would turn out 20,000
Tacoma pick-up trucks a year starting in 2005 (El Universal, 2002c). In April 2002 Michelin announced that it would open a tyre production
plant in central Mexico, which would manufacture some 6,000 tyres a day for the domestic and external markets, with an investment of
US$ 50 million (Gestión, 2002b). Firestone planned to invest US$ 10 million in new technologies and the expansion of its two Mexican
plants in 2002 (América Economía, 2002a).
24 This is equivalent to about 40,000 cars a year.
25 This means that the manufacturer provides the full range of services, from the purchase of inputs to the manufacturing process to the timely
delivery of the finished merchandise.
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FDI in the natural gas sector has remained buoyant,
even though the sector’s closer linkages with local
economies could have represented a liability in this
regard, given the economic difficulties being experienced
by several countries in the region. This is because firms
are eager to cash in on the large reserves discovered in
recent years, mainly in Bolivia, in which they have
already invested considerable sums. Two other favourable
influences should also be noted: firstly, the potential for
developing new markets for natural gas, given that this
hydrocarbon still represents only a small fraction of the
energy mix in the region’s countries, except in Argentina;
and secondly, the equally interesting potential of projects
aimed at exporting liquefied natural gas (LNG) to markets
outside the region.
In 2002 several major investments were undertaken
in the hydrocarbon sector in Andean Community
countries,26 including: (i) projects linked to the export
of Bolivian natural gas to Brazil; Bolivia is also about to
receive a major capital injection for a project to export
LNG to the United States and Mexico (see ECLAC,
2002); (ii) development of the Camisea natural gas
project in Peru;27 (iii) investments in oilfield exploration,
development and exploitation in Ecuador, and in
construction of the heavy crude oil pipeline; (iv)
investments in oilfield exploitation in Colombia, where
production from the Guando field (which was discovered
in 2000 by a consortium led by Petrobras, and is
considered the largest find in Colombia since the Cusiana
and Cupiagua fields)28 came on stream in July 2002; and
(v) investments in oil and gas in Venezuela, where an
agreement to develop the Mariscal Sucre project,29
requiring an outlay of US$ 2.7 billion, was signed in
November 2002. The agreement involves Petróleos de
Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), which is expected to put up
60% of the capital, together with Shell Venezuela S.A.
(10%), Mitsubishi Venezolana C.A. (8%) and several
locally-owned firms (2%).
In addition to projects in the hydrocarbon sector that
are currently under study or being developed in Andean
Community countries, in Mexico transnational oil
companies are jockeying for position in the only segment
that is open to private capital, namely downstream
activities in natural gas. One of the leading investors is
Gas Natural México, a subsidiary of Gas Natural S.D.G.
Other firms have also shown interest in investing in LNG
regasification projects, under which they plan to transport
liquefied gas to terminals along the coast of Baja
California, south of the border with the United States.
Interested firms include Shell Gas & Power, which
intends to build a US$ 500-million regasification plant
in Baja California, and Phillips Petroleum Company,
which is planning a joint venture with El Paso
Corporation of the United States to transport LNG to the
city of Rosarito from gas deposits located under the Timor
Sea. In addition, Marathon Oil Company, in partnership
with the Indonesian State oil company Pertamina, has
announced a plan to build an LNG complex close to
Tijuana. Lastly, CMS Energy Inc. and Sempra Energy
International have plans to transport LNG from Latin
America to a terminal to be located on the outskirts of
Ensenada. In August 2002 Sempra announced its
intention to invest a total of US$ 10 billion in Mexico
over the next five years. In addition to the regasification
terminal, its projects include the construction of gas
pipelines and electric power plants (El Economista,
2002c).
Mexico’s Energy Regulatory Commission is
currently reviewing 18 different LNG proposals. Projects
in this field generally require large-scale investments,
since they entail building port facilities, gas pipelines
and regasification plants to deliver the product in gas
form to consumers (The Wall Street Journal Americas,
2002a).
In Argentina, the crisis has caused major problems
for oil companies that have a large proportion of their
assets in that country and that also have to service the
large foreign-currency debts they used to fund their rapid
expansion in the region in the 1990s. This is true of
Spain’s Repsol-YPF and a number of Argentine
enterprises, including Pérez Companc (PeCom Energía).
Given the serious financial difficulties PeCom Energía
was facing in 2001, an imminent change of ownership
was forecast in last year’s report (ECLAC, 2002). In 2002
the firm was duly taken over by Brazil’s State-owned
Petrobras, making the latter the second-largest oil
company in Argentina. Petrobras is apparently also
interested in acquiring Argentine assets owned by Repsol-
26 See chapter II of this report.
27 The total cost of this project, up until it comes on stream commercially in mid-2004, is estimated at US$ 1.6 billion; subsequent costs are
expected to add another US$ 1 billion to this amount.
28 The Cusiana and Cupiagua fields, which contain large reserves of high-quality crude, were discovered in the early 1990s by a consortium
led by British Petroleum.
29 This is a natural gas production project that includes: (i) development of offshore gas fields located north of the Paria Peninsula; (ii)
processing of the gas in a liquefaction plant to be built onshore; and (iii) export of liquefied gas to Brazil, the eastern seaboard of the
United States and Mexico.
Foreign investment in Latin America and the Caribbean,  2002 39
YPF, the leading player in the sector in that country (see
La Nación, 2002, and Gazeta Mercantil, 2002). Petrobras
currently operates about 600 service stations in Argentina
under the brand name Eg3, acquired as part of an asset
swap with Repsol-YPF in December 2001 (see ECLAC,
2002). It is currently studying a variety of investment
alternatives in Argentina. Its immediate goal is to have
service stations operating under its own banner, for which
it plans to invest US$ 140 million between now and 2004
in the refining and marketing areas.
(c) Market-seeking TNCs
Market-seeking strategies are employed by TNCs
engaged in a wide range of activities, both
manufacturing, where their activities are aimed at local
or regional markets, and services. Transnationals
pursuing this strategy in the manufacturing sector
include firms linked to the automotive sector in
MERCOSUR, which, as discussed in the case of Brazil,
have been restructuring with a view to expanding their
sales beyond the subregion. The same process is taking
place in Argentina, though it is still at a very early stage.
By contrast, in the Latin American brewing industry,
regionally owned firms have been more active than
transnationals in fighting for market position.
Meanwhile, TNCs that invest in public utilities face
adverse conditions both globally and regionally. The
sharp deterioration in the South American currencies’
purchasing power as against foreign currencies,
especially since the Argentine crisis, has significantly
eroded TNCs’ income in the region. This was
compounded by the heavy foreign-currency debts they
had contracted to finance their rapid expansion, together
with the financial woes of their parent companies. The
upshot of these factors was that such firms slashed their
investments in the region. Some have declared a
suspension of payments, as discussed in connection with
Argentina, while others are seeking to sell off their
assets in the region. This section examines the situation
prevailing in the brewing, automotive and service
industries. The situation in the financial sector will be
analysed separately in chapter III of this report, given
its enormous importance for the economy as a whole
and for investment financing in particular.
• The new configuration of the regional brewing
industry
In recent years, the brewing industry has witnessed
a series of aggressive strategic moves by the region’s
largest players. Brewing is one of the most advanced
sectors of manufacturing in terms of market
consolidation, partnerships, acquisitions and the
exploitation of synergies between firms. The factors
underlying this development include trade liberalization
in the various economies and the overall globalization
process. These phenomena, by intensifying competition,
have prompted firms to cut costs, enhance efficiency and
improve distribution channels. The brewing industry has
also forged increasingly close links with the soft drinks
sector, and this has boosted profits by exploiting the
similarity of activities and synergies between firms in
the two segments.
One of the features that distinguish this process from
patterns in other industries is that it basically involves
large regionally owned firms that compete for market
position. Their strategies comprise two phases: one in
which they acquire and/or merge with local firms and
consolidate their hegemony in the home market, and
another in which they expand regionally via strategic
acquisitions in other countries for the purpose of
strengthening positions in those markets and improving
distribution channels.
This has resulted in greater industry concentration
and the formation of large regional brewing groups.
Although the major transnational brewers, such as
Anheuser-Busch, Heineken, Miller Brewing, South
African Breweries, Interbrew and Carlsberg, have not
claimed a leading role in the new industry structure in
the region, they have not been entirely absent, having
purchased blocks of shares in the main brewing groups
or forged partnerships with them.
Reorganization of the sector began in 1999, when
Brahma, the leading Brazilian brewer, merged with its
biggest competitor, Antártica, to consolidate its position
as the Brazilian market leader, with a share of
approximately 80%. The firm that resulted from this
merger (AmBev) has since made moves to expand its
regional presence, including a recent agreement to take
a 37% stake in Quilmes, the main Argentine beer
conglomerate, with interests in Bolivia, Paraguay and
Uruguay. Although AmBev and Quilmes will maintain
separate corporate images, the aim is to establish joint
operational management and to merge fully in 2009.
Nonetheless, the operation has not yet been carried out,
since it has given rise to numerous legal objections filed
by competitors and minority shareholders. With this
operation and the acquisition of a number of smaller firms
in Paraguay and Uruguay, AmBev would become one of
the world’s largest brewers in terms of sales. In addition
to the Brazilian market, it would also gain control of the
Argentine, Bolivian, Paraguayan and Uruguayan
markets, making it the leading brewery group in the
Southern Cone. It should be noted that the headquarters
of the group that controls Quilmes is located in
Luxembourg, so the acquisition is considered officially
as a transaction between foreign firms.
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Other firms had to respond rapidly to this newly
developing industry landscape. The Colombian brewer
Bavaria followed Brahma by consolidating its local
presence before embarking on an active
internationalization process. In 2000 it acquired
Cervecería Leona, its main domestic competitor, and in
2002 it increased its stake in Cervezas Nacionales de
Ecuador by 25% and began to expand into Peru and a
number of Central American countries. In Peru it bought
a 24% interest in Backus, and in Panama it negotiated
the takeover of Cervecería Nacional. As a result of these
operations, Bavaria has become one of the largest brewers
in the region, and it aims to continue expanding its
activities in Central America.
The case of Backus is particularly interesting. This
icon of the Peruvian brewing industry currently competes
with several other companies in the region, having
consolidated its status as market leader in Peru over the
last decade by taking over a number of smaller firms,
including Cervesur in 1999. Its size has made it a strategic
takeover target for several large firms in the region, which
see the chance to form a regional brewing group to
counter the dominant position of AmBev. Consequently,
the Polar and Cisneros groups (which during the 1990s
had consolidated their position as the main competitors
in Venezuela), along  with Colombia’s Bavaria, have set
their sights on the Peruvian firm. Polar, in particular, is
very interested in making Backus the cornerstone of its
internationalization process, and, following a number of
share purchases over the past few years, it now has a
15.6% holding in the company. Bavaria and the Cisneros
group have responded by acquiring stakes of their own.
Although the large transnationals have played a
somewhat secondary role in changing the shape of the
brewing industry, they have also purchased blocks of
shares and have formed alliances with local firms,
particularly in Chile and Mexico. Since these two
countries have not been included in the main strategic
moves by the regional groups, transnational brewing
companies have a stronger presence in them. As a result
of successive acquisitions, Anheuser-Busch now owns
36% of Chile’s Compañía de Cervecerías Unidas
(CCU), which dominates about 85% of the domestic
market. In the 1990s Anheuser-Busch also bought
successive holdings in Mexico’s Modelo group, in
which it now has a 52% stake. This group has not yet
begun to internationalize its activities, its basic strategy
being to develop its already established products and
increase its exports to the United States. Other large
transnationals have also joined the list: Molson of
Canada acquired Kaiser, the second-largest brewer in
Brazil, and Heineken purchased Panama’s Barú,
together with 25% of Costa Rica’s beverage firm Florida
and 100% of Nicaragua’s Consorcio Cervecero
Centroamericano. South African Breweries, meanwhile,
has made several smaller acquisitions in Honduras and
Nicaragua.
In short, the brewery market has been characterized
by a succession of strategic moves, mainly by local
players. The aim of these acquisitions, partnerships and
purchases of ownership stakes is to gain access to new
markets, improve distribution channels and build
defences against possible hostile takeover bids. The
process is leading to greater industry concentration and
the establishment of large regional brewing groups.
Although the key players in this process have been the
leading local firms, TNCs based in Canada, the United
States and Europe have also made several acquisitions.
Thus, the possibility that they may decide to play a more
active role in the future cannot be ruled out.
Table I.7
LATIN AMERICA: MAIN BREWERY GROUPS
(Millions of dollars)
Firm Country Ownership a 2001 sales
Grupo Modelo Mexico Anheuser-Busch (United States, 51%) 3 518
AmBev Brazil Investor group b 2 812
Femsa Cerveza (Cuauhtémoc Moctezuma) Mexico Interbrew (30%) 2 183
Grupo Polar Venezuela Local groups 1 718 c
Quilmes Argentina Grupo Bemberg (Argentina, 30%) 938
Bavaria Colombia Grupo Santo Domingo (80%) 858
Compañía Cervecerías Unidas Chile Anheuser-Busch (United States, 36%) IRSA (Chile, 61.5%) 520
Backus Peru Bavaria (Colombia, 24.5%) Grupo Cisneros 484
(Venezuela, 20%) Grupo Polar (Venezuela, 15.6%)
Cervecería Regional Venezuela Grupo Cisneros (100%) ...
Source: ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies.
a The ownership percentage corresponds to the total holding and may differ from the values shown in table I.8, which reflects only individual purchases.
b AmBev was formed from the merger between the Brazilian brewers Brahma and Antártica.
c
 Sales in 2000.
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Table I.8
LATIN AMERICA: MAIN ACQUISITIONS IN THE BREWERY SECTOR
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Year Firm sold Country Buyer Country of origin of buyer (%) Amount paid
2002 Cervecería Leona a Colombia Bavaria Colombia 55.8 350
2002 Cervecería Nacional Panama Bavaria Colombia 91.5 260
2002 Kaiser Brazil Molson b Canada 100 765
2002 Quilmes a Argentina AmBev Brazil 37.5 346
2002 Backus-Johnston Peru Bavaria Colombia 24.5 420
2002 Backus-Johnston Peru Grupo Cisneros Venezuela 16.0 200
2002 Cervezas Nacionales a Ecuador Bavaria Colombia 25.0 152
2002 Barú/Coca-Cola de Panamá a Panama Heineken/Florida Netherlands/Costa Rica/ 100 -
Ice/Pan American Beverages other
2002 Florida Bebidas S.A. Costa Rica Heineken Netherlands 25.0 230
2002 Kunstmann Chile Compañía Cervecerías Unidas Chile 50.0 -
2001 Backus-Johnston Peru Grupo Polar Venezuela 12.8 110
2001 Cervecería Internacional Paraguay AmBev Brazil 100.0 12
2001 Compañía Cervecerías Unidas Chile Anheuser-Busch c United States 36.0 -
2000 Compañía Boliviana Nacional Bolivia Quilmes Argentina 42.0 -
2000 Cervecería Leona Colombia Bavaria Colombia 44.2 .
2000 Cervecería del Sur Peru Backus-Johnston Peru 98.0 164
1999 Compañía Boliviana Nacional Bolivia Cervecería Paysandú Uruguay 24.0 -
1998 Grupo Modelo Mexico Anheuser-Busch d United States 13.0 556
Source: ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies.
a Pending transactions.
b
 Through this operation, Molson obtained a licence to produce Heineken beers in Brazil.
c
 In 2001 Anheuser-Busch made three successive share purchases to gain a 36% stake in Compañía Cervecerías Unidas (CCU).
d
 This operation gave Anheuser-Busch a 51% stake in the Modelo group; it had made previous purchases in 1993 and 1997.
• The automotive sector in MERCOSUR: reorientation
towards extraregional exports
Although the Argentine crisis forced TNCs producing
for the MERCOSUR market to refocus their strategy on
extraregional exports, the automotive industry’s problems
had begun earlier. In Brazil, the decline in domestic
demand that began in 1998 shifted market shares in favour
of firms serving specific niches or segments, while
undermining the position of the large manufacturers –
Volkswagen, General Motors and Fiat– which between
them accounted for over 80% of output and 87% of sales
in the domestic market (see monthly bulletin Carta da
ANFAVEA No. 197, October 2002). The crisis in
Argentina made these problems worse: large firms
accumulated excess inventories and were forced to institute
measures such as compulsory vacations and lay-offs and
the temporary or permanent closure of a number of
factories30 (see The Wall Street Journal, 2002b, and The
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002a, 2002d and 2002e).
In order to counteract these negative factors,
Volkswagen is investing in a truck plant with a view to
increasing its share of the domestic and external markets.
It expects that within three years, it will be in a position
to export 25% of its output, the bulk of which will be
sent to Mexico (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002f).
In 2002 a number of firms with small shares of the
domestic vehicle market, such as Honda (1.4%), Toyota
(1.5%), Ford (7.8%) and Renault (4.5%), not only took
advantage of the prevailing low costs to increase their
exports from Brazil to the rest of the world, but also
announced their intention to expand their investments in
that country in order to gain a larger presence in the
domestic market. In June 2002 Ford announced that it
was speeding up production at its Taubaté engine,
transmission and components plant in order to increase
its exports to new markets. In May it launched a new
model (Fiesta) in Brazil, which has also helped boost
production at that plant. In 2002 it started exporting its
new small all-terrain vehicle (Fusion), which is cheaper
and aimed at young consumers, to the North American
market after it invested US$ 1.3 billion in its new Bahía
plant (La Prensa, 2002).
Japanese automotive firms also have expansion
projects in the pipeline. The Honda Motor Company plans
to produce its compact model Fit in Brazil and to double
30 For example, General Motors shut down its São Paulo truck plant in January 2002, citing the high cost of imported components (The
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002a).
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its vehicle sales in that country in 2003. Meanwhile,
Toyota, following a US$ 300-million expansion of its
factory in the State of São Paulo, announced a policy to
stop the import of its Corolla model from Japan and turn
Brazil into an export base for selling the model in other
Latin American and Caribbean countries (El Economista,
2002b).
Lastly, Renault has set up three plants in Brazil over
the past five years (one making automobiles, another
engines and another pick-up trucks and vans). Having
seen its local market share grow from 2.9% in 1999 to
4.5% in 2001, it then suffered a slump in profits as a
result of the steep devaluation of the real, which pushed
up costs, given the high proportion of imported
components in its production. The firm’s executives
decided that the only way to make the business viable in
this situation was to gradually increase production from
today’s 70,000 units per year to 200,000 by 2005, of
which 40% would have to be exported. This strategy
requires the local subsidiary to draw up a new schedule
of investments in Brazil and to design a new model of
car to be built on a large scale for sale in the external
market.
In Argentina –Brazil’s main trading partner in
MERCOSUR– signs of price and exchange-rate
stabilization began to emerge in 2002, along with an
upturn in the level of activity and spending. This led
several automotive firms to reconsider earlier decisions
to close down some of their plants. An example is Fiat
Iveco, which was planning to transfer its truck plant in
Córdoba to Brazil. In April, however, it put those plans
on hold and decided to resume its activities, taking
advantage of the new cost structure resulting from
devaluation. Volkswagen Argentina, which had aired
doubts about the future of its Pacheco plant in Buenos
Aires, now views this factory as viable, although it is not
yet planning any new investments.
Nonetheless, perhaps the most important
development in the Argentine automotive sector concerns
Toyota. In October 2002 the Japanese firm unveiled plans
to invest US$ 200 million over the next two years to
expand its facilities in the country –the largest amount
of FDI for greenfield investment announced since the
January 2002 devaluation. Toyota plans to triple its
production of light utility vehicles in Argentina, to attain
an output level of 60,000 units, of which 75% will be
exported to other Latin American countries. These new
investments in Argentina are part of a global plan being
put in place by Toyota to concentrate its production in
South Africa and in certain Asian and Latin American
countries. As mentioned above, it is also expanding its
activities in Brazil and Mexico.
• TNCs seeking access to services
The last few years have witnessed large inflows of
external capital into sectors such as finance,
telecommunications, electric power, computer services
and retail trade. FDI in the electric power and
telecommunications sectors has recently been much less
active than in the 1990s. This is largely explained by the
difficulties being experienced by the relevant operators
in the international arena, compounded by the problems
facing them at the regional level. Here again, there are
differences between Mexico and the South American
countries.
Whereas in Mexico many public utility assets are
still in State hands or under national ownership, and are
coveted by a number of TNCs, in South America the
privatization process has virtually run its course.
Moreover, in view of the worsening economic situation,
some TNCs are curtailing their expansion plans, freezing
their investments or attempting to leave the subregion
–even declaring a suspension of payments in certain
cases. As seen in Argentina, parent companies have
stopped propping up their subsidiaries, and several firms
have suspended payments. This also happened in
Colombia in the case of the local subsidiary of the United
States electric power utility AES Gener.31
In Brazil several foreign-owned electric power utilities
are apparently attempting to divest their local assets
because of the drop in profits resulting from the steep
depreciation of the real, in some cases compounded by
financial problems in the respective parent company. Such
firms include Enron, AES Corporation, Électricité de
France (EDF) and Pennsylvania Power and Light (PP&L).
It is interesting to note that the potential buyers that have
emerged are not TNCs, but locally owned financial groups,
along with the State-owned Petrobras, which is specifically
interested in acquiring Enron’s gas assets.
Nonetheless, FDI in the Brazilian electric power-
generating segment has shown some buoyancy in
response to the incentives mentioned earlier. The United
States firm El Paso Energy opened two thermoelectric
power plants this year and is scheduled to open a third in
mid-2003. It also has a project in the pipeline for a new
plant in Rio de Janeiro, which is currently on hold
pending better market conditions. In January 2002 the
electric power group Enersis, controlled by Endesa
31 Also in Colombia, six transnational telecommunications firms are demanding a total of US$ 1.5 billion in compensation from the State-
owned Telecom Colombia because their income fell short of the levels projected in joint operation contracts signed in 1993.
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España and its subsidiary Endesa Internacional,
announced a US$ 207-million investment to build a
thermoelectric power plant in the State of Ceará.
Meanwhile, Eletricidade de Portugal (EDP) is planning
an investment of US$ 450 million to construct a
thermoelectric power plant in Araraquara (São Paulo).
In the Brazilian telecommunications sector, several
subsidiaries of foreign firms that had borrowed heavily in
dollar terms in the 1990s have encountered major financial
difficulties because of the crisis in the sector worldwide,
compounded by the steep devaluation of the real and local
financial instability. As a consequence, several operators
have tried to divest assets or find new strategic partners.
Not all of them have been successful, however, because
of the sudden slowdown in the expansion plans of firms
in the sector, not only in Brazil but also internationally.
Firms interested in purchasing telecommunications
assets in Brazil and expanding their activities include the
locally owned Brasil Telecom (BrT)32 and the Mexican
firm América Móvil. The former is negotiating to purchase
three firms currently under foreign control: MetroRed, an
Internet service provider controlled by Fidelity
Investments; Globenet, a fibre-optic cable operator; and
Intelig, a long-distance telephone service operator
controlled by Sprint, France Telecom and National Grid.
If these negotiations are successful, BrT will grow from a
second-tier firm in the Brazilian market into one of the
country’s leading long-distance operators and one of the
biggest providers of Internet services to large firms.
For its part, América Móvil gained four mobile
telephone businesses in Brazil by purchasing shares in
Telecom Américas from its partner Bell Canadá
Internacional. Once this acquisition is complete, América
Móvil is expected to exercise an option to acquire the
11.1% still held by its other partner, Southwestern Bell
Communications (SBC) of the United States. In addition,
in November 2002 it announced it was studying the
possibility of purchasing shares held by BellSouth in two
mobile telephone firms:33 BCP Telecomunicações and
BSE S.A. BellSouth was very keen to sell its holdings
in these two firms, following the non-payment of a
US$ 375-million debt by BCP.
Among the foreign firms operating in the Brazilian
telecommunications sector, Portugal Telecom and
Telefónica de España have both made a number of
investments in the country. The former decided to reduce
the debt of its Telesp Celular Participações (TCP)
subsidiary, Brazil’s largest cellular telephone firm, by
issuing new shares. It purchased 80.5% of these itself,
thereby increasing its stake in TCP from 45.2% to 83.9%.
The operation enabled TCP to raise just over US$ 750
million. Then, in October 2002, Portugal Telecom sold
14.7% of TCP to Telefónica Móviles España, a subsidiary
of Telefónica de España, as part of an agreement between
the two firms to merge all their mobile telephone
businesses in Brazil. For this purpose, a holding company
will be set up, with each party having a 50% stake. The
resulting corporation will be the largest in the sector in
Brazil, with a client base of 13 million.
Spain’s Telefónica is also strengthening its position in
the mobile telephone segment in Mexico. According to
statements made in May 2002 by company president César
Alierta, the company plans to invest US$ 500 million in
2002 and a further US$ 2.5 billion over the next three years.
Telefónica paid US$ 87 million for the mobile telephone
operator Pegaso PCS in 2002, taking on a US$ 1.23-billion
debt in the process. This will make it the second-largest
mobile telephone operator in Mexico, with about 2 million
customers and a target level of 6 to 7 million subscribers by
the end of 2005 (El Economista, 2002a).
In the Mexican electricity sector, private generating
plants today account for about 10% of electricity output
nationwide. The National Congress is currently studying
a reform of the sector to enable private generators to sell
directly to large consumers without having to go through
the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE).34 The reform
will divide the electricity market into two segments: one
consisting of households and small businesses that
consume less than 2,500 MW per year, which will be
customers of CFE, and the other comprising large private-
sector firms, which will be supplied directly from private
generating plants (The Economist Intelligence Unit,
2002h). Nonetheless, foreign firms do not seem to be
waiting for the reform to be implemented before
expanding their investments in the sector. Spain’s
Iberdrola, for example, is already undertaking major
investments and has several projects in the pipeline.
In 2002 Iberdrola acquired 13% of Gas Natural
México (GNM), the country’s leading natural gas
distributor. Through this operation, Iberdrola aims to
guarantee natural gas supplies to all its electric power
generators –not only the existing ones, but also the ones
it is building or planning to build. According to its 2002-
2006 strategic plan, the firm intends to invest a total of
32 Brasil Telecom (BrT) is owned in part (65.5%) by Grupo Brasil Telecom Participações. Since August 2002 the latter has been controlled by
Opportunity, a local financial group, which increased its share in the firm by acquiring the stake held by Telecom Italia.
33 BellSouth holds a 45% stake in each of these firms.
34 The sector was partially opened up in 1992 to allow private investment in the generating segment, but only for purposes of self-supply or
under 25-year contracts to sell exclusively to CFE.
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US$ 2.35 billion in electric power generation in Mexico,
to achieve a total installed capacity of 5,000 MW (El
Universal, 2002a, 2002b).
Another subject worth touching upon here is
Argentina’s software industry. This is one of the areas in
which firms are trying to adapt their strategy to the
country’s new circumstances by  external markets to take
advantage of the new cost structure. Crisis
notwithstanding, Oracle Corporation of the United States
has decided to set up a computer services centre in
Buenos Aires to provide customer support in relation to
programming, analysis, applications and databases. Over
the next few months it will increase its staff to 550
employees, from 200 in June 2002. Meanwhile, Motorola
(United States) and Ericsson (Sweden) are considering
35 For the most part, these shares went to minority investors, i.e. individuals or entities that did not have a controlling interest in the company
concerned.
turning their facilities in Argentina into a hub for
developing software for their cellular telephones (The
Economist Intelligence Unit, 2002I).
Lastly, one of the biggest investment projects in the
retail trade sector in 2002 was that of Wal-Mart de México
(WALMEX), a subsidiary of Wal-Mart Stores, which is
the largest chain in the United States in the department
store and supermarket segment. Early in the year,
WALMEX announced that it would invest about
US$ 670 million over the next 18 months to implement
its expansion plan in the country. The company already
has 555 commercial outlets in Mexico, including self-
service stores, department stores and restaurants, and it
plans to open 67 new establishments and increase its sales
by 10% (La Hora, 2002).
2. Foreign investment modalities in Latin America and the Caribbean
In terms of investment modalities, there were few FDI
inflows associated with privatizations in 2002 (see table
I.9). As mentioned in ECLAC (2002), there are few assets
left to sell in the region, and transactions during the year
consisted mainly of sales of minority shareholdings in
firms that had already been privatized, in cases where
such shares, for various reasons, had been retained by
the public sector. Most of these shares, which were sold
on the respective stock markets, belonged to firms in the
service sector.35
Table I.9
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PRIVATIZATIONS BY SECTOR AND AMOUNT, 2002
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Date Economic activity Privatized firm Country Buyer Origin of (%) Millionsbuyer  of dollars
January 2002 Financial intermediation, apart Banco do Estado do Brazil Banco Brasileiro de Brazil 100 76
from the financing of insurance Amazonas Desconto (BRADESCO)
and pension plans
January 2002 Electricity, gas and water supply Generadora Occidental Nicaragua Coastal Corporation United 95 12
S.A. (GEOSA) States
March 2002 Financial intermediation, apart National Commerce Jamaica Advantage Investment Canada 75 134
from the financing of insurance Bank Jamaica Ltd. Counsel
and pension plans
April 2002 Electricity, gas, steam and hot Empresa de Distribución Peru Minority shareholders a 9 24
water supply Eléctrica de Lima Norte
S.A. (EDELNOR)
April 2002 Water catchment, purification Companhia de Brazil Minority shareholders a 16 -
and distribution Saneamento Básico
do Estado de
São Paulo (SABESP)
May 2002 Electricity, gas, steam and Empresa de Distribución Peru Minority shareholders a 27 73
hot water supply Eléctrica de Lima Norte
S.A. (EDELNOR)
May 2002 Complementary and auxiliary Port of Belize City Belize Minority shareholders a 100 38
transport activities; travel
agency activities
June 2002 Financing of insurance and Aseguradora Hidalgo Mexico Metropolitan Life Ins United 100 962
pension plans, except S.A. (AHISA) urance (MetLife Inc.) States
mandatory social security
schemes
December 2002 Water catchment, purification Aguas Andinas Chile Minority shareholders a 8 96
and distribution (formerly EMOS)
Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investments and Corporate Strategies, Division of Production, Productivity and Management, on the
basis of information published in the specialized press.
a Minority shareholders are defined as investors that do not possess control of the firm’s management.
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Among acquisitions in excess of US$ 100 million,
the amounts paid were significantly lower than in 2001.
The biggest purchases at this level involved businesses
in the financial sector, which accounted for 42% of all
operations, thereby confirming the sector’s growing
importance as a target for FDI. The manufacturing sector
took second place in terms of the amounts paid (29%),
in particular reflecting acquisitions by United States
TNCs in Mexico, along with those made by Latin
American and a number of foreign firms in the brewery
sector (see table I.A-1).
The largest acquisition in Mexico was the takeover
of Grupo Financiero Bital by the United Kingdom-based
holding company HSBC for US$ 1.74 billion.36 Bital is
the country’s fifth-largest financial institution, with 1,400
branches, 6 million customers and 15,400 employees.
This operation dashed the hopes of Spain’s Banco
Santander Central Hispano (SCH), which had also been
interested in gaining control of the Bital group, as
revealed a few months earlier when it had accumulated a
26.6% stake through a succession of purchases –the most
recent being a 13.3% holding bought in April. The
takeover, which has yet to be approved by the Mexican
financial authorities, means that foreign bank penetration
in Mexico, which began in the mid-1990s, is now
practically complete. As much as 92% of the assets of
the country’s financial institutions will now be in foreign
hands, and there will be only one bank left in the country
that is still 100% Mexican-owned –Banorte, based in the
northern city of Monterrey.
36 See Expansión Directo (www.expansiondirecto.com), 22 August 2002.
37 Petrobras also took on the external debt of PeCom, estimated at US$ 2 billion.
38 Both Santa Fe and Quilmes are foreign-owned: Santa Fe Energy belongs to Devon Energy (United States), while Quilmes, owned by the
Bemberg family, has its headquarters in Luxembourg.
Another major operation in the Mexican financial
sector was the US$ 962-million purchase of Aseguradora
Hidalgo S.A. (AHISA) by Metropolitan Life Insurance
(MetLife Inc.) of the United States. In addition, the
Mexican State sold a 3% interest in Grupo Financiero
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Bancomer (BBVA
Bancomer) to Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA)
of Spain for US$ 216 million. Another large transaction
in this area (which, however, took place between two
foreign parties) was Citigroup’s US$ 1.24-billion
purchase of the 48% stake held by Aegon N.V. of the
Netherlands in the pension fund manager Afore
Banamex.
In Argentina, although the opportunities opened up
by lower asset values have thus far failed to attract large
investment flows, a number of substantial acquisitions have
nonetheless taken place. The largest ones have been carried
out by two Brazilian firms. Firstly, the State oil company
Petrobras paid US$ 1.124 billion for a 58.6% holding in
Argentina’s Pérez Companc (PeCom Energía)37 and
US$ 89.5 million for outright ownership of Santa Fe, a
United States oil firm. Secondly, Companhia de Bebidas
das Américas (AmBev) agreed to pay US$ 346 million
for a 37.5% stake in the brewer Cervecería y Maltería
Quilmes (Quinsa).38 This operation has not yet taken place
because competitors of Quilmes have filed legal objections
which are delaying approval of the deal by the antitrust
authorities. Domestic investors have also taken the
opportunity to acquire firms which had been divested by
foreign owners, mainly in the financial sector.
3. Conclusion
The analysis in this section shows that TNCs have
generally reacted in two different ways to the changes
that have occurred in the regional context. The first
reaction, of a short-term nature, has been displayed
particularly by corporations that were seeking efficiency
gains in the 1990s. It represents a response, first, to the
slump in United States demand for products assembled
in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean; and
second, to the decline in competitiveness caused by
currency revaluation in Mexico. These firms’ strategy
has included reducing output, temporarily shutting down
assembly plants and increasing productivity, primarily
on the basis of considerable reductions in their workforce,
while awaiting a recovery in the United States economy,
which is the main market for these products. This has
occurred mainly in production sectors that use low
technology (footwear, clothing, furniture, electrical
appliances), but it has also been observed in a number of
mid-level- and high-technology product lines that employ
more highly skilled labour (electronics).
The second reaction, of a structural nature, has a
number of different components. Some TNCs have
chosen to relocate their plants within their integrated
international production systems (see UNCTAD, 2002b).
This is happening in activities that involve less complex
productive processes and employ lower-skilled labour.
As a result, plants are being transferred to countries where
wages are lower, with output aimed at markets showing
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the greatest growth potential. For these and other reasons,
the chosen country has been China, which has also
benefited from its admission to WTO. As a result, Mexico
is losing its share of these activities, and now faces the
challenge of maintaining already established positions
or even gaining ground in activities that involve more
complex processes and require more highly skilled
labour. In this regard, the country’s proximity to the
United States continues to represent an advantage.
The Argentine crisis had profound repercussions for
corporations that had directed their sales towards
MERCOSUR. This subregion does not offer good
prospects for market growth at the present time,
especially in comparison to the expectations that
prevailed in the 1990s. This has led firms in a number of
sectors to downsize their projects and divert their products
to countries outside the subregion. This reorientation is
structural and has given rise to a new trend in the
geographical distribution of activities and investments.
This does not mean that the subregion will suffer a
massive outflow of FDI, however. Brazil seems to be the
country that foreign investors are bound to favour,
because the depreciation of the real will enable them to
cut costs significantly. Nonetheless, for the time being
investors are waiting to see what policies will be adopted
by the new government. As regards Argentina, TNCs have
been cautious, again waiting for clear indications of the
course the economy is likely to take. In some cases,
however, there is evidence of an incipient strategy of
redirecting exports to countries outside the region.
The one strategy that has not altered is that of TNCs
that extract raw materials, especially hydrocarbons.
Countries possessing such resources have benefited from
major gas discoveries, along with new investments in
gas pipelines in Bolivia, an oil pipeline in Ecuador and
the Camisea gas deposits in Peru. These investments make
intensive use of capital. Except in the case of natural
gas, they normally have few linkages with the local
economy, so domestic conditions in the host country tend
to have less influence on investment decisions (see
ECLAC, 2002, chapter IV). In 2002 the relatively high
price of oil gave an additional boost to these projects,
which permanently benefit from the strategic nature of
the product. This has led TNCs in the sector to invest in
circumstances that would otherwise be considered
prohibitive for FDI. The current geopolitical context,
involving heightened uncertainty about oil supplies from
the Persian Gulf countries, is encouraging transnationals
to consider investing in other parts of the world with oil
potential.
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Table I.A.1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ACQUISITIONS OF PRIVATE FIRMS
BY FOREIGN INVESTORS FOR OVER US$ 100 MILLION, 2002
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
AmountFirm sold Country Ownershipa  Buyer Country (%) paid
1. Primary sector
Cerrejón Zona Norte (CZN) coal mine Colombia F Anglo American Plc. United Kingdom 50.0 200
BHP Billiton Plc. Australia
Glencore International AG Switzerland
Pérez Companc (PeCom Energía) Argentina L Petrobras Brazil 58.6 1 028
Compañía Minera Disputada de  Las Condes Chile F Anglo American Plc. United Kingdom 100.0 1 300
Iberdrola assets b Colombia/Brazil F Gas Natural SDG Spain 137
Gas Natural México (GNM) Mexico F Iberdrola S.A. Spain 13.3 139
2. Manufacturing sector
Grupo Embotellador México  (Pepsi-Gemex) Mexico L Pepsi Bottling Group (PGB) United States 99.8 1 132
Fleischmann’s Regional F Burns Philp & Co. Australia 100.0 110
Florida Bebidas S.A. Costa Rica L Heineken Netherlands 25.0 230
Consorcio Cervecero Centroamericano Nicaragua L South African Breweries South Africa 25.0
Compañía de Cervezas Nacionales c Ecuador F Cervecería Bavaria Colombia 25.0 152
Unión de Cervecerías Backus Johnston Peru L Cervecería Bavaria Colombia 24.5 420
Unión de Cervecerías Backus Johnston Peru L Grupo Cisneros Venezuela 16.0 200
Cervecería y Maltería Quilmes c Argentina L AmBev Brazil 37.5 346
Chocolates Garoto Brazil L Nestlé Switzerland 100.0 250
Kaiser Brazil L Molson Canada 100.0 765
Cervecería Nacional Panama L Cervecería Bavaria Colombia 91.5 260
Puerto Rican Cement Puerto Rico L Cemex Mexico 97.7 180
Masisa S.A. Chile L Inversiones Suizandina Switzerland 43.2 150
Excélsior Mexico L Foreign investors United States 100.0 150
Canada
Vitromatic (Vitro Enseres Domésticos) Mexico L Whirlpool Corporation United States 51.0 150
3. Service sector
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Telesp Celular S.A. (TCP) Brazil F Portugal Telecom S.A. (PT) Portugal 24.0 603
Telesp Celular S.A. (TCP) Brazil F Minority shareholders 5.8 146
Telecom Américas Brazil L América Móvil Mexico 39.1 366
FINANCE
Grupo Financiero Serfinb Mexico F Bank of America Corp. United States 24.9 1 600
BBVA Bancomer Mexico F Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Spain 2.5 183
Argentaria (BBVA)
Grupo Financiero Bital Mexico L HSBC Holdings United Kingdom 99.2 1 131
BBVA Bancomer Mexico F Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Spain 3.0 216
Argentaria (BBVA)
BBVA Bancomer Mexico F Minority shareholders 8.8 634
Banco Santiago Chile F Banco Santander Central Spain 35.5 682
Hispano (BSCH)
Banco Santiago Chile F Minority shareholders 7.0 130
Sul América Brazil L ING Netherlands 49.0 160
Afore XXI Mexico L Prudential Ins. Co. of America United States 50.0 128
Afore Banamex (Aegon)/Seguros Mexico F Citigroup United States 48.0 1 240
 Banamex (Aegon)
Grupo Cinemex Mexico L Onex Corporation Canada 58.0 125
Oaktree Capital United States 42.0 165
Management LLC.
COMMERCE
Disco Ahold International  Holdings N.V. Argentina F Royal Ahold N.V. Netherlands 44.0 490
Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, Division of Production, Productivity and Management, on the
basis of information published in the specialized press.
a L: Prior to sale, the firm was locally owned. F: Prior to sale, the firm was owned by foreign investors.
b





LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: LARGEST TRANSNATIONAL FIRMS
BY SALES, 2000-2001
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Sales in Sales in Sales 2001/Rank Firm Country Sector
2001 2000 sales 2000(%)
1 TELEFÓNICA DE ESPAÑA Spain Telecommunications 39 953.7 41 048.1 -2.7
2 THE COCA-COLA CO. United States Beverages/beer 14 239.7 13 503.1 5.5
3 VOLKSWAGEN Germany Automotive 12 050.6 12 879.2 -6.4
4 DAIMLERCHRYSLER Germany Automotive 11 930.0 13 930.4 -14.4
5 ENDESA ESPAÑA Spain Electric power 11 147.4 10 914.9 2.1
6 DELPHI United States Automobile parts 10 647.5 12 085.0 -11.9
7 GENERAL MOTORS United States Automotive 10 378.0 9 934.5 4.5
8 CEMEX Mexico Cement 10 249.9 8 722.6 17.5
9 FORD United States Automotive 8 626.7 8 799.0 -2.0
10 GENERAL ELECTRIC United States Electronics 8 568.4 7 265.3 17.9
11 ESSO United States Oil/gas 8 347.6 8 582.0 -2.7
12 REPSOL-YPF Spain Oil/gas 9 013.1 9 550.0 -5.6
13 PEPSICO United States Beverages/beer 5 675.9 5 141.5 10.4
14 AES CORP. United States Electric power 5 274.0 5 188.8 1.6
15 ROYAL DUTCH/SHELL Netherlands/United Kingdom Oil/gas 5 093.9 5 266.5 -3.3
16 NISSAN Japan Automotive 5 007.4 4 771.0 5.0
17 PROMODÉS France Commerce 4 194.9 4 981.5 -15.8
18 PHILIPS Netherlands Electronics 4 029.1 3 789.4 6.3
19 NESTLÉ Switzerland Food 4 002.8 3 874.7 3.3
20 FRANCE TELECOM France Telecommunications 3 960.5 3 891.0 1.8
21 IBM United States Computers 3 686.6 3 793.5 -2.8
22 HEWLETT-PACKARD United States Computers 3 447.2 3 472.8 -0.7
23 WAL-MART STORES United States Commerce 3 383.7 2 836.9 19.3
24 TEXACO United States Oil/gas 3 350.2 3 445.1 -2.8
25 FIAT Italy Automotive 3 174.8 3 412.4 -7.0
26 PHILIP MORRIS United States Tobacco 3 105.4 2 695.0 15.2
27 BELLSOUTH United States Telecommunications 2 935.0 2 963.0 -0.9
28 DUPONT EI DE NEMOURS United States Chemicals 2 646.6 2 432.1 8.8
29 AHOLD Netherlands Commerce 2 594.7 2 670.5 -2.8
30 UNILEVER United Kingdom/Netherlands Hygiene/cleaning/food 2 467.8 2 007.9 22.9
31 ERICSSON Sweden Electronics 2 407.0 3 153.0 -23.7
32 PROCTER & GAMBLE United States Hygiene/cleaning 1 920.5 1 782.7 7.7
33 TELECOM Italy Telecommunications 1 802.8 1 479.5 21.9
34 BASF Germany Chemicals 1 730.0 1 757.7 -1.6
35 KIMBERLY-CLARK United States Pulp/paper 1 710.1 1 661.7 2.9
36 BAT United Kingdom Tobacco 1 701.2 1 703.6 -0.1
37 LG ELECTRONICS Republic of Korea Electronics 1 659.6 1 590.1 4.4
38 KODAK United States Photography 1 628.5 892.0 82.6
39 SIEMENS Germany Electronics 1 383.5 1 776.3 -22.1
40 MOTOROLA United States Electronics 1 366.4 1 100.0 24.2
41 IBERDROLA Spain Electric power 1 293.1 784.4 64.9
42 CAMUZZI Italy Oil/gas 1 050.4 1 355.0 -22.5
43 BECKAERT Belgium Steel 1 020.9 1 149.5 -11.2
44 XEROX United States Electronics 975.9 1 100.5 -11.3
45 MAKRO Netherlands Commerce 904.5 913.1 -0.9
46 SEARS ROEBUCK United States Commerce 892.3 775.8 15.0
47 EDF France Electric power 868.5 897.1 -3.2
48 HONDA MOTORS Japan Automobile parts 823.4 602.5 36.7
49 NEC Japan Computers 730.9 708.2 3.2
50 ALCOA ALUMINIUM United States Aluminium 700.9 780.2 -10.2
 Source: América Economía magazine, No. 235, 12-25 July 2002.
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Table I.A.3
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CONCESSIONS WITH FOREIGN INVESTOR
PARTICIPATION, BY SECTOR, 2002
Date Economic activity Project Country Firm Country of origin
PRIMARY SECTOR
November 2002 Crude oil and natural gas extraction, Expansion of Cartagena Colombia Technip Italy SpA  Tipiel Italy/Colombia
together with related service activities refinery
other than prospecting
October 2002 Manufacture of coke, refinery by- Ancap awarded contract Uruguay Vitol Canada
products and nuclear fuel for sale of fuel in the future
September 2002 Metal ore extraction Exploration block B Venezuela Hecla Mining United States
Company
September 2002 Production of metal manufactures, Las Cristinas gold project Venezuela Crystallex International Canada
except machinery and equipment Corporation
August 2002 Crude oil and natural gas extraction, Block 1 – Deltana platform Venezuela BP Amoco Plc.
together with related service activities (British Petroleum) United Kingdom
other than prospecting
July 2002 Metal ore extraction Exploration and exploitation Peru Vista Continental United States
    Río Grande Argentina
June 2002 Crude oil and natural gas extraction, Exploitation rights Argentina ChevronTexaco Corp. United States
together with related service activities
other than prospecting
June 2002 Crude oil and natural gas extraction, Drilling of exploration wells Mexico Dowell Schlumberger United States
together with related service activities
other than prospecting
May 2002 Crude oil and natural gas extraction, Bandurria exploration block Argentina Wintershall Germany
together with related service activities Repsol-YPF Spain
other than prospecting TotalFinaElf S.A. France
Pan American Energy Argentina
February 2002 Metal ore extraction Pueblo Viejo sulphur project Dominican Placer Dome Inc. Canada
Republic
February 2002 Crude oil and natural gas extraction, Modernization of the Peru Otepi Cosapi Venezuela Peru
together with related service activities Talara refinery
other than prospecting
February 2002 Crude oil and natural gas extraction, Exploration and exploitation Peru Petrotech United States
together with related service activities of lot Z-6
other than prospecting
SERVICE SECTOR
November 2002 Electricity, gas, steam and hot Sale of energy to Santiago Chile Chilectra S.A. Chile/Spain
water supply Metro
November 2002 Other service activities Technical assistance project Bolivia Ente Vasco de la Energía Spain
(EVE)
Iberdrola Ingeniería y Bolivia
Consultoría (Iberinco)
November 2002 Overland transport; pipeline transport Installation of control Peru Abengoa Spain
systems in gas pipelines Transportes de Gas Peru
del Perú (TGP)
November 2002 Postal and telecommunication services PCS licences Brazil Vésper United States
October 2002 Construction Isla Margarita airport Venezuela IDC Chile




October 2002 Waste and waste water disposal, Waste disposal contract Uruguay OMB International Italy
sanitation and similar activities
October 2002 Construction Gas pipeline construction Mexico Techint Compañía Técnica Argentina
Internacional
October 2002 Overland transport; pipeline transport Sale of trains to the Mexico Bombardier Inc. Canada
Mexico City Metro
October 2002 Manufacture of machinery and Expansion of the Caracas Venezuela Alstom France
equipment not elsewhere classified Metro
September 2002 Electricity, gas, steam and hot Etecen and Etesur Peru Interconexión Eléctrica Colombia
water supply transmission concessions S.A. (ISA)
September 2002 Waste and waste water disposal, Trash collection Brazil Enterpa Ambiental Argentina/
sanitation and similar activities United States
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Date Economic activity Project Country Firm Country of origin
September 2002 Electricity, gas, steam and hot Electric power plant Brazil Alstom France
water supply operation and maintenance
September 2002 Electricity, gas, steam and hot Natural gas transportation Chile Gasoducto GasAndes S.A. France
water supply services
September 2002 Complementary and auxiliary Tendering of customs Bolivia GBH Investment Peru/
transport activities; travel agency warehouses Switzerland
activities
August 2002 Diversified Concession to manage Peru Ecolatina Argentina
zoological garden
August 2002 Construction Prison infrastructure Chile Besalco Chile
programme Sodexho Alliance France
Torno Italy
July 2002 Postal and telecommunication services PCS licences Chile BellSouth Corporation United States
    Telefónica Móviles Spain
July 2002 Overland transport; pipeline transport Delivery and maintenance Chile Alstom France
of trains for suburban rail
service in Valparaíso
June 2002 Electricity, gas and water supply High-tension power lines Mexico Asea Brown Boveri Switzerland
(ABB AG)
June 2002 Construction Construction of Daule Ecuador Andrade Gutiérrez Brazil
River bridge
June 2002 Electricity, gas, steam and hot Construction of Chile Alstom France
water supply transmission network Mitsubishi Corporation Japan
May 2002 Water catchment, purification and Operating contract and Puerto Ondeo Servies France
distribution sewerage works Rico Mitsubishi Corporation Japan
May 2002 Electricity, gas, steam and hot Electric power contract Venezuela Asea Brown Boveri Switzerland
water supply with Edelca (ABB AG)
April 2002 Waste and waste water disposal, Waste control division of Chile Hidronor Chile Belgium
sanitation and similar activities CODELCO
April 2002 Other community, social and personal Trash collection Brazil Consorcio Comapa Brazil/Argentina
services
April 2002 Water catchment, purification and Sanitation services Brazil Aguas Guariroba Spain
distribution concession
April 2002 Electricity, gas, steam and hot Mazar hydroelectric project Ecuador Unión Fenosa Spain
water supply Consorcio ACS-Cobra- Spain
Omegaport
March 2002 Construction International Route 60-CH Chile Obrascón, Huarte y Spain
Laín (OHL)
Fomento de Construcciones Spain
y Contratas (FCC)
February 2002 Electricity, gas, steam and hot Construction of sub-stations Mexico Isolux Spain
water supply for CFE
January 2002 Complementary and auxiliary transport Puerto Caldera concession Costa Rica Sociedad Portuaria Regional Colombia
activities; travel agency activities de Buenaventura (SPRB)
January 2002 Construction Highway construction Dominican Grupo Dragados Spain
Republic
January 2002 Electricity, gas and water supply Emergency energy sales Brazil Keppel Corp. Singapore
January 2002 Electricity, gas and water supply Maintenance of nuclear Brazil Iberdrola S.A. Spain
plant Planta nuclear Brazil
Almirante Álvaro Alberto
Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, Division of Production, Productivity and Management, on the
basis of information published in the specialized press in Latin America.
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Table I.A.4
LATIN AMERICA: TOP 100 SUBSIDIARIES OF TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS  BY NET SALES, 2001
(Millions of dollars)
Rank Firm Country Activity Net sales Current investors Country of origin
1 Telefónica do Brasil (formerly Brazil  Telecommunications  27 907.8 Telefónica de España S.A. Spain
TELESP S.A.)
2 General Motors de México S.A. Mexico Automotive 9 968.9 General Motors Corporation United States
de C.V. (GM)
3 Wal Mart de Mexico S.A. de C.V. Mexico Commerce 9 684.7 Wal Mart Stores United States
(S.A.- Walmex)
4 DaimlerChrysler México Mexico Automotive 9 294.6 DaimlerChrysler AG Germany
5 Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF) Argentina Petroleum 8 162.0 Repsol-YPF Spain
6 Volkswagen México Mexico Automotive 7 004.4 Volkswagen AG Germany
7 Delphi Automotive Systems Mexico Automotive 6 763.5 Delphi Automotive Systems United States
Corporation
8 Ford México Mexico Automotive 5 563.1 Ford Motor Company United States
9 Nissan México Mexico Automotive 5 007.4 Nissan Motor Japan
10 Enersis S.A.   Chile   Electric power   4 497.0 Citigroup United States
Endesa España Spain
11 Volkswagen Brasil Brazil Automotive 4 404.0 Volkswagen AG Germany
12 Carrefour Brasil Brazil Commerce 3 981.3 Carrefour Group France
13 Delphi Packard Electrics Systems Mexico Automotive 3 884.0 Delphi Automotive United States
Systems Corporation
14 Grupo Royal Dutch Shell (Shell Brasil) Brazil Petroleum 3 839.0 Royal Dutch/Shell Group United Kingdom/
Netherlands
15 General Electric México (GE) Mexico Electronics 3 711.6 General Electric (GE) United States
16 Light Serviços de Eletricidade    Brazil    Electric power    3 696.3 Électricité de France (EDF) France
Reliant Energy (Houston Energy) United States
AES Corp. United States
17 IBM México Mexico Electronics 3 686.6 International Business United States
Machines (IBM)
18 Hewlett-Packard México Mexico Electronics 3 447.2 Hewlett-Packard (HP) United States
19 MCI Embratel (formerly Empresa Brazil  Telecommunications  3 215.4 MCI WorldCom United States
Brasileira de Telecomunicações)  Societé Européenne des Belgium/
Satellites S.A (SES) Luxembourg
20 General Electric Grupo Industrial Mexico Electronics 3 193.5 General Electric (GE) United States
21 Telecom Argentina Argentina Telecommunications 3 049.0 France Telecom France/Italy
Telecom Italia
22 Compañía Anónima Nacional Teléfonos  Venezuela    Telecommunications 3 011.9 Telefónica de España S.A. Spain
de Venezuela (CANTV)  Verizon Communications United States
Banco de Desarrollo Venezuela
Económico y Social de
Venezuela (BANDES)
23 Esso Brasileiro Petróleo Ltda. Brazil Fuel distribution 2 999.3 ExxonMobil Corporation United States
24 Lear Corporation México Mexico Automotive 2 825.0 Lear Corporation United States
25 Telefónica de Argentina S.A. (TASA) Argentina Telecommunications 2 797.0 Telefónica de España S.A. Spain
26 Grupo Fiat Brasil Brazil Automotive 2 776.3 Fiat Italy
27 GrupoTexaco Brasil Brazil Petroleum 2 684.9 Texaco Inc. United States
28 The Coca-Cola Company México Mexico Food and beverages 2 504.1 The Coca-Cola Company United States
29 Visteon México Mexico Automotive 2 400.0 Visteon United States
30 Nestlé México Mexico Food and beverages 2 326.6 Nestlé Switzerland
31 Sistema Pepsicola Mexico Food and beverages 2 204.7 PepsiCo United States
32 Compañía Energética de Minas
Gerais (CEMIG) Brazil  Electric power  1 978.0 AES Corp. United States
Southern Energy United States
33 Disco S.A. Argentina Commerce 1 915.1 Disco Ahold International Holland
Holdings N.V. (DAIH)
34 Sabritas Mexico Food and beverages 1 801.7 PepsiCo United States
35 Kimberly Clark México  Mexico  Paper  1 710.1 Copamex Mexico
Kimberly Clark (CK) United States
36 Nestlé Brasil Brazil Food and beverages 1 676.2 Nestlé Switzerland
37 Mabe Mexico Electronics 1 663.4 General Electric (GE) United States
38 Procter & Gamble México Mexico Chemicals 1 652.3 Procter & Gamble United States
39 Ford Brasil Brazil Automotive 1 621.7 Ford Motor Company United States
40 Philips Mexicana (Philips Sociedad Mexico Electronics 1 544.0 Royal Philips Electronics Netherlands
Exportadora Trasatlántica) (Koninklijke Philips Electronics
N.V.)
41 Bunge Brasil S.A Brazil Food and beverages 1 505.4 Bunge & Born United States
42 Sonae Brasil Brazil Commerce 1 470.4 Sonae de Distribuição Portugal
43 Brasmotor S.A. Brazil Automotive 1 458.9 Whirlpool Corporation United States
44 Siemens Brasil Brazil Machinery 1 407.2 Siemens AG Germany
45 ExxonMobil Colombia Colombia Fuel distribution 1 396.2 ExxonMobil Corporation United States
46 Motorola de México S.A. de C.V. Mexico Electronics 1 366.4 Motorola Inc. United States
47 Telefónica CTC Chile Chile Telecommunications 1 352.4 Telefónica de España S.A. Spain
48 Consorcio Guaraniana  Brazil  Electric power  1 324.8 Iberdrola S.A. Spain
49 Ericsson México Mexico Electronics 1 307.0 L.M. Ericsson Sweden
50 Philip Morris México Mexico Tobacco 1 303.1 Philip Morris Companies Inc. United States




Rank Firm Country Activity Net sales Current investors Country of origin
52 Telesp Celular S.A. (TCP)  Brazil  Telecommunications  1 269.7 Portugal Telecom S.A. (PT) Portugal
Telefónica Móviles Spain
53 Shell Argentina CAPSA Forestry Argentina Petroleum 1 254.9 Royal Dutch/Shell United Kingdom/
Holland
54 LG Electronics México Mexico Electronics 1 239.6 LG Electronics Inc. Republic of Korea
55 Bompreço Supermercados Brazil Commerce 1 195.7 Royal Ahold N.V. Netherlands
(Koninklijke Ahold)
56 Grupo Ericsson Brasil Brazil Electronics 1 100.0 L.M. Ericsson Sweden
57 BASF Brasil Brazil Chemicals 1 080.0 BASF AG Germany
58 Empresa Nacional de Chile Telecommunications 1 074.7 Telecom Italia Spa Italy
Telecomunicaciones S.A. (ENTEL)
59 Du Pont Mexico Chemicals 1 064.0 E.I. du Pont de Nemours United States
(DuPont)
60 Telefónica del Perú S.A. Peru Telecommunications 1 033.4 Telefónica de España S.A. Spain
(formerly Entel Perú)
61 Siemens México Mexico Machinery 1 033.2 Siemens AG Germany
62 Grupo BAT/ Souza Cruz SA Brazil Tobacco 1 023.6 British American Tobacco United Kingdom
Plc. (BAT)
63 Grupo Arbed/ Belgo Mineira (CSBM) Brazil Metallurgy 1 020.9 Arbed Belgium/
Luxembourg
64 Solectron de México, S.A. de C.V. Mexico Electronics 1 003.0 Solectron Corporation United States
65 Apasco SA Mexico Cement 997.1 Holcim (formerly Holderbank) Switzerland
66 Ford Argentina Argentina Automotive 977.0 Ford Motor Company United States
67 Xerox Brasil Brazil Electronics 975.9 Xerox Corporation United States
68 Minera Escondida Ltda.      Chile      Mining      959.4 Mitsubishi Corporation Japan
Broken Hill Proprietary (BHP) Australia
Rio Tinto (RTZ) United Kingdom
Nippon Mining & Metal  Japan
69 Grupo Bemberg Argentina Food and beverages 938.7 Grupo Bemberg Luxembourg
70 Grupo Kodak México Mexico Photography 928.5 Eastman Kodak Company United States
71 Makro Atacadista SA Brazil Commerce 904.5 Makro Holland
72 Navistar Mexico Automotive 869.0 Navistar International United States
73 EDENOR (Empresa Distribuidora y Argentina    Electric power   868.5 Électricité De France (EDF) France
Comercializadora Norte Sociedad Societé D Amenagement France
Anónima) Urbain et Rural (SAUR)
Electricidad Argentina Argentina
Sociedad Anónima ( EASA )
74 Kemet de México S.A. de C.V. Mexico Electronics 830.0 Kemet Corporation United States
75 Honda México Mexico Automotive 823.4 Honda Motor Japan
76 Pan American Energy  Argentina  Petroleum  806.2 Bridas Energy United Kingdom
BP Amoco United Kingdom
77 Electricidad de Caracas (EDC or Elecar)  Venezuela  Electric power  777.9 AES Corp. United States
Brown Brother Harriman & Co. United States
78 Tele Sudeste Celular S.A.    Brazil    Telecommunications    734.1 Itochu Corporation Japan
Telefónica de España S.A. Spain
Iberdrola S.A. Spain
79 NEC do Brasil S.A. Brazil Electronics 730.9 Nippon Electric Co. (NEC) Japan
80 Alcoa Brasil Brazil Metallurgy 700.9 Alcoa United States
81 Kodak Export Mexico Commerce 700.0 Eastman Kodak Company United States 
82 Compaq México Mexico Electronics 699.0 Compaq Computer Corporation United States
83 PSA Peugeot-Citroen Argentina Argentina Automotive 697.5 PSA Peugeot Citroen S.A. France
(SEVEL)
84 Labatt Mexico Food and beverages 686.2 Interbrew Belgium/
Luxembourg 
85 Santa Isabel S.A. Chile Commerce 679.6 Royal Ahold N.V. Netherlands
(Koninklijke Ahold)
86 Elektro Eletricidade e Serviços Brazil Electric power 677.5 Enron Corp. United States
87 Texaco Colombia Colombia Petroleum 665.3 Texaco Inc. United States
88 Metrogas S.A. Argentina Argentina Electric power 657.7 British Gas United Kingdom/
Repsol  YPF Spain
89 Southern Peru Copper Corporation Peru  Mining  657.5 Grupo Minero México Mexico
(SPCC) Phelps Dodge Corporation United States
90 BASF México Mexico Chemicals 650.0 BASF AG Germany
91 Telefónica Comunicaciones Argentina Telecommunications 647.0 Telefónica de España Spain
Personales S.A. (TCP)- Unifón
92 Volkswagen Argentina Argentina Automotive 642.2 Volkswagen AG Germany
93 Wal Mart Brasil Brazil Commerce 639.2 Wal Mart Stores United States
94 Nokia México Mexico Electronics 630.0 Nokia Corporation Finland
95 Vitromatic (Vitro Enseres Domésticos) Mexico Electronics 629.0 Whirlpool Corporation United States
96 Nidera Argentina Argentina Food and beverages 625.9 Nidera Netherlands
97 Cemex Venezuela (formerly Vencemos) Venezuela Cement 623.9 Cementos Mexicanos S.A. Mexico
(CEMEX SA)
98 Avon México Mexico Chemicals 620.7 Avon Inc. United States
99 Parmalat Brasil Brazil Food and beverages 615.6 Parmalat Finanziaria S.p.A. Italy
 100 Chevron San Jorge Argentina Petroleum 611.0 Chevron Texaco Corp. United States
Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investments and Corporate Strategies, Division of Production, Productivity and Management, on the
basis of information published in the specialized press in Latin America.
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APPENDIX
STATISTICS ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
In view of the differences between the figures given in
the ECLAC publications Economic Survey of Latin
America and the Caribbean and Foreign Investment in
Latin America and the Caribbean, it should be clarified
that even though both sets of figures correspond to the
definitions contained in the International Monetary
Fund’s Balance of Payments Manual, they reflect
different concepts in terms of balance-of-payments
items and cover different numbers of countries in the
region.
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: COMPARATIVE TABLE
(Millions of dollars)
1990-1994a 1995-1999a 1999 2000 2001 2002b
Figures given in the Economic Survey
of Latin America and the Caribbean:
A. Net FDI flows 12 983 52 365  79 741 67 711 68 081 38 974
Investment abroad by residents 2 113 5 735 6 286 7 794 380  4 928
B. Net inflows in the reporting economy 15 096 58 100 86 027 75 505 67 702 43 902
Figures given in Foreign Investment
in Latin America and the Caribbean
C. Net inflows in the reporting economy 15 802 60 604  88 220 75 583 69 020 44 402
Financial centres 2 506 8 914 19 810 18 855 14 993 11 788
a Annual average.
b Estimates.
The first difference is conceptual:
As the purpose of the Economic Survey is to present
a macroeconomic analysis of the region’s countries, it
takes into account net flows of foreign direct investment
–that is, net inflows of foreign investment in the reporting
economy minus net investment abroad by its residents.
These flows are shown in line (A) of the above table.
Conversely, as Foreign Investment in Latin America
and the Caribbean has the aim of analysing capital
inflows in the form of direct investment, their sectoral
distribution and the strategies of the transnational
corporations that provide them, the report refers only to
net inflows in the reporting economy (without subtracting
the net amounts that residents invest abroad).
The second difference concerns coverage:
The figures for net inflows of foreign direct
investment presented in lines B and C are different
because their coverage is different. The foreign
investment figures in the Economic Survey of Latin
America and the Caribbean refer only to countries that
are able to supply these statistics prior to publication.
Foreign Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean
includes figures recorded by the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as
investments in financial centres by its member countries.
If the latter figures are omitted, the similarity to the
figures in line B becomes apparent.
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II.  THE ANDEAN COMMUNITY: FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT AND CORPORATE STRATEGIES
This chapter reviews trends in foreign direct investment
in the Andean Community, which comprises Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. Ever since the
Community was established in the early 1970s, the
treatment afforded to foreign capital has been one of the
most significant –and controversial– issues to be
addressed by this subregional grouping. Initially, the
Community’s policy decisions regarding foreign
investment were binding in nature and took precedence
over any national rules, thereby superseding local foreign
investment regulations. A multitude of restrictions were
placed on foreign direct investment (FDI) and on the
operation of transnational corporations (TNCs).  The aim
of the restrictions was to ensure that these activities would
play a complementary role to local investment which
would not constrain the industrialization of the Andean
economies.
In the late 1980s, the severe economic crisis that
had overtaken Latin America, together with pressures
building up within the Andean Community, brought
about a rapid shift in the thrust of economic policy and
in the prevailing attitude towards foreign capital. These
changes in the subregional rules gave more discretion to
the individual countries. The process of phasing out the
restrictions on foreign capital was also spurred by the
appearance of new incentives.  The main such incentives
were associated with the privatization of State assets and
with the opening and liberalization of the great majority
of economic activities, in particular the resource-based
industries (hydrocarbons and mining) which are the
principal source of wealth for almost all the Andean
countries.
With the liberalization of these countries’ resource-
based sectors, large volumes of foreign investment began
to flow into their economies.  Most of these flows were
associated with exploration and drilling in the petroleum
and natural gas sectors. A number of utilities and
infrastructure activities also aroused some interest among
foreign investors, particularly those in the process of
building up Latin American networks in such areas as
telecommunications, electricity, financial services and
retail commerce. This trend did not extend to other sectors
of the subregion’s economies, however. This was largely
attributable to the political and economic instability
exhibited by the Andean countries, along with the limited
size of their domestic markets and the impossibility of
creating a genuine subregional market.
This chapter will look at the main features of FDI
flows to the Andean Community countries, including the
main factors of attraction, general and specific
regulations, the sectoral pattern of allocation, the origin
of these capital flows and the most common corporate
strategies. Within this context, foreign investors are
divided into two clearly differentiated categories based
on whether their main strategy is to seek out raw materials
or to seek entry into national services markets.
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A. FOREIGN CAPITAL IN THE ANDEAN COMMUNITY
1.  The treatment of foreign capital in the member countries of the Andean Community
In the mid-twentieth century, the Andean countries were
very open to foreign capital, and most of them had no
specific legislation on the subject. In many of these
nations, the only regulations in this area were a few
exchange-rate provisions applying to activities involving
foreign capital. With the nationalization of many utilities
and companies in the extractive industries (especially in
the hydrocarbons sector), however, the scope for foreign
investment was sharply curtailed.
Foreign investment began to be considered as a
means of supplementing national saving, technology
transfer and industrialization in the context of a
development model that was based largely on domestic
markets. Nonetheless, apprehensions about foreign
investment’s impact on the balance of payments led the
countries to control and restrict FDI. Mechanisms for
the authorization, registration and control of FDI were
created, and governments were empowered to channel
flows according to national economic development
priorities. An effort was  made to give preference to FDI
that would help to increase or diversify exports, prior
assessments of its impact on the balance of payments
and on employment were encouraged, and foreign capital
was denied access to many activities, particularly the
financial sector and public utilities. Requirements and
limitations were also established regarding the
repatriation of earnings and capital.
This was the context in which the Andean integration
process was launched with the signing of the Cartagena
Agreement in 1969. This was the agreement that
established the Andean Pact, which is now known as the
Andean Community.1 The main purpose of this initiative
was to expand intraregional trade and stimulate economic
growth in the member countries, first by creating a free
trade zone and later by means of a customs union (a
common external tariff). To this end, it propounded the
harmonization of economic policies, particularly in the
areas of foreign exchange, monetary and fiscal affairs,
external trade and foreign investment. With regard to
foreign investment, the integration scheme encouraged
the substitution of local and subregional investment for
foreign capital, emphasizing the adverse effects of FDI
on the generation of foreign exchange and balance-of-
payments equilibria. The idea was to prevent foreign
capital from monopolizing the benefits of the regional
integration process and transferring them abroad.
June 1971 saw the introduction of a system called
the Common Regime of Treatment of Foreign Capital
and Trademarks, Patents, Licenses and Royalties (more
commonly known as Decision 24), which later took on
regulatory force in the countries of what was then the
Andean Pact. The intent of this supranational rule was to
limit external financial influence and ensure that the local
private sector would make a greater contribution to
national development. In addition, it provided for various
restrictive practices, such as the gradual reduction of
foreign stakes in local firms to a minority interest,2 the
elimination of foreign capital in key sectors and
limitations on the right to remit earnings abroad. Other
decisions relating to technology transfer, Andean firms
and sectoral industrial development programmes also
influenced the treatment of foreign capital.
The severe deterioration seen in the terms of trade
during the late 1970s and early 1980s had an adverse
impact on export earnings and the balance of payments.
Economic growth slowed, and import substitution began
to show signs of having exhausted its potential. External
debt reached unprecedented levels, triggering a crisis
throughout Latin America and a steep downturn in
external financing. This situation affected all the countries
of the subregion and brought the integration process to a
standstill.
The crisis prompted the Andean countries to
reconsider the role of FDI in development. As a result,
after having been in force for 16 years and undergoing a
number of amendments, on 11 May 1987 Decision 24
was superseded by Decision 220, which was published
on 18 May of that same year. Decision 220 provided
greater flexibility in the treatment of foreign capital by
eliminating some of the requirements concerning the
registration and authorization of investments and profit
remittances, doing away with the classification of
“reserved sectors” and allowing each member country
to formulate its own legislation on foreign investment.
Under Decision 220, national regulations were changed
substantially as the countries became increasingly more
1 The original signatories to the Cartagena Agreement were Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. Later, Chile withdrew and Venezuela
joined. Chile’s withdrawal from the Cartagena Agreement had a great deal to do with the restrictions that the arrangement placed on FDI,
which clearly ran counter to the structural reforms that Chile began to implement in its economy in the second half of the 1970s.
2 Under the provisions of conversion contracts, new foreign firms were required to convert to mixed ownership within 15 years.
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open to foreign capital, streamlined their administrative
procedures and introduced a more promotional regulatory
approach. One of the strongest proponents of these
reforms was Colombia, which was planning to implement
a series of projects in its mining and petroleum sectors
(COINVERTIR, 1998).
On 29 March 1991, against a backdrop of sweeping
economic reforms driven by the restructuring of national
governments and by trade and financial liberalization
programmes, the signatories to the Cartagena Agreement
once again found it necessary to revise their common
legislation. So it was that, in order to stimulate and
promote the flow of foreign capital and technology to
the Andean economies, the Common Regime was
modified through the replacement of Decision 220 by
Decision 291.
Decision 291 introduced a number of major changes
which were aimed at removing obstacles to foreign
investment and encouraging the flow of foreign capital
and technology to the Andean economies. All references
to prior authorizations were eliminated, leaving only the
requirement that investments be registered with the
relevant national agency. Legislation on the subject also
enshrined the principle of equal treatment for foreign,
mixed and local firms, as well as the right to remit profits
and capital (without any upper limit being set on the
amount of such remittances) and to have access to all
applicable tariff benefits within the Andean Community
framework.
In addition to increasing the flexibility of their
guidelines, the Andean Community countries made major
changes in their economic policies. As a result, a number
of significant differences in focus of the countries’
development strategies began to emerge.
• At one end of the spectrum was Peru, which had
embarked upon a far-reaching process of economic
reform that included trade and financial
liberalization, privatization of State assets and the
implementation of one of Latin America’s most
liberal foreign capital regimes. These changes
strained relations between the Peruvian authorities
and the institutions of the Andean integration
scheme. The dispute became so heated that threats
were made by both sides regarding Peru’s possible
departure from the Andean Community. Both sides
eventually softened their stances, however, and this,
together with a gradual erosion of the power of the
Community’s institutions, kept Peru within the
integration scheme, albeit under special rules,
particularly in respect of the common external tariff.
• Bolivia, Colombia and Venezuela also launched
economic reform plans which, although less radical
than the Peruvian programme, included the
privatization of some major public enterprises. The
Bolivian authorities put in place an innovative
programme, known as the Capitalization Plan (see
box II.1), to transfer the country’s largest public
firms to the private sector. This mechanism provided
a number of Bolivia’s flagship enterprises with fresh
resources to finance ambitious investment and
modernization plans, while at the same time laying
the foundations for the development of a capital
market and a private pension fund administration
system. In Colombia, electricity firms, financial
entities and mining companies were the main assets
to be transferred to the private sector. In Venezuela,
the government privatized telecommunications
companies, air transport and a number of
manufacturing firms, but retained control over
Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), the largest
firm in the entire Andean region. Both Venezuela
and Bolivia have also pursued a policy of
establishing closer relations with other subregional
groupings, such as the Southern Common Market
(Mercosur) of which Bolivia is actually an associate
member, while Colombia and Venezuela are
members of the Group of Three, together with
Mexico.
• At the other end of the spectrum is Ecuador, where
“pro-market” reforms were less ambitious and
privatization plans encountered staunch opposition
from both political circles and civil society.
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Box II.1
BOLIVIA: THE CAPITALIZATION PLAN
In the first half of the 1990s, Bolivia
launched an ambitious programme of
structural reforms known as the Plan
de Todos (“plan for all”). As part of
these reforms, a vast and innovative
privatization process was devised for
the purpose of capitalizing large State-
owned companies. The objectives of
the authorities were to increase the
rate of investment to over 20% of GDP
and encourage foreign investment. A
private pension fund management
system was created so that the
resources generated by this initiative
could be channelled directly to the
capitalized companies and to the
Bolivian population. The process was
also designed to attract the world’s
leading corporations into the Bolivian
market in order to lend solidity to the
process and enhance the credibility of
the Bolivian State in the eyes of the
international community. State-owned
enterprises were thus turned into
mixed capital corporations, in which
Bolivian citizens owned a 50% stake
and foreign capital the other 50%.
In 1994 this reform was launched
with the creation of the Ministry of
Capitalization and the establishment of
interdisciplinary groups responsible for
overseeing the process in each of the
companies. The process also required
substantial modifications in the
regulatory framework applying to the
economic sectors in which the
capitalized firms operated. The most
significant reforms took place in the
hydrocarbons and electrical energy
sectors. The Capitalization Plan
encompassed the main utilities:
Empresa Nacional de
Telecomunicaciones (ENTEL),
Empresa Nacional de Ferrocarriles
(ENFE), Lloyd Aéreo Boliviano (LAB),
Empresa Nacional de Electricidad
(ENDE), and the transport, exploration
and production of hydrocarbons
conducted by Yacimientos Petrolíferos
Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB). The Vinto
mining concern was finally sold in 2000
because, although it had been included
in the original plan, it proved difficult to
find an investor willing to run it.
In the early stages of the
Capitalization Plan, it exceeded the
authorities’ expectations. The process
raised investments worth more than
double the book value of the firms
included in the Plan. (The book value
was reckoned at US$ 648 million, while
the revenues of the capitalization
process amounted to US$ 1.671 billion,
which was equivalent to 257% of the
original estimate.) (Cossio, 2001). This
investment channel had a strong impact
on FDI, as slightly over half of all inflows
to the country in the period 1995-2000
were generated by firms privatized
under the Plan (ECLAC, 2000). In 2001
and 2002, however, Capitalization Plan
funds began to decline markedly as a
proportion of total FDI inflows. This
decline signalled that the process has
run its course, since the firms had
discharged 98.4% of their commitments
by the end of 2002 (MCEI, 2002). The
foreign firms that came out as “winners”
in this process included some of the
leaders in their respective fields: Royal
Dutch Shell Group, Telecom Italia and
Enron Corporation.
FDI IN CAPITALIZED FIRMS, 1995-2002a
(Millions of dollars)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total Shortfall Additional
FDIb
Electricity 2.17 23.82 31.09 51.94 45.73 0.56 1.36 1.79 158.45 6.18 24.78
EE Guaracachi 0.62 0.71 4.87 30.13 29.84 66.17 19.04
EE Valle Hermoso 0.31 21.45 12.98 3.96 0.59 0.23 0.14 39.66 5.74
EE Corani 1.24 1.66 13.23 17.86 15.30 0.33 1.22 1.79 52.61 6.18 -
Transport 5.00 40.64 203.95 208.60 217.12 95.31 97.13 2.13 869.88 519.80
FC Andina 2.87 5.78 4.48 0.54 13.67 0.42
FC Oriental 3.90 12.49 15.98 9.15 2.13 43.65 17.80
LAB 5.0 33.87 2.30 2.30 2.30 2.30 1.728 49.81 2.34
Transredes 183.38 185.84 205.12 93.01 95.40 762.75 499.25
Hydrocarbons 162.23 281.17 133.21 64.82 23.87 665.29 93.85
Petrolera Andina 62.23 175.07 60.84 1.09 299.23 34.46
Petrolera Cahaco 100.00 106.10 72.36 63.73 23.87 366.06 59.40
Communications 136.46 148.12 109.65 64.31 49.69 63.12 18.66 590.01 -
ENTEL 136.46 148.12 109.65 64.31 49.69 63.12 18.66 590.01 19.99 -
Total 7.17 200.92 545.38 651.36 460.37 210.38 185.79 22.59 2 228.64 19.99 638.44
Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, Division of Production, Productivity and Management, on
the basis of figures provided by The Department of Private Investment, Office of the Under-Secretary of Exports and Private Investment,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Investment.
a
 Information available up to third quarter of 2002.
b
 Additional investments made outside the framework of the Capitalization Plan.
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The impact that the capitalization
process has had on fiscal revenues
through direct transfers and taxes has
been mixed. In the cases of ENTEL
and LAB, the impact appears to have
been negative, but in ENFE, ENDE and
particularly YPFB, the results have
been positive (Salinas, 2001).
Investment commitments were
established when capitalization
contracts were drawn up in order to
secure a capital contribution to
modernize the respective firms and
enhance the efficiency and coverage of
their services. With the exception of
ENTEL and Empresa Eléctrica Corani,
the privatized companies received
investments far in excess of the
commitments made by the investors at
the time of purchase. Between 1995
and mid-2002, total investments by
capital ized f irms amounted to
US$ 2.279 billion, which was US$ 642
million more than the sum originally
committed (MCEI, 2002). The most
tangible effects of the process have
been seen in the sectors of
telecommunications, electrical energy
and, especially, hydrocarbons.
• Before the capitalization of ENTEL,
Bolivia had a telephone density of
four lines per 100 inhabitants, had
265,000 lines in service and 65% of
its network was digitalized. Given
the lag in this subsector, the
capitalization strategy of ENTEL
consisted of providing universal
access to the telecommunications
network by supplying higher quality
services and wider coverage. Five
years after its capitalization began,
the landscape of the sector has
changed dramatically. Increases in
the penetration rates of local fixed
telephony and public telephone
service have kept pace with a
spectacular expansion in mobile
telephony, and the charges for the
different services have decreased
substantially. Between 1995 and
2001, the number of main telephone
lines per 100 inhabitants almost
doubled (from 3.33% to 6.22%), and
the number of subscribers to mobile
telephone services rose from
10,000 to 744,000.
• The capitalization of ENDE has led
to a large increase in the generation
capacity of the National
Interconnected System (SIN). In the
last five years, national coverage
has expanded from 31% to almost
43% (Cossio, 2001). As in the
telecommunications subsector, the
expansion of the electric power
sector has gone hand in hand with
a reduction in real rates (Salinas,
2001).
• Hydrocarbons have been the most
dynamic sector since the
capitalization of the State energy
firm, YPFB. In fact, investment in
exploration and production has
expanded sixfold since the time the
sector was run by YPFB. This has
significantly increased proven
reserves of petroleum and natural
gas (Cossio, 2001). Between 1997
and 2001, reserves of natural gas
increased by 5.7 trillion cubic feet
(TCF) to 46.8 TCF, and reserves of
petroleum from 201 million to 692
million barrels. Bolivia thus became
the second-ranking country in terms
of natural gas reserves in South
America, after Venezuela (EIA,
2002a). The Bolivian authorities see
the development of the natural gas
sector and the fiscal revenues it will
provide –through taxes and
royalties– as a means of achieving
rapid growth and reducing poverty
levels.
In summary, as well as increasing
FDI inflows, the Capitalization Plan has
greatly improved the administration of
companies that were previously
running deficits, and this has helped to
reduce the pressure on public finances.
As a result of this process, the Bolivian
State has also been able to achieve
major savings, especially with regard to
large infrastructure projects –such as
the gas pipeline to Brazil– and the
exploration and development of new
deposits of hydrocarbons.
Box II.1 (concluded)
Source: ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies.
In summary, the supranational rules established by
the Andean Community have given member countries
increasing degrees of freedom to define their own FDI
policies. As a result, the countries have been moving away
from the original directives developed within the
integration scheme and have been adapting their legislation
to fit in with their own national interests. Today, although
their umbrella legislation still exists, the Andean countries
each have specific rules on the treatment of FDI. All of
these nations’ bodies of legislation are liberal in spirit and
are conducive to the establishment of a broad presence by
foreign capital in their domestic economies.
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The Andean subregion has not been a major destination
for the FDI that has been pouring into Latin America and
the Caribbean in recent years (see chapter 1). The Andean












Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies,
Division of Production, Productivity and Management, on the basis of balance-of-
payments statistics from IMF and national sources.
Table II.1
FDI FLOWS TO THE ANDEAN COMMUNITY COUNTRIES, BY DESTINATION, 1990-2002
(Millions of dollars)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Bolivia 27 52 93 124 130 393 474 731 949 1 010 725 662 612
- Privatization … … 9 12 0 66 31 0 10 148 0 … ...
- Petroleum ... ... 84 66 63 125 53 299 544 449 408 484 ...
Colombia 500 457 729 959 1 446 968 3 112 5 562 2 829 1 468 2 280 2 328 1 950
- Privatization … … … … … 298 333 2 324 … … … … ...
- Petroleum 270 264 440 557 135 151 778 382 91 -551 -639 347 ...
Ecuador 126 160 178 474 576 452 500 724 870 648 720 1 330 1 335
- Privatization … … … 8 92 20 20 58 … … … … ...
- Petroleum 90 124 146 395 368 320 302 555 754 615 680 1 120 ...
Perú 41 -7 152 686 3 107 2 558 3 471 2 140 1 644 1 939 662 1 064 1 943
- Privatization 0 0 6 168 2 241 547 1 688 145 60 219 229 267 ...
- Petroleum 39 9 119 9 310 173 132 89 141 282 35 3 ...
Venezuela 451 1 916 629 372 813 985 2 183 5 536 4 495 3 290 4 465 3 448 1 389
- Privatization 0 1 469 7 0 0 27 12 743 … … … … ...
- Petroleum 0 0 0 0 195 539 1 087 3 164 1 731 2 045 1 354 2 165 ...
Andean Community 1 145 2 578 1 781 2 615 6 072 5 356 9 740 14 693 10 787 8 355 8 851 8 832 7 229
Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, Division of Production, Productivity and Management, on the
basis of figures provided by the Andean Community and the central banks of the member countries.
2.  Recent trends in FDI in the Andean Community
of total regional inflows, thereby coming in well behind
the other Southern American regional grouping, Mercosur,
and the region’s main recipient economies, Brazil and
Mexico (see figure II.1 and table II.1).
Figure II.1
SHARE OF THE ANDEAN COMMUNITY IN TOTAL FDI FLOWS TO
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 1990-2001
(Percentages)
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Although the Andean Community represents no
more than a small fraction of FDI flows to the region, in
relative terms its economies have turned in a similar, or
even better, performance than the Latin American
Integration Association (LAIA) taken as a whole (see
figure II.2). Between 1995 and 2002, the Andean
Community received more than three times as much FDI
as it had in the first half of the decade, which suggests
that foreign investors saw new business opportunities in
the subregion and were not deterred by the trying
circumstances that have arisen in the Andean countries.
In fact, the performance of the Andean Community has
been one of the most stable in the region in recent years.
Between 1999 and 2002, when the great majority of Latin
American countries were experiencing downturns in FDI
inflows, the Andean Community was attracting
remarkably regular investment flows of around US$ 8.8
billion per year. The downside to this stability, however,
is that investment has tended to be concentrated in just a
few economic activities, mainly those undergoing
privatization (Bolivia, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela)
and those involved in the gradual opening of the
petroleum sector (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and
Venezuela) (see table II.1). The fact that manufacturing
industries have attracted a very small percentage of FDI
inflows suggests that TNCs have not responded to the
supposed benefits of the Andean Community’s
integration scheme, particularly during periods when one
or more of these economies experience serious economic
and political problems.
Figure II.2
FDI FLOWS TO THE LATIN AMERICAN INTEGRATION ASSOCIATION










1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Andean Community Latin American Integration Association (LAIA)
Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, Division of Production, Productivity
and Management, on the basis of balance-of-payments statistics from IMF and national sources.
Plans for the privatization of public utilities have
been specific to each country within the Andean
Community and have not ref lected any sort of
subregional directive. These programmes have targeted
public utilities and infrastructure (particularly
telecommunications and electr icity), financial
institutions and extractive industries (mainly mining and
oil drilling companies). The intensity, speed and scope
of these programmes have varied substantially from one
economy to another. Peru has been at one extreme, with
the most extensive and ambitious programme, while
Ecuador, which has experienced the most difficulties
in carrying forward privatization plans, stands at the
other end of the spectrum. Other important, albeit more
limited, initiatives have been carried out in Colombia
(mainly in electricity, banking and mining) and
Venezuela (telecommunications, air transport, iron and
steel, and finance).
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Privatizations had a particularly strong impact on
FDI inflows in 1991 in Venezuela, with the sale of the
Compañía Anónima Nacional de Teléfonos de Venezuela
(CANTV); between 1994 and 1996 in Peru, with the
privatization of the Empresa Nacional de
Telecomunicaciones (Entel) and some of the main
electricity generation and distribution companies;
between 1995 and 1998 in Colombia, with the sale of
electricity companies; and since 1996 in Bolivia, with
the implementation of the Capitalization Plan (see table
II.A-1).
As in other Latin American economies, a number of
mergers and acquisitions involving firms that had been
privatized in the 1990s took place in the Andean
Community countries. This process led to a concentration
of ownership among some of the subregion’s largest
firms, such as Telefónica del Perú, Electricidad de
Caracas and several telecommunications companies,
mainly in the mobile telephony segment. In addition,
foreign investors bought some of the largest financial
institutions in Bolivia, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela,
as well as private local firms in the foods, beverages and
non-ferrous minerals (cement) sectors in Colombia, Peru
and Venezuela (see table II.A-2). The purchase of existing
assets thus became one of foreign investors’ preferred
strategies for gaining entry and positioning themselves
in Andean markets, particularly in the utilities,
infrastructure and financial sectors. As a result, services
accounted for 36.4% of FDI flows into Andean
Community countries between 1992 and 2001, and a
significantly higher proportion in Colombia, Bolivia and
Peru (see table II.2).
Table II.2
MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE ANDEAN COMMUNITY: CUMULATIVE FDI FLOWS,
BY ECONOMIC SECTOR, 1992-2001
(Percentages)
AndeanBolivia Colombia Ecuador Peru Venezuela
 Community
Primary 53.6 17.9 81.7 7.8 34.4 30.1
- Mines and quarries 5.6 9.4 - - - -
- Petroleun and gasa 48.1 7.8 80.7 7.5 33.0 29.3
Manufactures 9.1 21.2 6.2 6.3 28.9 19.4
Services 43.9 60.9 12.0 38.9 24.1 36.4
- Electricity, gas and water - 17.1 - 9.1 0.8 6.4
- Commerce - 5.2 4.9 3.5 2.5 3.4
- Transport and telecommunication - 10.1 2.3 15.9 2.1 6.7
- Finance - 24.3 - 9.1 17.8 15.3
- Other services - 4.2 4.8 1.3 0.9 4.6
Other -6.7 - - 47.0 b 12.5 14.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, Division of Production, Productivity and
Management, on the basis of figures provided by the Andean Community and the central banks of the member countries.
a
 In Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, mining and petroleum activities are grouped under a single heading.
b
 In Peru, the statistics prepared by the National Commission on Foreign Investment and Technology (CONITE) differ considerably
from the data supplied by the Central Reserve Bank of Peru. The Andean Community has corrected the CONITE figures on the
basis of the balance of payments so that the investment figures will correspond to actual flows rather than registered figures.
Consequently, the sectoral destination of a large portion of these FDI flows cannot be determined.
In the hydrocarbons sector, rather than privatizing
their public enterprises, the governments of Colombia,
Ecuador and Venezuela decided to offer association
contracts to foreign investors interested in exploring and
exploiting deposits or secondary areas. This mechanism
enabled the national authorities to tap resources that
otherwise would have been impossible to exploit, either
because of a lack of funding or because of the difficulties
involved in obtaining and using the requisite technology.
The gradual liberalization of activities in the petroleum
and natural gas sectors consequently translated into
massive inflows of FDI.
In Venezuela and Colombia, FDI was more highly
concentrated in the manufacturing sector than it was in
the subregion as a whole owing to the size of these
countries’ markets and their greater degree of industrial
development (see table II.2). Liberalization and reforms
made the domestic market more attractive to investors,
and this, together with their integration strategy,
positioned both countries as potential export platforms,
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especially for sales to the rest of the Andean region
(COINVERTIR, 1998). The continuation of operations
by United States and Japanese subsidiaries in the
automotive sector is an important factor in this respect.
In addition, a number of manufacturing firms in the food,
beverages and tobacco; hygiene and cleaning products,
and chemicals and pharmaceuticals sectors cater to the
Andean market. In fact, many large firms have chosen to
set up manufacturing concerns in Venezuela and
Colombia so that they can take advantage of these
countries’ membership in the Andean Community as a
trampoline for exports to other member countries. This
has been particularly significant in the automotive
industry in Venezuela, where General Motors and Ford
Motors (both United States firms), DaimlerChrysler
(Germany) and Toyota (Japan) have increased allocations
for the production of exports, especially to Colombia and
Ecuador. In addition, thanks to the existing degree of
specialization among the Andean subsidiaries of vehicle
assembly firms, Colombia has also been able to export
to Venezuela.3
Extractive industries in the hydrocarbons sector
–and, in some cases, metal mining– and access to services
markets (mainly through the acquisition of existing
assets) have thus accounted for much of the FDI that has
flowed into the subregion in the past decade (see tables
II.1 and II.2). In the larger economies, the manufacturing
sector has received a relatively greater share thanks to
the presence of a number of production activities with
potential access to a broader subregional market.
With regard to the geographic origin of FDI inflows,
the United States is the single largest investor in the
Andean Community. Between 1992 and 2001, almost
24% of total flows into the subregion came from United
States firms (see table II.3). The next largest investor is
the European Union as a whole and, within it, Spain,
which is the second most important single-country
investor. As in the rest of Latin America, within a quite
brief span of time Spanish firms have managed to increase
their presence in most of the Andean countries and
especially so in Colombia and Peru, where they have
been key players in the privatization of State electricity
and telecommunications firms. Other European countries
that are high up on the list include Italy, thanks to Telecom
Italia’s stake in The Bolivian Empresa Nacional de
Telecomunicaciones (Entel), and the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom, whose oil companies have investments
in Bolivia, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela. As part of a
general pattern seen throughout Latin America, Japanese
investment in the Andean Community is limited to a few
mining projects in Peru and Venezuela and a number of
vehicle assembly plants in Colombia and Venezuela.
Although the figures indicate that investments from
other Latin American countries are significant, these
statistics need to be examined very carefully. First, the
figures are distorted by the fact that a substantial share
of the resources flowing into the Andean Community
either has no clear origin –a problem attributable to
national registration authorities– or comes from financial
centres. These centres are used by foreign investors for
tax purposes and conceal large amounts of funds, which
come mainly from the industrialized countries. Second,
these problems notwithstanding, it is quite clear that intra-
subregional investments are very limited.  This fact calls
into question some of the basic principles underlying the
integration process since its inception.  Third, some of
the largest Latin American investors have been replaced
by capital from other sources as a result of the acquisition
of Latin American networks previously established by
major Argentine and Chilean firms. Examples include
the Argentine petroleum firm Yacimientos Petrolíferos
Fiscales (YPF), which ran operations in a number of
Andean economies before being bought by Repsol of
Spain, and the strong presence established by Chilean
energy firms in Peru and Colombia before they came
under the ownership of extraregional investors –Endesa-
España and AES Corporation– following the purchase
of their parent companies (Enersis and Gener).
3 The automotive industry received a boost from a purpose-designed programme which Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela signed in 1993
and updated in 1999. The aim of the programme is to take greater advantage of the Andean market and lay the foundations for the
continued development of the automotive sector in the Community. Based on this agreement, the countries have announced plans to
expand vehicle production in the subregion from 212,000 to 500,000 units in less than 10 years. The new agreement does away with
subregional content rules, in compliance with a provision of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and establishes a specific origin rule,
as required by the Andean Community in order for locally assembled vehicles to gain access to the Andean market. This agreement entered
into force in January 2000 and will remain in effect until 2010, when it may be extended. The new mechanism has fostered the development
of producers of automotive parts and related services in Colombia, Venezuela and, to a lesser extent, Ecuador.
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Table II.3
ANDEAN COMMUNITY: CUMULATIVE FDI, BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, 1992-2001
(Percentages)
AndeanBolivia Colombia Ecuador Peru Venezuela Community
Developed countries 72.2 45.9 76.3 43.9 61.1 54.4
European Union 30.0 25.9 16.6 34.4 22.4 25.6
- Germany 0.8 2.1 2.0 0.3 1.4 1.4
- Spain 4.0 13.8 4.2 14.1 6.1 9.3
- France 2.8 1.4 1.0 1.3 4.4 2.7
- Italy 10.8 0.6 5.0 0.2 0.6 1.5
- Netherlands 7.6 5.3 1.8 5.0 4.0 4.6
- United Kingdom 2.3 1.0 2.2 12.8 4.8 5.1
North America 41.4 14.6 58.7 8.4 34.8 26.8
- Canada 0.6 4.6 16.5 0.6 1.3 3.1
- United States 40.8 10.0 42.2 7.8 33.5 23.8
Other developed countries 0.9 5.1 1.1 1.1 3.7 2.0
- Japan 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.4 2.7 1.4
Developing countries 32.4 46.9 14.9 8.5 39.0 22.7
Latin America and the Caribbean 32.3 46.7 14.9 7.7 13.6 21.8
- Andean Community 2.6 2.2 1.0 0.7 0.6 1.2
- Mercosur 20.2 0.7 5.3 1.2 2.9 3.3
  (Argentina) (11.9) (0.1) (4.0) (0.4) (2.9) (2.3)
- Chile 5.2 1.6 1.6 3.2 0.7 1.8
- Mexico 0.0 0.7 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.3
- Central America and the Caribbean 4.3 41.5 a 6.5 2.3 9.3 15.4
Other unclassified -4.6 7.2 8.8 47.6b 23.8 22.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, Division of Production, Productivity and
Management, on the basis of figures provided by the Andean Community and the central banks of the member countries.
a
 In Colombia, a significant portion of FDI comes from financial centres, particularly the Cayman Islands, Bermuda and the Virgin Islands.
b
 In Peru, the statistics prepared by the National Commission on Foreign Investment and Technology (CONITE) differ considerably
from the data supplied by the Central Reserve Bank of Peru. The Andean Community has corrected the CONITE figures on the
basis of the balance of payments so that the investment figures will correspond to actual flows rather than registered figures.
Consequently, the sectoral destination of a large portion of these FDI flows cannot be determined.
Foreign firms’ pattern of specialization in the Andean
Community did not help to overcome the member countries’
failings in terms of international competitiveness. Between
1985 and 2000, this regional grouping’s share of world
imports dropped from 1.3% to 0.9%, while its export
structure –which revolves around natural resources and a
few resource-based manufactures– remained virtually
unchanged. The situation varies from one country to another,
however. Colombia, for example, has increased its export
diversification and its proportion of non-resource-based
exports (see table II-A.5). Nonetheless, as of  2000 the
external sector of the Andean countries was still heavily
reliant on primary goods, with natural resources accounting
for almost 62% of the export basket (84% if resource-based
manufactures are included) (see table II-A.4). Hydrocarbons
are the main export product of three of the Andean
economies –Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador– and figure
among the 10 main exports of the other two (Bolivia and
Peru) (see table II-A.5). Certainly, the export figures for the
subregion are strongly influenced by Venezuela’s strong
specialization in oil and by the large volumes it produces
and exports, but the fact remains that no technologically
sophisticated goods figure among its principal export
products (see table II-A.4).
In summary, FDI flows to the Andean Community
rose in the second half of the 1990s.  Nevertheless,
they expanded at substantially lower rates than they
did for Latin America as a whole, which suggests that
foreign investors have been hesitant to embark upon
new undertakings in the subregion. The volume of FDI
inflows was largely attributable to privatizations, the
reform of the financial sector and the partial
liberalization of the hydrocarbons sector, which was
accomplished without lessening the relevant States’
stake in the ownership and management of their oil
companies except in the cases of Peru and Bolivia.
Privatization enabled operators that were very active
in other Latin American economies to establish
advantageous market positions in the Andean
countries’ utilities and infrastructure sectors (see table
II-A.3). Despite significant changes in the ownership
structure of many leading Andean companies and the
implementation of new mining and drilling projects,
the results of the process are still to be seen. The
following section investigates this question further by
analysing the microeconomic effects of the corporate
strategies used by the new agents that are now at the
forefront of economic activity in the subregion.
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B. STRATEGIES USED BY TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS
IN THE ANDEAN COMMUNITY
1. Seeking natural resources for export
4 In order to operate in Colombia, foreign oil companies have to negotiate an association contract with ECOPETROL. Contracts usually run for
a fixed period of 28 years, which may be extended to 30 years if natural gas is found together with the oil. In the past 30 years, around 93% of
Colombia’s oil output has been drilled under the terms of association contracts. An association contract is a strategic contractual alliance in
which ECOPETROL becomes a partner of a foreign company (or consortium) to drill and develop hydrocarbon deposits and distribute these
products after the payment of the corresponding royalties. The partner company usually assumes 100% of the risk and the exploration costs,
and ECOPETROL shares past and future expenses once the discovery is declared to be commercially viable (Barrios, 2001).
The Andean countries possess large reserves of petroleum
and mining resources. Over the last 100 years, dominance
in these activities has alternated between TNCs and the
State. The 1990s saw a series of reforms that allowed
private –especially foreign– capital into the different
segments of these activities. Not all the Andean
Community countries opened up these areas of activity
to the same degree, especially in the case of the oil sector.
However, in those that did, some of the world’s largest
TNCs entered the market to launch new projects.
(a) Hydrocarbons: the great wealth of the Andean
countries
The Andean countries began to tap their first major
oil deposits in the late nineteenth century, and in the 1920s
they began to market these resources internationally. This
process was largely conducted by foreign firms, which
were drawn to the subregion by its national authorities’
decision to launch an active policy of concessions. Some
of the world’s largest oil companies –Exxon Corporation,
Texaco, Inc., Mobil Oil Company and Royal Dutch Shell–
became market leaders in Colombia, Ecuador and
Venezuela. Later, as the Andean governments came to
realize how much wealth was buried under their soil,
they set up new legal mechanisms that would allow them
to reap part of the earnings generated by this activity.
In the period following the Second World War,
national governments began to taken on a larger role and
to share operations in the oil sector with TNCs. The
Empresa Colombiana de Petróleos (ECOPETROL) was
founded in 1948 and began operations in 1951, when
the Exxon Corporation’s De Mares contract came to an
end and the concession reverted to the State. In 1953,
Bolivia nationalized its hydrocarbons industry, which
then began to be administered by Yacimientos
Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB). Venezuela set
up its first public oil company, the Corporación
Venezolana de Petróleo (CVP), in 1960. In October 1968,
the Peruvian Government nationalized the assets of the
International Petroleum Company (IPC) and created
Petróleos de Peru (Petroperú). Foreign capital was not
barred from participation, however, and Petroperú
operated alongside a number of transnational petroleum
companies (Campodónico, 1999).
The shift towards greater State involvement in the
oil industry in the Andean countries gathered momentum
when international oil prices began to climb in 1973.
This trend was particularly strong in Venezuela, which
possesses Latin America’s largest oil reserves (see figure
II-A.1). In 1971 new legislation was passed which
reserved for the State –through CVP– the right to operate
natural gas interests in Venezuela. In 1975, the
Venezuelan Congress approved the Nationalization Act,
under which the hydrocarbons industry and trade in these
products became the sole reserve of the State, concessions
were voided and petroleum resources were transferred
to the State. Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) was created
in 1976 to administer the national petroleum industry.
Ecuador also adopted a new, strongly nationalist
policy on petroleum in the 1970s and went on to found
the Compañía Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana (CEPE).
Contracts with foreign firms were reviewed, and some
older concessions reverted to the State, giving it control
over 80% of the country’s oil industry. Ecuador began to
export hydrocarbons following the discovery of large
reserves in the Amazonian region of Pañacocha.
Colombia was faced with a difficult situation during
this period. For the first time in the country’s history,
known oil reserves were being depleted faster than new
reserves were being discovered. In response to this
situation, and in the light of the prevailing trend in the
region’s other oil-producing countries, the State redefined
its policy on petroleum. The largest foreign-owned
concessions reverted to State ownership, and many of
these firms’ assets were acquired by ECOPETROL. At
the same time, the government entered into new
association contracts4 in order to redefine access
conditions for foreign firms and give a boost to
exploration. These activities led to the discovery of large
hydrocarbons deposits in the first half of the 1980s in
Caño Limón, Cusiana and Cupiagua, which substantially
increased the country’s reserves (see figure II-A.1).
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(i) The gradual return of TNCs to the
petroleum industry5
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the lack of public
funds for investment in exploration and drilling
operations prompted the governments to find ways of
encouraging private investors to play a more active role
in the hydrocarbons subsector. This led to the elimination
of State monopolies in the various phases of the
production process.  Bolivia and Peru privatized their
State monopolies so that private investors could take part
in the exploration, operation, marketing and distribution
of petroleum and petroleum products. Ecuador and
Venezuela introduced or extended mechanisms for
establishing partnerships or associations with foreign
companies to implement new projects (Moguillansky and
Bielschowsky, 2001). Colombia maintained the scheme
it had created in 1974.
In the early 1990s the liberalization of the petroleum
sector gathered pace in Peru. The process of privatizing
PETROPERU6 was begun, and a new Hydrocarbons Act
was passed that provided greater incentives for foreign
firms and put an end to the State-run company’s
monopoly. The next phase of the privatization programme
was postponed several times because the necessary
agreements could not be reached. Finally, in late 1996, a
new plan was introduced and some prized assets, such
as La Pampilla refinery, the Petrolube lubricants plant
and some oilfields were sold to the private sector for more
than US$ 700 million plus investment commitments
worth US$ 119 million (Paliza, 2000).
In 1996, production began to decline (see figure
II-A.2), turning Peru into a net importer of oil, mainly
from Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela. Today, four
companies account for 90% of its oil production:
Occidental Petroleum and Petrotech of the United States
and Plupetrol and Pecom (formerly Pérez Companc) of
Argentina. There are extensive, largely unexplored
regions in the north of Peru, thus the country has
enormous potential natural gas reserves. The present
Administration hopes to encourage foreign investment
in hydrocarbons and is looking into new types of
incentives to make the industry more attractive.
In Bolivia, most of the assets of YPFB were sold
under the country’s Capitalization Plan (see box II.1). In
1997, fields for exploration and production of
hydrocarbons began to be tendered on an annual basis.7
Colombia maintained its policy of pursuing
exploration both directly and through associations,
entering into joint ventures, compiling assay data on
reserves and opening up new areas under tendering
schemes. As the financial situation of Ecopetrol
improved, its stake was gradually increased, although
most new investments in exploration have been made by
partner firms (see figure II.3). At the beginning of 2000,
no new finds had followed the major discoveries at Caño
Limón, Cusiana and Cupiagua, which translated into a
gradual decline in proven reserves, and in their useful
life (see figure II-A.2).
As a result of the sharp downturn in Colombian
production in the last few years, which threatened to turn
it into a hydrocarbon importer by 2004 (see figure
II-A.2), Ecopetrol approved major changes in oil policy
and in the terms of its association contracts. In September
1999 it introduced attractive incentives to revive foreign
companies’ interest in exploration and to counteract the
risk aversion generated by guerrilla sabotage of oil
industry infrastructure.8 The main change was the
reduction of the State company’s stake from 50% to 30%
once an exploratory phase has proved to be successful;
this allows the partner firm to increase its share of the
reserves and recover its costs more quickly.
5 For further details see ECLAC (2002), chapter IV.
6 The total assets of PETROPERU were not included in the first stage of privatization. The main assets at this stage were Compañía Peruana
de Gas (Solgas), 83 retail service stations and the shipping company which owned the tankers, Petrolera Transoceánica.
7 In 1997, 16 blocks were tendered out, followed by six in 1998 and five in 1999. In 1999, Pluspetrol was the only bidder. In 2000 and 2001,
two and four blocks, respectively, were tendered out. In late 2002, YPFB offered concessions on nine blocks; two of these blocks were in
non-traditional areas (Rio Beni and Puerto Linares) while the other seven were in traditional petroleum- and gas-producing areas (Cedro,
Bato, Ipita, Inau, Irenda, Itaguazurenda and Buena Vista). No bids were entered, however, and the auction was declared void. A new round
was scheduled for early 2003 (Alexander’s Gas and Oil Connections, vol. 7, No. 20, 15 October 2002).
8 Between mid-1986 and late 2001, the hydrocarbon transport system had sustained some 900 attacks in which explosives were used. The
Caño Limón-Puerto Coveñas pipeline, which services the Caño Limón field, was attacked 170 times during 2001 alone. The government
puts the cost of the attacks perpetrated over the last 15 years at a total of US$ 1.5 billion (EIU, 2002a).
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9 Thirteen contracts were awarded in this round, five for exploration and eight for incremental production.
10 This is particularly important because, out of the 167 fields discovered in Colombia in the history of the industry, less than 20 have held
more than 100 million barrels of reserves (Ecopetrol press release, 31 May 2002).
11 After six years of exploration, petroleum deposits have been found in four of the eight fields (La Ceiba, East Paria, West Paria and San
Carlos), and commercial production is expected to begin in late 2004. At the end of 2001, four of the blocks were returned to PDVSA.
Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, Division of Production, Productivity and
Management, on the basis of figures provided by Empresa Colombiana de Petróleos (ECOPETROL).
These changes rekindled foreign investors’ interest
in Colombia’s hydrocarbons sector, and the authorities
viewed the tender round of 2000 as a great success.9
ECOPETROL expects the 58 new association contracts
signed in 2000 and 2001 –security conditions permitting–
to generate investments of close to US$ 750 million in
exploration in 2002-2003. Working within the framework
of an association contract, ECOPETROL, the Brazilian
firm Petrobras and the Canadian firm Nexen (formerly
Canadian Petroleum Company) discovered a field at
Guandó, which turned out to be the most important find
since Cusiana-Cupiagua. In early 2002, two new fields
were found in the western and southern regions of the
country, with estimated reserves of 100 million barrels
each.10 With these discoveries, the prospect of Colombia
becoming an importer of crude oil has receded, at least
for the moment.
In 1992, Venezuela began to liberalize its petroleum
industry by offering local and foreign private investors
the opportunity to invest in production activities.  Three
different investment categories were available: (i) operating
contracts for mature fields; (ii) development of new
areas through joint venture exploration contracts; and
(iii) strategic associations for developing the Orinoco Belt.
Since this process began, 20-year operating concessions
for a total of 33 fields have been awarded to international
consortiums in three different bidding rounds. Eight blocks
have been licensed under shared risk and earnings schemes
for a total payment of US$ 800 million.11 There are now
four partnerships that are working on projects designed to
drill extra heavy crude in the Orinoco Belt at a total
investment of around US$ 13.5 million.
Lately, private firms’ move into the petroleum  industry
has suffered a setback. The current Administration has given
repeated assurances that it will respect the terms of existing
contracts, but it is unlikely that any new licenses will be
awarded in the near future. Moreover, in November 2001 a
new Hydrocarbons Act was passed which increases
petroleum royalties from 16.7% to 30% and reserves a stake
of over 50% for the State in joint ventures that are in the
business of exploring for, drilling, transporting or storing
crude oil. Some firms have argued that it will be impossible
to continue with these projects under such conditions, given
the high cost of drilling heavy crude in the Orinoco Belt.
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The Ecuadorian Government set up a mechanism for
the issuance of petroleum concessions in the mid-1980s.
In 1989, the Empresa Estatal de Petróleos del Ecuador
(PETROECUADOR) was created out of the former
(CEPE). The more active role played by
PETROECUADOR and the involvement of private capital
led to a major increase in proven petroleum reserves (see
figure II-A.1). Underinvestment between 1994 and 2000
led to a year-upon-year decline in the company’s output,
however (EIU, 2001). In 2000, its  share of  total production
dropped to 60%, with the rest being accounted for by
contract arrangements with private firms.
A large number of new discoveries have been made
in the past few years, and proven and probable reserves
are now estimated at some 6.18 billion barrels. The
biggest find has been in the Ishpingo Tambococha
Tiputini field in the Amazon region, on the border with
Peru, with estimated reserves of 700 million barrels. The
State-owned company has sought to attract FDI to the
country’s major deposits in order to raise its production
from about 230,000 barrels per day to 600,000 by 200512
(see figures II-A.1 and II-A.2). The firms that are active
in Ecuador include Repsol-YPF of Spain, Occidental
Petroleum Corp (OXY) and Vintage Petroleum Inc. of
the United States and Pérez Companc of Argentina.
The biggest constraint on the expansion of the
Ecuadorian oil industry is its pipeline network. This has
opened up an opportunity for foreign firms to join the
consortiums that are building pipelines. In June 2000,
work was completed on the extension of the Trans-
Ecuadorian Oil Pipeline System (SOTE), which increased
its capacity to 390,000 barrels per day. In June 2001,
work began on the Heavy Crude Oil Pipeline (OCP),
which is being constructed by a consortium formed by
Alberta Energy of Canada (31.4%), Repsol-YPF of Spain
(25.7%), OXY (12.3%) and Kerr McKee (4%) of the
United States, Pérez Companc (15%) and Techint (4.1%)
of Argentina and Agip of Italy (7.5%). With an investment
of US$ 1.1 billion to build 500 kilometres of pipeline,
work is expected to be completed by the end of 2003.
The pipeline will transport about 450,000 barrels per day,
and OCP will operate it for 20 years. As well as doubling
the existing petroleum transport capacity, this project is
expected to boost GDP by 2.5%, create 52,000 jobs
directly and indirectly, and generate US$ 800 million in
tax revenue (EIU, 2001).
(ii)A booming natural gas industry
After the United States, Venezuela possesses the
largest proven reserves of natural gas in the western
hemisphere, but it has not been very successful in
launching large-scale private initiatives. The Christopher
Columbus Project is one example.  The passage of the
Organic Law on Gaseous Hydrocarbons in September
1999 made Venezuela an interesting prospect for some
of the world’s largest energy companies. In June 2001,
the first steps were taken to tender 11 blocks of non-
associated natural gas; 6 of the 11 areas were awarded to
such bidders as the French-Belgian group TotalFinalElf,
Repsol-YPF of Spain and Pérez Companc and Pluspetrol
of Argentina.
In November 2002, the government signed an
agreement with seven foreign firms to develop five
offshore blocks of natural gas in the Deltana Platform
to the east of Venezuela, which has proven reserves of
100 trillion cubic feet. All ventures are to be conducted
jointly with PDVSA, which holds a stake (60%) in each.
Since most of the output will be exported, a liquefied
natural gas (LNG) plant will also be built13 (EIU,
2002b).
Petroleum production has declined in Peru, but the
Camisea deposits in that country are South America’s
largest natural gas field. In 1984, the British-Netherlands
firm Royal Dutch Shell located reserves of natural gas
and condensates equivalent to 2.4 billion barrels of oil.
This field holds a wealth of resources, but negotiations
concerning its operation have run up against a series of
complications, such as those encountered by the
consortium formed by Shell and Mobil, which abandoned
the project in 1998, citing technical, commercial and
political problems. After many delays, contracts were
finally signed for the development of the Camisea fields
in March 2001. The $2.6-billion Camisea project has
been split into a 40-year contract covering exploration
and production, and a 33-year contract for transportation
and distribution. In February 2000 the upstream
(production) phase of Camisea was auctioned off to a
consortium formed by Pluspetrol of Argentina (40%),
Hunt Oil of the United States (40%) and SK Corporation
of the Republic of Korea (20%). The consortium is
investing about US$ 1.6 billion in the exploration phase,
12 Although the Constitution absolutely prohibits the sale of State-owned petroleum assets, President Noboa’s Administration attempted to
open up the oil industry to foreign firms in the segments of transport (pipelines), investment in refineries and marketing.
13 In February 2002, PDVSA announced that the cost of exploring these fields and bringing them on stream, as well as building a major
natural gas processing complex, would amount to some US$ 4 billion by 2007 (EIU, 2002b). About 4,830 kilometres of gas pipelines
already exist, but no pipelines suitable for export purposes are available.
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US$ 400m of which is to be provided by 2003 (EIU,
2002c). The potential market for this project consists of
power plants in Lima and the central-north area of the
country, as well as large industrial customers.  Exporting
LNG to the west coast of the United States is also a
possibility.
In October 2002 a second auction was held for the
downstream (transport and distribution) phase of the
Camisea project.  The successful (and only) bidder was
a consortium led by Argentina’s Techint14, which has
made a total investment commitment of US$ 1.45 billion;
US$ 401 million of this sum is to be used for a gas
pipeline from Camisea to the coast, and US$ 91 million
for a natural-gas distribution network in Lima and Callao.
Techint has set itself a target of 36-44 months for bring
natural gas to the capital city.
In May 2002, the consortium responsible for the
development and operation of the downstream phase of
the project, Transportadora de Gas del Perú (TGP) selected
Belgium-based Tractebel as its strategic partner in the
concession for distributing Camisea’s natural gas to power
plants in Lima and the port of Callao. Once it comes on
stream, Camisea is expected to generate between US$ 5
billion and US$ 6 billion in royalties and tax revenues for
Peru over the next 30 years. The project is progressing as
planned; pumping operations are expected to begin in the
course of 2003 and natural gas should be reaching Lima
some time in 2004 (http://www.camisea.com.pe/
project.asp). President Toledo has also extended a proposal
to the President of Bolivia –which possesses Latin
America’s second largest gas reserves– that the two
countries should join forces to increase the use of natural
gas in both. This comes at a time when Peru and Chile are
competing to be chosen as the site for transport
infrastructure and a processing plant for Bolivian gas.
Bolivia has produced natural gas since the 1960s
and began to export it, mainly to Brazil, in the late 1990s.
More recently, an active exploration policy has led to
many large finds, including Block 20 (Tarija West), San
Antonio and San Alberto, El Dorado and Caipipendi.
With these discoveries, the country’s proven gas reserves
amount to five times the level of current domestic demand
and projected exports for the next 20 years combined
(EIU, 2002d).
Plans are in place to build a number of gas pipelines
in order to take Bolivian gas to the most lucrative markets.
Thanks to an investment of over US$ 2.1 billion involving
Enron Corp., Shell, Petrobras, the British Gas (BG)
group, TotalFinalElf and El Paso, a pipeline connecting
Bolivia to the Brazilian city of Sao Paulo came on stream
in 1999 (ECLAC, 2002). Although Brazilian demand for
Bolivian gas has declined lately, the consortium operating
the Bolivian end of the export pipeline,
GasTransBoliviano, has raised financing of US$ 90
million to expand the pipeline and expected to complete
this project in 2003.
Once the potential of the new finds had been
confirmed, the government began to seek markets for
Bolivian natural gas. Plans to export LNG to North
America through a port on the Pacific coast, involving
an investment of over US$ 5 billion, are well advanced.15
In July 2001, the largest producers in Bolivia –Repsol-
YPF (37.5%), British Gas (37.5%) and British Petroleum
(25%)– formed a consortium called Pacific Liquefied
Natural Gas (Pacific LNG) to export LNG to North
America (mainly to the Californian and Mexican coasts).
Pacific LNG has signed a memorandum of understanding
with the United States firm Sempra Energy for the supply
of LNG to the United States. The gas will be delivered to
a reception terminal to be built jointly by Sempra Energy
and CMS Energy Corp. in the Mexican state of Baja
California. The project also involves the construction of
a pipeline to connect the Margarita field in southern
Bolivia to a port on the Pacific coast of either Chile or
Peru. The Chilean option is preferred by the Pacific LNG
consortium, but there is strong opposition to it within
civil society in Bolivia. If the project comes to fruition,
natural gas shipments to the United States should begin
in 2006-2007. The initial delivery capacity would amount
to about two thirds of the current volume of the pipeline
to Brazil. TotalFinalElf –with one of the largest stakes in
Bolivia’s gas reserves– is therefore studying the
possibility of joining the Pacific LNG consortium in order
to circumvent the problems it has experienced in
operating the gas pipeline to Brazil (EIU, 2002d).
The discoveries at Cusiana and Volcanera in the
second half of the 1990s positioned Colombia as the site
of Latin America’s fourth largest reserves of natural gas.
Before 1990, discoveries of natural gas in Colombia were
viewed as a problem rather than an opportunity because
the infrastructure needed to secure a market for it was
not available (Barrios, 2001). Potential reserves in
14 The consortium Transportadora de Gas del Perú (TGP) comprises Techint and Pluspetrol of Argentina (30% and 19.2%, respectively),
Hunt Oil of the United States (19.2%), Sonatrach of Algeria (10%), SK Corp. of the Republic of Korea (9.6%) and the Peruvian Group
Grana y Montero (12%).
15 Efforts are also being made to promote the consumption of natural gas in Bolivia’s domestic market. One of the authorities’ objectives is
to build an urban gas distribution network to connect 250,000 consumers within five years. An effort will also be made to encourage the
use of natural gas as a fuel for motor vehicles.
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offshore basins along the Caribbean coast are estimated
to contain enough gas to cover 150-200 years of
consumption. Almost 100% of the natural gas now being
used is supplied by Chuchupa, an offshore field with
reserves of close to 7 trillion cubic feet which is operated
by ChevronTexaco of the United States.
In 1997 an Ecopetrol subsidiary, Ecogas, was created
to distribute natural gas.  The investment of some US$ 1
billion made in Ecogas was used primarily to build a 5,632-
kilometre network of gas pipelines. In 1998 a gas pipeline
linking the central and south-western portions of the
country came on stream.  This pipeline is being operated
under a 20-year concession by a Canadian company.
Ecuador has enough refining capacity to process
around 20% of the natural gas produced in the Oriente
oilfields and imports are necessary to meet about 50%
of domestic demand (EIU, 2001). Energy Development
Corporation (EDC), a subsidiary of Noble Energy of the
United States, owns 100% of a gas-to-power energy
venture. The project includes the Amistad field (9.8
billion cubic metres), which lies in the Gulf of Guayaquil
and is tapped from an off-shore platform. The gas from
Amistad will supply the Machala power plant. EDC has
so far invested about US$ 70 million in the gas project
and US$ 90 million in the electricity generation plant.
(iii) Strategies of the main transnational oil
companies in the Andean region
The liberalization of the hydrocarbons subsector,
together with a number of international mergers among
major oil companies, has brought about a repositioning
of the TNCs most heavily involved in exploration and
exploitation of petroleum and natural gas in the Andean
countries.
• TNCs that have been industry players for many
decades tend to have a smaller stake today. This is
the case of the world’s two largest oil companies,
ExxonMobil and Royal Dutch Shell.16
• As a result of these international mergers and
acquisitions, local firms been sought after as
complementary assets, and this has boosted the
subregional presence of the newly merged firms.
Examples are ChevronTexaco and BP Amoco Plc.
• Firms whose subregional presence has been a key
part of their strategy have –without abandoning their
Andean operations– started to expand their presence
in other parts of the world. Occidental Petroleum is
a prime example.
• New entrants –mostly European firms– have rapidly
expanded their presence in the region. The most
notable of these companies is TotalFinalElf.17
• Lastly, there are firms with a strong regional presence
whose international potential revolves around Latin
America. The Spanish firm Repsol-YPF is one
example, mainly because of its operations in
Argentina, while others include the Argentine firms
Pérez Companc (PECOM), Pluspetrol –linked with
Repsol-YPF– and Techint.18
The 2001 edition of this publication contained a
detailed analysis of the corporate strategies of Repsol-
YPF, TotalFinalElf, Royal Dutch Shell and Pérez
Companc (ECLAC, 2002). In order to provide the reader
with new information, this section will therefore take a
more detailed look at the activities of three firms which
have played an important role in the development of the
petroleum and natural gas industries in the Andean
subregion: Occidental Petroleum, ChevronTexaco and
British Petroleum.
(iv) Occidental Petroleum: the largest
transnational oil company in the Andean
region
Today, the Occidental Petroleum Corporation (OXY)
is one of the world’s largest so-called “independent” firms
engaged in exploring for and extracting petroleum and
natural gas (ECLAC, 2002, chapter IV). With operations
in the United States, the Middle East, Pakistan, Russia
and Latin America, OXY has concentrated on finding
and developing new sources of petroleum and natural
gas (OXY, 2002b). The success of this strategy is reflected
in the fact that the firm has found five of the 50 largest
oilfields discovered in the world in the last 50 years (OXY,
2002a). A pivotal element of its corporate growth strategy
has been the acquisition of new assets in the regions of
the world where its development is centred. Since 1998,
OXY has invested some US$ 7.5 billion in buying
petroleum and natural gas fields in the United States alone
(OXY, 2002a). These acquisitions have resulted in a huge
increase in the company’s reserves, output and profitability.
Occidental Petroleum is one of the leading oil
companies in Latin America, with production operations
in Colombia and Ecuador and exploratory activities in
Peru. In fact, since the discovery of over 700 million
barrels of oil in the northern Peruvian jungle in 1971, it
has become the top transnational oil company in the entire
Andean region.
16 See ECLAC (2002), chapter IV, for further details.
17 See ECLAC (2002), chapter IV, for further details.
18 See ECLAC (2002), chapter IV, for further details
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In 1983, OXY played a key role in Colombia’s
transformation from an oil-importing to an oil-exporting
country, thanks to the discovery of the Caño Limón
oilfield in the Department of Arauca in the north-eastern
portion of the country. This was one of the largest oil
strikes in the western hemisphere in the last 25 years
(OXY, 2002a). The project has been conducted through
an association contract with ECOPETROL, which
controls about 85%. Its production plant is sizeable and
has over 100 producing oil wells. This discovery and
Colombia itself became a key component of Occidental’s
global operations; in fact, in the early 1990s Colombia
accounted for around half of the company’s world
reserves and a similar proportion of its output and
investments (Puyana and Dargay, 1996). Later, because
of the firm’s swift international expansion, Colombia’s
importance in its operations declined. To date, Caño
Limón has produced 910 million barrels, out of estimated
reserves of 1.3 billion. The output of this oilfield has
dwindled to 100,000 barrels per day (from a peak
production level of 208,000 barrels per day in 1990). In
addition to the depletion of some of the wells, guerrilla
attacks at Caño Limón have also affected production
levels. Despite the decline, this deposit continues to
supply about a third of Colombia’s total oil exports (OXY,
2002a). Occidental’s total investment in Caño Limón
amounts to US$ 1.9 billion, including the construction
of a 777-kilometre pipeline to Coveñas on the Caribbean
coast, which the firm operates jointly with ECOPETROL.
In 1992, OXY signed a contract with the Colombian
Government to explore a new oil-bearing area in Samoré.
In 1997, seismological studies put potential reserves there
at an estimated 1.4 billion barrels of oil. Progress has
been slow, however, because of difficult relations with
the indigenous Uwa community. Occidental eventually
abandoned 75% of its original exploration block and
concentrated on a drilling area of just two hectares. In
September 1999, the Colombian Government issued
OXY a new licence to drill the exploratory well Gibraltar
I, which is located outside the Uwa reserve.
Despite the success of its operations in Colombia,
since 1964 OXY has had to deal with threats and violence
from guerrilla groups. In fact, even though strict security
measures are in place, the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army
(ELN) have attacked the Caño Limón pipeline more than
700 times. Since the start of production at this oilfield,
guerrilla attacks have caused the loss of over 2.1 million
barrels of oil. What is more, between January 1987 and
mid-August 2000, these attacks cost the Colombian
Government almost US$ 13 million in losses, in addition
to the cost of repairing the pipeline and the environmental
damage that was done.
In 1985, Occidental Petroleum bought the drilling
rights to 494,000 acres of Block 15 in the Amazon
region, in the north-eastern region of Ecuador. In the
early 1990s, OXY discovered six commercially viable
deposits in this area, which it brought on stream in 1993.
It also built some 20 kilometres of pipeline to join up
with SOTE, which is owned by the State oil company
PETROECUADOR.
In 1995, OXY and the Ecuadorian Government
signed an agreement to explore the remaining portion
of Block 15.  This led to the discovery of the Eden-
Yuturi field, with reserves of over 100 million barrels.
The company’s exploratory work in these new fields
has been quite successful, and it is therefore looking to
raise its production level in Ecuador by 30,000 barrels
per day (OXY, 2002a). Eden-Yuturi’s start-up will
coincide with completion of the new transcontinental
Heavy Crude Oil Pipeline (OCP), which is scheduled
for 2003; OCP will have the capacity to transport
450,000 barrels per day from the Oriente Valley to the
Pacific coast. The United States firm plans to spend
about US$ 965 million on the development of oilfields
in Ecuador’s Amazonian region over the next five years
in order to make the most of its stake in OCP. In
addition, OXY has invested about US$ 334 million in
the Eden-Yuturi field, US$ 33 million in the
Limoncocha field and US$ 76 million in Indillana (EIU,
2001). Lastly, Occidental is continuing with its
exploratory work in Block 15 and hopes that, with the
help of an aggressive use of 3-D seismic technology,
its exploratory programme in Ecuador will continue to
meet with success (OXY, 2002a).
Three decades ago, Occidental discovered the largest
oilfield to be found in Peruvian territory, Block 1-AB, in
the Amazon jungle, and began developing it. In early
2000, it sold its stake in this block to Pluspetrol of
Argentina, but maintains a presence in Peru with interests
in two exploratory fields: Block Z-3 offshore and Block
64, which lies to the south-east of 1-AB.
(v) ChevronTexaco Corporation: high stakes
in Venezuela
On 9 October 2001, a merger was completed between
the United States oil companies Chevron Corporation and
Texaco, Inc. The new firm –ChevronTexaco Corporation–
thus became the second largest in the industry in the United
States, after ExxonMobil, and the fourteenth largest in the
world (Fortune, 2002). Today, ChevronTexaco has
operations in more than 180 countries focusing on energy
activities and the chemical industry (ChevronTexaco,
2002a). In Latin America, ChevronTexaco maintains a
presence in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Trinidad and
Tobago, and Venezuela.
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In Venezuela, ChevronTexaco Corporation is the
leading private foreign operator in terms of daily output
(ChevronTexaco, 2002b). Texaco has been interested in
investing in the country, particularly in the deposits of
heavy crude oil that lie in the Orinoco Belt (the largest
reserves of crude oil in the world), ever since the
liberalization of the oil sector began. This is how
ChevronTexaco came to have a share in Ameriven, one
of the four strategic projects authorized to develop the
Hamaca project in the eastern part of the country. A
strategic partnership among PDVSA (30%), Phillips
Petroleum (40%) and ChevronTexaco (30%) has
embarked on a venture to drill and transport 190,000
barrels per day of extra-heavy 8.5 grade API crude and
to upgrade it to 26-degree API crude, which brings a
higher price on international markets. The Hamaca
project became operational on 20 November 2001, after
investing almost US$ 900 million of the US$ 4 billion
earmarked for the project over the next 35 years.
Also in Venezuela, ChevronTexaco operates the
Boscan oilfield under an operating service agreement.
So far it has drilled 32 wells which produce, on average,
104,800 barrels per day (ChevronTexaco, 2002b). The
group also maintains a 27% ownership interest in the
LL-652 field, located to the north-east of Lake Maracaibo
(estimated reserves of 18 million barrels), which it
operates under a risk service agreement.
In Colombia, ChevronTexaco operates and holds an
interest in one productive field and three that are at the
exploration stage through its subsidiary Texas Petroleum
Company (TEXPET). In the Guajira region, TEXPET
operates the Chuchupa field under a joint venture
agreement with ECOPETROL, with each company
holding a 50% stake. The area will revert to the
Colombian Government in December 2004, but TEXPET
will continue operating the fields until 2016. During
2001, net production averaged 211 million cubic feet of
natural gas and approximately 35,000 barrels of oil per
day (ChevronTexaco, 2002b). In 2001, ECOPETROL,
TexacoChevron and PDVSA signed a memorandum of
understanding to build a gas pipeline that will connect
Colombia’s  Caribbean cast with western Venezuela.
(vi) British Petroleum Amoco (BPA): seeking
new reserves
On 31 December 1998, British Petroleum (BP)
completed the purchase of Amoco, at a cost of US$ 55
billion, thereby creating the largest oil company in Britain
and the third largest in the world: BP Amoco Plc. BP has
been in the process of establishing an important presence
in Colombia since 1987, following some modest earlier
involvement in the country. The company discovered the
oilfields of Cusiana and Cupiagua in the Department of
Casanare, which it currently operates as part of a
consortium formed by ECOPETROL (50%), BP (19%),
TotalFinalElf (19%) and Triton (12%). These fields’
production level peaked at 815,000 barrels per day in
1999, of which 516,000 went for export (EIU, 2002a). It
also has a 50% holding in a consortium with ECOPETROL
that was formed to develop the Piedmonte Block, to the
north of Cusiana and Cupiagua.  In addition, following
its merger with Amoco, BP also has the use of a number
of licenses that were formerly controlled by Amoco.
BP entered Venezuela for the first time in 1976 to
provide technical services to the then recently
nationalized oil industry. In the early 1990s, when
PDVSA embarked upon the liberalization of the oil
industry, BP became an active participant in the bidding
process. With the Amoco merger and its acquisition of
ARCO, the new company secured a stake in 11 oilfields
located throughout Venezuela. This portfolio has been
reorganized into six fields –two in the west and four in
the east– producing 550 million barrels of oil. BP is the
operator of DZO in Maracaibo and Boquerón in Maturín
on behalf of PDVSA, partners TotalFinalElf, Chevron,
Statoil and the local companies Polar and Inelectra. BP
is now seeking to position itself as the leading gasoline
supplier in Venezuela with a network of 98 service
stations. In conjunction with Burmah Castrol, BP is in
first place in the lubricants market. In August 2002, the
Venezuelan Government signed pre-selection agreements
with seven foreign firms to develop five offshore natural
gas blocks in the Deltana Platform to the east of
Venezuela, which has proven reserves of 100 trillion
cubic feet. Block 1 was obtained by British Petroleum,
Block 2 by British Gas jointly with ChevronTexaco,
Block 3 by El Paso and the Norwegian firm Statoil, Block
4 by the Franco-Belgian group TotalFinalElf and Block
5 by ExxonMobil.
In Bolivia, BP owns 30% of Empresa Petrolera
Chaco in Santa Cruz, together with Bridas Corporation
(20%) and the Bolivian pension funds (50%). This firm’s
strengths include its existing production levels, significant
exploration acreage, mid- and downstream assets, and
experienced staff.
BP is also one of the largest private producers and
distributors of natural gas in Latin America and the
Caribbean. It owns sizeable reserves and maintains a
presence in several countries, including Argentina, Brazil,
Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, and
Venezuela, and has expanded into new natural gas-fired
generation projects as well.
BP’s Chaco fields in Bolivia produce 15,000 barrels
of liquids and 110 million cubic feet of natural gas per
day. In the natural gas mid- and downstream markets,
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Pan American Energy (PAE) and Chaco19 have gained
extensive development experience in such projects as the
215-kilometre Cruz del Sur Gas Pipeline, which links
Argentina and Uruguay, the oil pipeline between Bolivia
and Brazil and such power generation projects as the 800-
megawatt Central Dock Sud plant near Buenos Aires,
the 88 megawatt Bulo Bulo power plant and the Rio
Grande Compression Plant.
In summary, with the gradual opening of the
hydrocarbons subsector, some of the leading transnational
oil companies have included the Andean region in their
global strategy for building up a diversified array of
reserves. In these countries, better access was the
determining factor in attracting foreign firms, while factors
such as macroeconomic stability, political violence and
the cost of factors of production have been less influential.
The oil companies have tended to move into countries
when there is an acceptable degree of certainty that
resources can be found and exploited, and they have
invested large sums to this end. This pattern has not been
uniform across the Andean countries, however. While Peru
and Bolivia privatized their oil industries, Venezuela and
Ecuador have developed association arrangements
between the existing State company and foreign firms to
exploit those reserves that have a lower value or higher
production costs. The exception is Colombia, since it has
been developing its oil industry on a joint basis with foreign
firms since the mid-1960s.
(b) Metal mining
Most of the Andean countries have rich mineral
deposits. Mining has traditionally been the foremost
economic activity in Peru and Bolivia, and it has been
growing in importance in Colombia and Venezuela. The
endowment of mining resources, as well as the relative size
of the industry, varies markedly from one Andean economy
to another, however. Peru is the world’s seventh largest
producer of gold and copper (it possesses 15% of the world’s
copper reserves) and the second largest producer of silver,
as well as accounting for a substantial share of the world’s
zinc and lead production. Bolivia is the world’s largest
producer of tin (which was a major driver of its economy
until the crisis of 1985) and has sizeable reserves of gold,
silver, copper, zinc and lead. Colombia has the largest proven
reserves of coal in Latin America and is the fourth largest
coal exporter in the world (after the United States, Australia
and South Africa).20 Venezuela has rich endowments of
mining resources, including some that are used as raw
materials in industry (bauxite for producing aluminium and
iron ore for producing steel), and of precious metals, mainly
gold. Venezuela is also the third largest coal producer in
Latin America, after Colombia and Brazil.
As in the case of hydrocarbons, mining activities
have been dominated by foreign capital at some points
in the region’s history while, at others, the State has been
the primary (or sometimes only) agent. With the
economic reforms of the early 1990s, a number of
important regulatory changes were made in the mining
sector. National governments began to withdraw from
the activity and to give private (mainly foreign) investors
exploration and mining rights. Concessions were made
easier to obtain, legal stability was improved and more
substantial guarantees and incentives were offered to
investors.
In the 1990s, there was an increase in world
consumption that stimulated supply (and, therefore, the
initiation of new projects). In the end, this brought about
major technological changes in the industry  –then led
by TNCs– which were clearly evidenced in the mining
and refining of iron, copper and gold (Moguillansky and
Bielschowsky, 2001).
Of all the Andean countries, Peru made the fastest
progress in reforming its mining sector. The renewal of
the regulatory framework and the sale of State assets in
the early 1990s gave a significant boost to this industry.
The privatization of Minero Perú and Centromin
operating units and deposits yielded US$ 276 million
and US$ 291 million, respectively, and generated
US$ 1.592 billion and US$ 2.829 billion in projects
(Paliza, 2000). The Quellaveco and La Granja deposits and
the copper firm Cerro Verde, which belonged to Minero
Perú,21 were also sold around this time, as were Metal
19 BP has two significant business ventures in the Southern Cone: PAE, which is owned 60% by BP and 40% by Bridas Corporation of
Argentina; and Chaco, which is owned 30% by BP, 20% by Bridas Corporation and 50% by the Bolivian pension funds (http://www.bpgas-
latinamerica.com).
20 Colombian coal is of very high quality and 95% of its production is exported.
21 At the end of 1992, the copper deposit of Quellaveco was bought by Mantos Blancos, a South African firm active in Chile, which paid
US$ 12 million and committed a further US$ 562 million in investment. In March 1994, La Granja was sold to the Canadian company
Cambior, which agreed to invest US$ 475 million. In November 1993, Cyrpus Amax Minerals Co. of the United States bought the copper
firm Cerro Verde for US$ 35 million, with an investment commitment of US$ 485 million (Paliza, 2000).
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Oroya and the Antamina mine, which were owned by
Centromin.22 In the past few years, the mining subsector
has grown rapidly, thanks to fresh investments and new
projects coming on stream. Mining –along with
hydrocarbons– has thus become the most attractive
activity for foreign investors.
The most recent engine of growth in the Peruvian
mining sector has been the development of the Antamina
mine (owned by the Canadian firms Noranda, Rio Algom
and Teck Corporation), in which US$ 2.3 billion has been
invested. Antamina is thought to hold the largest reserves
of copper and zinc in the world (EIU, 2002c). The mine
began exporting copper concentrates in July 2001, and
by the first semester of 2002, Antamina had surpassed
Southern Peru Copper Corporation (SPCC) 23 as the
country’s largest copper exporter. Antamina was expected
to increase Peru’s copper exports by 50%, its zinc exports
by 30% and its GDP by two percentage points.
Persistently low international copper prices have placed
a number of large operations in difficulties, however. An
example is the Tintaya mine,24 owned by the Anglo-
Australian firm BHP Billiton, which shut down
operations at the end of 2001. According to information
supplied by the company, Tintaya’s activities will remain
at a standstill until at least mid-2003, although it will
continue to produce copper cathodes at full installed
capacity (34,000 tons per year).
Gold mining is another major activity in Peru. In
2001, Minera Yanacocha, owned by Newmont Mining
Corporation25 of the United States, was Peru’s leading
gold exporter and the largest gold mine in Latin America.
Newmont is planning to invest some US$ 1 billion in
Yanacocha in the next five years. The Yanacocha mine,
which now produces 40% of Peru’s gold, has the largest
reserves and has been the largest single gold exporter
since 1998. Another gold mining venture is Pierina,
owned by Barrick of Canada, which recently discovered
a vein containing an estimated 3.4 million ounces of gold
in northern Peru. Opened in May 1999, Pierina has the
world’s lowest production costs (EIU, 2002c).
Peru is also a major producer of silver, zinc and lead,
in which the main players are local firms (Compañía
Minera Buenaventura, Centromin and Compañía Minera
Volcán). Other leading lead producers are Compañía
Minera Atacocha, which has Peruvian stakeholders, and
the metallurgical complex of La Oroya, which is operated
by The Doe Run Corporation of the United States.26 The
zinc industry includes Empresa Minera Iscaycruz, which
is owned by Glencore International AG of Switzerland,
and Phelps Dodge Mining Company, which has a 40%
share in the San Vicente zinc mine. One of the major
silver mining companies is the Canadian firm Pan
American Silver Corporation, which operates the
Quiruvilca mine.
In Bolivia, the 1985 tin crisis triggered a far-
reaching structural reorganization of the mining
industry. The operations of the State-owned company
Corporación Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL) were
gradually wound down and, in 2000, following the
privatization of the Vinto tin and antimony smelter,
which was bought by the British firm Allied Deals,27
and the Huanuni and Colquiri mines, the State ceased
to be involved in the country’s mining activities.28
Mining production has also diversified towards gold and
polymetals (copper, silver, zinc and lead). Today the
bulk of production is in the hands of private –mostly
foreign-owned– companies. These include one of South
America’s largest mining concerns, the Kori Kollo mine,
88% of which is owned by Newmont Mining
Corporation of the United States.
22 In July 1996, the firm Metal Oroya –owner of the metallurgical complex of La Oroya– was sold to The Doe Run Corporation of the United
States for US$ 122 million, with an investment commitment of US$ 127 million. At the same time, rights to exploit the Antamina mine
were awarded to Rio Algom Ltd. and Inmet Mining Corp. of Canada, at a price of US$ 20 million plus investment commitments of
US$ 2.52 billion over five years (Paliza, 2000).
23 At the end of 2001, SPCC was considered to be one of the world’s top 10 copper producers. It is owned by Grupo México of Mexico
(54.2%) and The Marmon Group (14.2%) and Phelps Dodge Corporation (14%), both of the United States.
24 In October 1994, the Tintaya deposit was auctioned off to the United States firm Magna Koper Corporation for US$ 277 million plus US$
104 million in investment commitments.  In January 1996, Tintaya was bought by the then Australian firm The Broken Hill Proprietary Co.
Ltd. (BHP).
25 Newmont Mining operates Minera Yanacocha jointly with the Peruvian firm Compañía de Minas Buenaventura.
26 The Doe Run Corporation bought the complex at La Oroya from Centromin in 1997.
27 In early 2002, Allied Deals went into involuntary provisional liquidation amid accusations of financial mismanagement. Huanuni came
under temporary control of COMIBOL, while Vinto was sold to Empresa Minera Colquiri, a joint-venture subsidiary of Bolivia’s largest
mining company Compañía Minera del Sur (COMSUR, 51%) and British investment fund CDC Capital Partners (49%). The majority
shareholder in COMSUR is Bolivia’s President, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada.
28 COMIBOL signed a 30-year shared-risk lease contract agreement with Allied Deals to operate the Huanuni mining centre, which was
physically transferred on 16 March 2000. The investment commitment for the first two years of the contact is US$ 10.25 million. In April
2000, the Colquiri mine was leased for 30 years to Compañía Minera del Sur (COMSUR), with an investment commitment of US$ 2
million in the first two years.
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In Venezuela, the State controls all mining reserves,
but the authorities have taken steps to attract private
investment to a number of large-scale projects. In 2000
the regulatory framework that had been in place since
1941 was reformed in order to streamline concession
procedures and offer investors greater legal security.
With its rich endowment of iron ore and bauxite
deposits, Venezuela has been developing large iron and
steel and aluminium industries for some time now.
Ferrominera del Orinoco, a subsidiary of Corporación
Venezolana de Guyana (CVG), is the largest firm involved
in mining iron ore. An ambitious strategy to attract private
investment has yielded mixed results, however. In 2001, a
US$ 900 million joint venture of BHP Billiton and
Siderúrgica Venezolana S.A. (SIVENSA)29 was suspended
when the Anglo-Australian firm pulled out. A second
project, involving an investment of close to US$ 400
million that is being financed mainly by Phang Steel of
Korea, was launched in June 2000. In 1997, Corporación
Aluminios de Venezuela (CAV) was set up with a view to
privatizing the activity, but that plan has not borne fruit.
The Administration of President Chávez has not pursued
the idea of privatization, but it has continued to seek
strategic partnerships. In 2001 an agreement was signed
with the French firm Pechiney to expand the production
capacity of Bauxilum, a subsidiary of CVG.30 CVG also
plans to develop two new large bauxite deposits (El Palmar
and Pijiguaos), regarding which discussions have
reportedly been held with BHP Billiton.
Venezuela possesses vast gold reserves. The Ministry
of Energy and Mines has awarded some 350 exploration
and mining concessions. In 2001, the largest producer was
La Camorra, owned by the United States firm Hecla
Mining, followed by the State-run firm CVG Minerven.
Other major projects now underway are Las Cristinas
(US$ 575 million) and Brisas del Cuyuni (US$ 300 million).
In September 2002, the Canadian-owned Crystallex
International Corporation was selected by CVG to operate
the Las Cristinas gold mine, which is considered to be
one of the world’s largest undeveloped gold deposits31
(http://www.vannessaventures.com).   Crystallex
announced it would invest about US$ 500 million to
develop the mine, which should have come on stream in
2004-2005. This operation took Vannessa Venture Ltd.
by surprise, however, after it had bought a controlling
stake in the operation in late 2001 for a “token price” of
US$ 50 million, from Placer Dome32 (both companies
are Canadian). After putting the project on hold in 1998
because of low world gold prices, Placer Dome sold its
share in Minera Las Cristinas (MINCA) over the
objections of CVG. The Venezuelan authorities refused
to recognize the transaction and argued that Placer Dome
had violated the terms of the original concession contract,
which specified that CVG had to be consulted regarding
the sale of stock by any of the partners. This situation
has given rise to a legal battle between MINCA and CVG.
As a result of all this, the project has been set back by
more than five years. At the end of 2002, Vannessa was
still asserting ownership rights over Las Cristinas, despite
the agreement between CVG and Crystallex.33
Colombia’s large coal deposits have aroused the
interest of both local and foreign firms. In mid-1999, at
the time of the creation of Empresa Nacional Minera
Ltda. (MINERCOL) from the merger of two existing
firms, Ecocarbón and Mineralco, the government
established a policy regarding the country’s coal
resources. A new regulatory framework, the Mining
Code, was approved in June 2001 with a view to making
the Colombian mining industry more competitive by
providing investors with better contractual stability and
more favourable conditions. All mining contracts with
Minercol are 30-year concessions.
Almost 60% of Colombia’s coal output comes from
El Cerrejón, one of the largest open-pit mines in the
world. In 2002 it was bought by Consorcio Cerrejón Zona
Norte (CZN), formed by Glencore of Switzerland and
the two British firms Anglo American and BHP Billiton.
El Cerrejón had previously been operated by Interior, a
subsidiary of Exxon Corporation of the United States,
jointly with the State company Sociedad Carbones de
Colombia (CARBOCOL). In October 2000, the British-
Swiss consortium paid CARBOCOL US$ 437 million
29 SIVENSA is also a shareholder in Siderúrgica del Orinoco (SIDOR). In 1998, the government sold a stake in SIDOR to the consortium
Sierurgía Amazonia, formed by several Latin American firms including Techint, Hylsamex and Usiminas.
30 CVG operates four companies in the aluminium segment: two smelters, Venalum and Alcasa; a carbon anode plant, Carbonorca; and a
bauxite production plant, Bauxilum. Up to January 2002, those four firms has been vertically integrated in Corporación Aluminios de
Venezuela (CAV), which had suffered from mismanagement and had run up substantial debts.
31 In 1997, Placer Dome estimated the gold reserves at Las Cristinas to be 11.8 million ounces (www.vannessavenures.com).
32 In 1997, Placer Dome suspended construction of the mine because of low gold prices. Then, in June 2000, it made a new investment of
US$ 116 million.
33 Vanessa Venture is still awaiting a final ruling on an appeal it lodged with Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (TSJ, the supreme court). It has
also said that it will seek international arbitration for redress under an investment protection agreement between Canada and Venezuela.
Vannessa estimates that it has spent around US$ 170 million on exploration and preparatory work at the site (EIU, 2002b).
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for its stake in El Cerrejón and, in early 2002, bought
Exxon Corporation’s share for a sum of between US$
550 and US$ 600 million, which will enable it to operate
the mine until 2033 (La Nota, 27 December 2002). The
southern and central zones (Cerrejón Zona Sur and
Cerrejón Zona Central) are controlled by the consortium
Carbones del Cerrejón (CDC), which is formed by Anglo
American Plc., BHP Billiton and Glencore. In early 2002,
CZN won the bidding to begin exploring the Patilla field,
which has estimated reserves of 65 million tons. In mid-
2002, CDC was absorbed by CZN, which moved it up
from position 26 to position 17 in the ranking of the
country’s largest firms by sales (US$ 825 million) (La
Nota, 23 August 2002).
In 1995 the La Loma mine –a project managed by a
United States company Drummond– came on stream.
The mine yielded over 12 million tons in 2001, and its
output is expected to continue increasing over the next
five years. The government predicts that recent
developments in the industry will allow coal exports to
double in 2005-2010 (EIU, 2002a).
Thanks to the discovery of the high-grade Cerro
Matoso deposit in 1956, Colombia also has large reserves
of nickel and is currently among the top 10 nickel
producers in the world.34 Cerro Matoso was privatized
in 1996, when it was sold to Glencore for US$ 375
million.
Ecuador opened its mining sector to foreign
investment in the 1980s in an effort to find alternatives
to petroleum, but development in the sector has been scant
because of continuous regulatory changes and
uncertainty over the enforcement of property and
exploration rights. The 1991 Mining Act provides better
protection to local and foreign investors than they
previously enjoyed, and in 2000 further reforms were
enacted to increase the sector’s attractiveness.
In summary, regulatory changes and TNC strategies
have brought large flows of foreign investment into the
Andean Community countries for the development of
new mining ventures. The most active companies in the
subregion include Newmont Mining Corporation of the
United States, which operates gold mines in Peru and
Bolivia; the Anglo-Australian corporation BHP Billiton,
which mines copper in Peru and coal in Colombia;
Noranda, Rio Algom and Teck Corporation of Canada,
which are all in the copper industry in Peru; and Glencore
of Switzerland, which mines coal and nickel in Colombia.
This overview gives an indication of the geographical
and product diversification of the modern TNCs operating
in the mining sector.
2. Access to local services and infrastructure markets
In the early 1990s, a series of reforms were implemented
which permitted and, in many cases, encouraged foreign
investors to move into basic services provision and
infrastructure activities. The mechanism that was most
commonly used –although with widely varying
outcomes– was the privatization of public assets. The
pioneers in this area were Peru and Venezuela, followed
by Colombia and Bolivia. Ecuador, by contrast, has had
a great deal of difficulty carrying forward some of its
initiatives for downsizing the State’s role in the economy.
In Peru, at the start of the 1990s, the Administration
of President Alberto Fujimori embarked upon a plan to
reduce the State’s involvement in the economy to a
minimum. The government eliminated all the monopoly
privileges enjoyed by State enterprises, lifted all
restrictions and prohibitions on external trade, and
established non-discriminatory treatment for foreign
investment. The purpose of the privatization process was
to scale back State participation in economic activities
or to eliminate it altogether.
This programme was launched in 1992 with the sale
of the steel producer Hierroperú and continued with the
divestment of the airline Aeroperú and part of two
telephone companies. Subsequent privatizations in the
telecommunications, energy, banking, tourism and
manufacturing sectors were completed in 1998, but the
programme then began to languish, particularly in the
areas of electrical energy and road infrastructure.
Between 1991 and 1998, more than 180 privatizations
were carried through, generating revenues of US$ 7.72
billion and US$ 7.935 billion in investment projects
(Paliza, 2000).
Today, President Alejandro Toledo’s Administration
has made privatizations and concessions one of the
cornerstones of its economic policy. In February 2002,
Peru made a commitment to the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) to take in US$ 700 million from sales and
concessions in 2002 and US$ 1 billion in 2003. Up to
June 2002, the government had raised around US$ 400
million through privatizations, chiefly thanks to the sale
34 In 2001, Colombia was the eighth largest nickel producer in the world, after Russian, Australia, Canada, New Caledonia, Indonesia, Cuba
and China (World Bureau of Metal Statistics, 2002).
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and concession of power generation and distribution
companies. It has become very difficult to take the
privatization process further, however, because of
mounting public dissent. The greatest setback so far came
in mid-2002, when the authorities capitulated to protests
against the sale of electricity assets in the south of the
country.
Even though the government has altered its policy on
controversial privatizations, it remains optimistic with
regard to the sale of some of the State’s flagship enterprises.
These firms include the Servicio de Abastecimiento de
Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de Lima (SEDAPAL), the
Mantaro hydroelectric plant –which is worth an estimated
US$ 1.5 billion– and some of the lesser assets of the State
oil company, PETROPERU.
Venezuela began a privatization programme in 1991,
but its implementation was hesitant and short-lived.
Under this initiative, 45% of the State-owned airline and
the telephone company Compañía Anónima Nacional de
Teléfonos de Venezuela (CANTV) were sold to foreign
investors, but the process then ground the a halt.
Venezuela remains an economy in which the State has a
major hand. A sharp turnaround in privatization policy
came in December 1998, with the election of President
Hugo Chávez. The new Administration made it clear that
strategic economic assets such as oil production,
electricity transmission and hydroelectric power
generation would not be sold, but it did offer some shared-
risk ventures in certain areas.
Colombia began its programme of privatizations
and concessions in 1994, which focused primarily on
the areas of electr ical energy, banking and
telecommunications. These initiatives stalled in 1999,
but have picked up their pace somewhat in the last three
years. The public sector continues to be a major supplier
of electric power, is still the largest provider of
telecommunications services –though the Empresa
Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (TELECOM) and
other municipal firms– and maintains a monopoly in
petroleum and natural gas through ECOPETROL. The
Colombian authorities have no plans to privatize either
ECOPETROL or TELECOM any time soon. A key
factor for the future of the privatization process is the
outcome of the peace negotiations with guerrilla groups,
which are staunchly opposed to the sale of State assets
to foreign investors.
During Bolivian President Gonzalo Sánchez de
Lozada’s first term in office, his Administration used an
innovative privatization programme involving five major
State-owned enterprises to further the economic
liberalization process and downsize the State’s role in
the economy. Rather than paying the government for
these assets, investors received a 50% share in the firms
and signed an agreement which committed them to
making certain investments over a set period of time.
The remaining 50% went to a Collective Capitalization
Fund (FCC), whose dividends were administered by two
pension funds (see box II.1).
In Ecuador, the authorities have recently been
moving away from the protectionist models based on
heavy State involvement in the economy that
characterized a number of past Administrations. In 1998
important amendments were made to the Constitution
with a view to facilitating private-sector engagement in
the economy. Under the new provisions, the State is
responsible for supplying public services such as drinking
water, electric power, telecommunications, road-building,
and road and port maintenance. However, the authorities
are empowered to delegate this responsibility to the
private sector by means of concessions, capitalization or
the sale of shares in such assets. The Administration of
President Gustavo Noboa made a strong move in this
direction, seeking to separate the political responsibility
of the government from the economic activities of the
production sector by actively encouraging the sale of
State assets.35 In 2000, the government sponsored a
number of bills directed towards this objective, but failed
to garner sufficient support for them in Congress. The
most significant change in this connection has been the
passage of the Economic Transformation Act, under
which private investors may acquire up to 51% of the
shares in electricity and telecommunications companies.
(a) Telecommunications: burgeoning growth in
mobile telephony
In the early 1990s, telecommunications
infrastructure in the Andean countries suffered from
many shortcomings due to under-investment and
technological lags. During that period, national
authorities introduced a number of reforms to attract
private capital and, with it, investment and competition.
In the first half of the 1990s, Venezuela and Peru
privatized their public telecommunications companies
and gave foreign operators a monopoly position in the
market for a fixed period of time. In 1995, Bolivia did
something similar when it capitalized Empresa Nacional
de Telecomunicaciones (ENTEL). At the other end of
the spectrum are Colombia and Ecuador, where fixed
35 At the end of 2002, the Ecuadorian State had a stake in about 190 concerns in the sectors of agriculture, telecommunications, energy,
finances, industry, mining, storage, transport and tourism.
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telephony continues to be controlled by the State. At
around this same time, all the Andean countries opened
up other segments of the telecommunications market to
competition, particularly mobile telephony, in which a
small number of international operators have become the
main players. Telecommunications has thus been one of
the more dynamic subsectors of the Andean economies,
attracting large investments and bringing about
substantial improvements in infrastructure.
With the beginning of these privatization
programmes, the largest telecommunications operator in
Latin America, Telefónica of Spain, became one the most
important actors in the Andean subregion. Telefónica has
been the winning bidder in two of the three privatizations
of fixed telephony utilities held in the subregion so far.
In 1991, it formed part of a consortium led by GTE
Corporation –now Verizon Communications– which
gained control of Compañía Anónima Nacional de
Teléfonos de Venezuela (CANTV) with an investment
of close to US$ 1.89 billion. Although the Spanish firm
holds a minority interest, there has been speculation that
it has tried to increase its stake in CANTV. In fact, it is
thought Telefónica may have been one of the leading
forces behind the recent public tender offer (PTO) for
CANTV announced by Electricidad de Caracas, which
is controlled by AES Corporation.36 In early 1994,
Telefónica bought 40% of the Peruvian companies
Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (ENTEL), a
national and international long distance monopoly, and
Compañía Peruana de Teléfonos (CPT, or COPERTEL),
Lima’s telephone company. Telefónica surprised its rival
bidders by offering close to US$ 2 billion and then
merging the two firms to form Telefónica del Perú. In
2000, as part of “Operation Veronica”, Telefónica paid
US$ 3.218 billion to gain outright control of its Peruvian
subsidiary (ECLAC, 2001).
In Venezuela and Peru, the winning consortiums
maintained a monopoly in the fixed telephony market,
which placed them at a great advantage in dealing with
the new technological challenges arising in the
telecommunications sector.37 At that same time, two other
firms –BellSouth of the United States and Telecom Italia
Mobile (TIM) of Italy– which were emerging as major
players in the mobile telephony market began to compete
with Telefónica in the fixed telephony market. Then, in
mid-1999, BellSouth was awarded a concession to
provide fixed telephony services in Peru and later, in
2001, won a similar contract in Venezuela. Telecom Italia
had also gained experience in this segment of the
subregional market, having bid successfully in the
capitalization of Bolivia’s State-run company, ENTEL.
Under the terms of the privatization agreement, ENTEL
retained a monopoly over local, long distance and
international service, with an investment of US$ 626
million. TIM then began to invest heavily in the fixed
telephony market in Venezuela. Neither BellSouth nor
TIM has achieved a significant market share in Peru and
Venezuela, however.
The Colombian and Ecuadorian authorities have not
privatized their basic telephony companies, which has
limited foreign investors’ access to these markets. In
Colombia, a number of joint ventures were undertaken
with foreign firms to expand local telephone service, and
while public utilities continue to control the market,
competition among them has increased sharply.38 In
2000, the municipal authorities abandoned an attempt to
privatize 51% of Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de
Bogotá (ETB) –valued at US$ 710 million– because of
investor concerns about security in the country.  In
Ecuador, since 1992 successive Administrations have
tried to privatize the State telecommunications companies
Andinatel and Pacifictel. Following an unsuccessful
attempt to privatize 35% of these two firms in 1997 and
1998, subsequent regulatory modifications enabled the
government to divest itself of a 51% share of both
Andinatel and Pacifictel. This privatization operation may
be completed in 2003, depending on the economic policy
stance adopted by the new Administration. In this regard,
the government has asked the firms’ current management
to undertake competitive and transparent selection
processes –under the supervision of the competent
institution– to find operators interested in administering
them. In 2002 a second attempt to privatize the
administration of Pacifictel met with failure when no
valid bids were received.39 The only bid was made by
the Swedish firm Telia, but it did not include the US$ 10
million guarantee required under the conditions of the
call to tender (www.bsteam.telecomindice7.htm).
In general, the limited volume of foreign investment
being made, particularly in the less developed countries,
36 In the event of a successful takeover, AES proposed to sell the mobile telephony subsidiary (Movinet), and is believed to have entered into
discussions with Telefónica in this connection.
37 Telefónica del Perú’s monopoly in fixed telephony expired in August 1998, and CANTV’s in November 2000.
38 Empresas Colombiana de Telecomunicaciones (TELECOM), Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Bogotá (ETB) and Empresas Públicas de
Medellín (EPM) controlled 79% of local telephone services.
39 The tender offered a five-year concession to administer the company, which, to date, has 587,000 clients (44% of the country’s fixed lines).
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has translated into slower progress in improving basic
telephony services than in other Latin American
countries (see table II.4). At the same time, the deferral
of investments in fixed telephony has helped the
mobile telephony market to flourish. Between 1995
and 2001, the number of mobile telephony subscribers
in the Andean Community countries as a group jumped
from 816,300 to almost 13 million (see table II.4). The
case of Venezuela is most notable, where mobile
telephones accounted for over 70% of total telephones
in service and the number of cellular phone users per
1,000 inhabitants reached 26.4% in 2001  (see table
II.4). The same operators that maintain a major
presence in fixed telephony also dominate the cellular
segment, although their shares of the two markets
differ markedly.
Table II.4
ANDEAN COMMUNITY: TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDICATORS, 1995-2001
Fixed telephony Mobile telephony Internet
Celular Percent- Internet PersonalNo. of Main lines Celular telephone age users computers
main per 100 telephone subscribers of total per 100 per 1,000lines inhabitants subscribers per 100 tele- inhabitants inhab-(thousands) (percentages) (thousands) inhabitants phones (percent- itants(percentages) ages)
1995 2001 1995 2001 1995 2001 2001 2001 2001 2001
Bolivia 246.9 514.8 3.33 6.22 10.0 744.0 8.99 59.1 ... ...
Colombia 3 872.8 7 300.0 10.05 17.05 274.6 3 265.3 7.63 30.9 4.16 55.25
Ecuador 679.9 1 335.8 6.09 10.37 54.4 859.2 6.67 39.1 1.61 19.08
Peru 1 109.2 2 022.3 4.71 7.75 73.5 1 545.0 5.92 43.3 2.16 36.40
Venezuela 2 463.2 2 758.3 11.38 11.20 403.8 6 489.9 26.35 70.7 4.66 60.90
Argentina 5 622.5 8 108.0 16.17 21.63 340.7 6 974.9 19.26 46.2 7.26 80.20
Brazil 13 263.0 37 430.8 8.51 21.78 1 285.5 28 745.8 16.73 43.4 5.30 68.84
Chile 1 818.0 3 703.3 12.74 23.90 197.3 5  271.6 34.23 59.5 7.93 78.23
Mexico 8 801.0 13 773.0 9.39 13.72 688.5 21 757.0 21.68 61.2 5.59 71.74
Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, Division of Production, Productivity and Management, on the
basis of figures provided by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) (www.itu.int).
The United States firm BellSouth is the leading
mobile telephony operator in three of the five Andean
countries (Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador) and is the
second largest in the Peruvian market (see table II.5). In
Venezuela, BellSouth’s subsidiary TELCEL has secured
about 60% of the market and plans to invest around US$
1.5 billion by 2005. In June 2000 it invested US$ 295
million to buy 33.8% of  Celumóvil S.A., which operates
in six of Colombia’s 10 largest cities. A few days later,
the United States firm bought a further 16.6%, increasing
its stake in Celumóvil to 54.4%. Through this newly
acquired firm, BellSouth then negotiated an agreement
with the owners of Compañía Celular de Colombia
(COCELCO), for which it paid US$ 414 million. This
operation enabled BellSouth to increase its stake in
Celumóvil to 66% and obtain control of the company.
This, together with the purchase of COCELCO, gave
40 Entel’s Móvil competes in the Bolivian market with private firms TELECEL (majority owned by Millicom of Luxembourg) and VIVA
(majority owned by Western Wireless of the United States). between 1991 and 1996, TELCEL had a monopoly of the market.
BellSouth the largest share of the Colombian mobile
telephony market (ECLAC, 2001). In Peru, in January
1997, BellSouth bought 58.7% of Tele 2000, a multi-
service telecommunications company. Since then it has
increased its stake in this firm to 97%, has begun to
operate its own fibre optics network in Lima and the
surrounding area, and has adopted the BellSouth brand
name.
Using its solid position in the Bolivian market as a
trampoline, TIM has become one of the three principal
firms in the mobile telephony segment in any Andean
country (see table II.5). In November 1996, Entel
switched its cellular telephony service to Time Division
Multiple Access (TDMA) technology and then, in late
2000, incorporated the Global System for Mobile
Communication (GSM) standard.40 That same year, TIM
moved into the Peruvian market with an initial investment
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of US$ 250 million, and later paid US$ 180 million to
obtain a PCS (Personal Communication System) licence
and offer GSM technology, thus becoming the third-
largest mobile telephony operator in Peru (ECLAC,
2001). In November 2000, TIM bought 57% of the
Venezuelan mobile telephony firm Digitel for US$ 600
million (www.americaeconomica.com/numeros/70/
noticias/fitamovil.htm) and, early in 2003, injected an
investment of US$ 352 million into the firm. Between
2003 and 2005, Digitel plans to invest some US$ 485
million in expanding its network and developing new
technology (Gestión, 15 November 2002). As of mid-
2002, the firm had some 800,000 clients, compared with
450,000 the year before.
Table II.5
ANDEAN COMMUNITY: MAIN MOBILE TELEPHONY OPERATORS, DECEMBER 2001
Bolivia Colombia Ecuador Peru Venezuela
BellSouth Year of entry - 2000 1997 1997 1991
Subsidiary - Celumóvil BellSouth BellSouth Peru TELCEL
Ecuador (formerly Tele 2000
Stake in subsidiary - 66.0 89.4 100.0 78.0
(percentage)
Number of users - 859 366 225 180 361 367 3 234 972
TIM Year in of entry 1995 - - 2000 2000
Subsidiary ENTEL Móvil - - TIM Perú Digitel
Stake in subsidiary 100.0 - - 100.0 56.6
(percentage)
Number of users 280 000 - - 173 000 667 000
Telefónica Year of entry - - - 1994 1991
of Spain Subsidiary - - - Telefónica Móviles Perú CANTV
Stake in subsidiary - - - 100.0 6.4
(percentage)
Number of users - - - 1 087 000 2 461 500
Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, Division of Production, Productivity and Management, on the
basis of data provided by the firms (www.bellsouth.com; www.tim.com; www.telefonica.es).
Finally, Telefónica of Spain took advantage of the
monopoly it had built up during much of the 1990s in fixed
telephony in Peru and Venezuela –with a minority stake in
CANTV– to consolidate its position as one of the leading
mobile telephony operator in both markets. In Peru it has
maintained this position, but in Venezuela it lost a large part
of its market share with the liberalization of the subsector
and the expansionist strategy of BellSouth (see table II.5).
With the consolidation of the leading operators, the
Andean countries have received large inflows of resources
in the last few years. According to the Peruvian authorities,
up to 2001 the telecommunications subsector had received
some US$ 4 billion in private investment and agreements
had been signed with two foreign firms (Telefónica of
Spain and AT&T of the United States)41 for investments
of about US$ 5 billion over the next few years. A similar
situation has developed in Venezuela, where approximately
US$ 5 billion in investments were made in the
telecommunications industry between 1997 and 2001.
Market liberalization and the rapid incorporation
of new technologies has also brought new market
entrants. The Peruvian Government has awarded a total
of 252 concessions in the area of telecommunications,
bringing firms such as Nextel and Americatel42 of the
United States into the market.  In Venezuela, the award
of 15 licences in a Wireless Local Loop (WLL)
technology auction generated US$ 20.2 million in
revenues for the government. TELCEL and Genesis
Telecom –and joint venture formed by Bell Canada and
Telmex of Mexico– were the largest winners, with five
licences each, but TIM of Italy, Millicom of
Luxembourg and Entel of Chile were also successful
bidders. Investments in telecommunications fell off
sharply in 2001, however, as the companies in the sector
await the Venezuelan Government’s announcement of
auctions for LMDS (Local Multipoint Distribution
System) licences and the third round of WLL
technology.
41 AT&T entered the Peruvian market in mid-2000 after having formed a partnership with FirstCom.
42 In mid-2000, AT&T arrived in Peru after forming a partnership with FirstCom.
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In Colombia and Ecuador, the situation has
developed rather differently. In Colombia, the concession
of three new PCS licences was delayed by pressure from
the firms already holding such licences (BellSouth and
COMCEL, a subsidiary of América Móvil of Mexico).
Finally, in January 2003, Colombia Móvil –a consortium
of the Colombian firms Empresas Públicas de Medellín
(EPM) and ETB– obtained the right to operate the three
new licenses.  EPM is owned by the City of Medellín
and is the leading public services provider in Colombia,
while ETB is owned by the Colombian Government and
is the country’s second-largest fixed telephony company.
In late 2002, the Government of Ecuador announced it
would auction off a third mobile telephone license –
licenses are currently held by BellSouth and Porta (a
subsidiary of América Móvil), but the auction was
postponed at Porta’s request.43  This development is of
particular interest, since it seems to indicate that América
Móvil is beginning to emerge as an important new
operator in the Andean subregion.  This conglomerate,
in which SBC Communications, Teléfonos de México
and Bell Canada all have an interest, has obtained a share
of the market in Colombia, Ecuador and, recently,
Venezuela.  It also was involved in the unsuccessful
attempt to privatize Ecuador’s State-owned Pacifictel.
In summary, the telecommunications subsector has
been the recipient of sizeable amounts of foreign
investment, particularly in those of the Andean countries
whose markets have been opened up to competition.
After the first few privatization operations, the major
international operators have concentrated their efforts on
expanding their shares in the mobile telephony market.
In fact, cellular telephone penetration rates in the Andean
countries are quite high.  Competition, the entry of new
operators and the ongoing introduction of state-of-the-
art technology have brought about significant
improvements in service, coverage and prices which have
enabled leading firms such as BellSouth to meet the
challenge posed by new entrants despite the fact that they
do not  have a subregional network of their own.
(b) Electric power: towards an Andean duopoly?
As in the telecommunications industry, most Andean
countries have encouraged private investment in the three
segments of the electric power subsector (generation,
transmission and distribution) as a means of improving
and expanding available energy infrastructure. Outcomes
have varied widely, however.
Nearly all the countries have amended their sectoral
regulations and devised mechanisms for transferring the
main public enterprises to private ownership.
Nonetheless, the ambitious privatization and concession
schemes put in place in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru faced
opposition from civil society, and this tended to erode
interest among potential foreign investors. In Ecuador
and Venezuela, several attempts at privatization have also
been abandoned, either as a result of political opposition
in Congress or as new authorities take office. In countries
where privatizations did take place, assets have tended
to gravitate into the hands of a few Spanish, United States
and Chilean firms, such as Endesa-España and AES
Corporation.
In Peru, a legal framework allowing the sale of all
State firms in the subsector was established in 1992. This
led to privatization of the restructured business divisions
of ELECTROLIMA,44 together with the distribution and
generation units of ELECTROPERU.45 In the mid-1990s,
the authorities in Bolivia carried out a far-reaching reform
of the subsector, which allowed three of the main
generating units of the State-owned Empresa Nacional
de Electricidad to be included in its Capitalization Plan.46
In 1996, the Colombian Government unblocked the sale
of major electric power assets and embarked upon a
privatization policy that resulted in about half of the
country’s generating and distribution capacity passing
into private ownership. The process attracted investments
of about US$ 6 billion into the electric power subsector.
The initial enthusiasm engendered by privatizations
in Peru and Colombia faded rapidly, however. The
population in Peru associated the sale of State assets with
43 In March 2000, the Mexican firm TELMEX acquired a 60% equity interest in Conecel S.A. as part of an investment programme aimed at
strengthening Porta’s coverage and modernizing its network.
44 To facilitate its privatization, ELECTROLIMA was split into five independent businesses: one generating firm – Empresa de Generación
Eléctrica de Lima (EDEGEL), and four distributors – Luz del Sur, Empresa de Distribución Eléctrica de Lima Norte S.A. (EDELNOR),
Ede-Chancay and Ede-Cañete.
45 The Government retained a 40% stake in these assets to be sold subsequently; 10% was reserved for employees.
46 After making a contribution of US$ 140 million, 50% of the ownership and management of these companies was sold to United States
investors: Duke Energy (Empresa Eléctrica Conari S.A., US$ 59 million), Energy Initiatives (Empresa Eléctrica Guaracachi S.A., US$ 47
million) and the Constellation Energy Group consortium (Empresa Eléctrica Valle Hermoso, US$ 34 million). In 1998, the country’s largest
generator, Compañía Boliviana de Energía Eléctrica (COBEE), was acquired by NRG Energy Inc. also of the United States.
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an increase in unemployment and utility-rate hikes, which
generated strong popular opposition. In June 2002, the
Government cancelled the US$ 167 million sale of two
electric power generators (EGASA and EGESUR) to the
Belgian firm Tractebel in the wake of serious protests; it
then suspended the remainder of its privatization
programme indefinitely. In Colombia, plans to increase
private-sector participation were discontinued in view
of the scant interest shown by foreign investors in
electricity distribution firms that had been experiencing
financial difficulties (in addition to being involved in legal
disputes), compounded by continuous guerrilla attacks.
The sale of ISAGEN de Generación y Comercialización
de Energía (valued at US$ 415 million) was postponed
indefinitely, having failed to attract foreign investors.
Privatization of Interconexión Eléctrica S.A. (ISA) has
also been held back; in order to capitalize the firm, a
24% stake was instead sold directly to the public between
November and December 2000. This operation raised a
total of US$ 74 million. Despite terrorist attacks
(numbering 194 in 2001), the ISA management has
striven to double profits and project itself abroad through
projects in Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela (see box II.2).
Although these programmes have been very short-
lived, there has been one major winner: the Spanish firm
Endesa – firstly, as a member of the consortia that
submitted the winning bids for some of the most attractive
assets, and then by acquiring a controlling interest in the
Chilean group Enersis, which was also an active
participant in Andean privatizations. Even before this
acquisition, Endesa and Enersis had been working
together to form consortia to bid on the different assets
being privatized. In Colombia, Endesa-España acquired
control of Comercializadora y Distribuidora de Energía
S.A. (CODENSA) and Empresa Generadora de Energía
S.A. (EMGESA), both of Bogotá, and later added Central
Hidroeléctrica de Betania, which had been acquired by
an Enersis subsidiary. In Peru, the Spanish transnational
participated in the consortia that acquired Empresa de
Distribución Eléctrica de Lima Norte S.A. (EDELNOR),
Empresa de Generación Termoeléctrica de Ventanilla
(ETEVENSA) and Empresa Eléctrica de Piura (EEPSA),
in addition to several other assets acquired by Enersis
and its subsidiaries.
With its acquisition of Enersis, Endesa-España
consolidated its position as the leading energy group in
Latin America (Calderón, 2003); this also, however,
created a number of problems for it with regulatory
authorities, especially in Peru. In mid-1997, Endesa-
España was already displaying a degree of horizontal
concentration in the generation market (ETEVENSA and
EEPSA), but its acquisition of assets owned by Enersis
–Empresa de Generación Eléctrica de Lima (EDEGEL)
and the distributor Edelnor– not only increased this, but
also gave the firm a high degree of vertical concentration
(generation-distribution), which was expressly prohibited
under Peruvian energy regulations. In November 1997,
in an unprecedented decision, the Peruvian Congress
passed an anti-trust act for the electric power subsector
which, curiously enough, allowed vertical integration of
up to 5% and horizontal concentration of up to 15%, if
requested in advance. Despite this, the National Institute
for the Defence of Competition and Protection of
Intellectual Property (INDECOPI) accepted the petition
filed by ENDESA, which presented its 31%
concentration in both cases as a fait accompli.
In Venezuela, the electric power subsector is made
up of both State-owned firms (which account for the
majority of assets) and a number of private operators.
The State infrastructure is substantially degraded, and
an estimated US$ 12 billion in investment is required
(EIU, 2002b). In September 1999, a new regulatory
framework was approved which allows private
investment in State firms and divides electric power
activities into separate generation, distribution and
transmission segments in preparation for the opening of
the subsector. To date, however, progress in this direction
has been very slow, and in 2001 the government departed
still further from these objectives by declaring that the
largest State firms –the generator Empresa de
Electrificación del Caroní (EDELCA), and the distributor
Compañía Anónima de Administración y Fomento
Eléctrico (CADAFE)– were strategic assets and would
therefore not be privatized. The authorities have also done
an about-turn regarding the privatization of Energía
Eléctrica de Venezuela (ENELVEN); Energía Eléctrica
de la Costa Oriental (ENELCO); Energía Eléctrica de
Barquisimeto (ENELBAR); and Sistema Eléctrico de
Monagas y Delta Amacuro (SEMDA).
It was against this backdrop that one of the most
ambitious strategies implemented in Latin America began
to unfold, as the United States firm AES Corporation
employed an aggressive acquisitions programme to
position itself among the leaders in the region’s electric
power subsector. One of the epicentres of this process
was the Andean Community, and particularly Venezuela.
In June 2000, Venezuela’s regulatory system was put to
the test by a hostile takeover bid for the country’s largest
private electric power firm, Electricidad de Caracas
(EDC), for which AES Corporation offered US$ 1.6
billion. The National Securities and Exchange
Commission (CNV) suspended the AES bid on two
occasions, arguing in support of the rights of minority
shareholders. Pressure from CNV forced the firm to
broaden its bid to include all EDC shares wishing to
participate, thereby benefiting minority interests. In the
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end, the takeover was authorized, since this was seen as
a means of sending out a positive signal to foreign
investment. Once the acquisition was accomplished, AES
sold off a number of unprofitable EDC assets in Colombia
to the Spanish firm Unión Fenosa. Like Endesa-España,
AES further expanded its presence in the Andean
countries in 2000 by acquiring the Chilean firm, Gener,
which had assets in Peru and Colombia. It then also
attempted to use a PTO to purchase the
telecommunications firm CANTV, but this operation was
ultimately aborted.
In Ecuador the government’s privatization plan for
the electric power subsector has run into difficulties. In
1999, the State-owned Instituto Ecuatoriano de
Electrificación (INECEL) was divided into seven separate
entities as a means of making it more attractive to
potential foreign buyers.47 The plan was to sell 51% of
the equity in 17 distribution firms.48 In late 2001, three
international corporations were showing interest in
participating in this privatization: Unión Fenosa of Spain,
AES Corporation of the United States, and Pérez
Companc of Argentina. The Ecuadorian authorities
subsequently planned to sell off the transmission firm
and six generators during 2002. In the case of Hidropaute,
the country’s largest generator, 49% of its equity was to
be sold to the private sector. In early 2002, the
government was also intending to offer a concession for
electric power distribution in the City of Guayaquil,
where 30% of all the country’s consumers reside.
Nonetheless, in March and April of that year its
privatization plans broke down because of the low
valuation obtained by the 17 distribution firms (about
47 One transmission firm, Transelectric S.A., and six generators, Hidropaute S.A., Hidroagoyán S.A., Hidropucará S.A., Termoesmeraldas
S.A., Termopichincha S.A. and  Electroguayas S.A. In early 2001, Hidroagoyán took over Hidropucará.
48 Of the other 49% the workers would receive 10%, with the remainder going to the beneficiaries of popular capitalism.
Box II.2
INTERCONEXIÓN ELÉCTRICA S.A. (ISA): A MULTI-ANDEAN FIRM
Interconexión Eléctrica (ISA) is
Colombia’s leading power transmission
firm. Although its main activity is the
transportation of high-voltage power,
the firm is noteworthy for its use in
recent years of a growth strategy
based on two central pillars: (i)
internationalization of its activities in
Andean Community countries and
exploitation of network synergies; and
(ii) incipient diversification of activities
towards the telecommunications sector.
The ISA business group consists of its
subsidiaries Transelca and ISA-Perú in
the electric power sector, and Internexa
and Flycom Comunicaciones in
telecommunications. One of the key
strategic moves made by ISA in
Colombia was its 1998 acquisition of
65% of Transelca, the country’s
second-largest power transmitter. In
2000, ISA became the leading
Colombian mixed public-private
enterprise, although the State
continues to hold a majority interest.
As part of its regionalization
process and its diversification towards
the telecommunications sector, in 2000
ISA set up its Internexa subsidiary and
began operations in fibre-optic
networks. Internexa provides a carrier’s
carrier service for power and
telecommunications firms. Recently it
teamed up with the Ecuadorian firm
Transelec to form Transnexa, which will
operate the fibre-optic network joining
the two countries; it hopes to start
operations in Ecuador through this
partnership early in 2003. In addition,
Internexa entered a joint venture with
New World Network to develop a land-
based station for the use of the
submarine cable that interconnects
Colombia, the United States and
several Central American and
Caribbean countries. Meanwhile,
Flycom Comunicaciones will operate
the local access licence in Colombia to
provide wireless broadband services
regionwide with a view to supplying its
clients with network interconnectivity
for voice and data, high-speed Internet
and other services.
In Peru, the regionalization of
electric power activities began in 2001
with the creation of the subsidiaries
ISA-Perú and Red de Energía del Perú.
This step was made possible by the
award of several tenders to ISA,
including a concession for the design,
construction, exploitation and operation
of a set of substations (Oroya,
Carhuamayo and Vizcarra, among
others), together with the electric
power interconnection systems of the
Government of Peru (Etecen and
Etesur) in 2002. This made ISA the
largest energy carrier in the country. In
recent months, the firm has shown
interest in deepening its position within
the Andean Community and
strengthening the interconnections it
already possesses with Venezuela and
Ecuador; specifically, it has declared its
intention to participate in new tenders
for energy transmission concessions in
Bolivia and Ecuador. ISA has set itself
the objective of providing electric
power connectivity among Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela in 2004;
it is also evaluating the possibility of
joining a future integrated market in
Central America.
ISA is thus a good example of a
largely State-owned firm that has found
fertile ground for expansion in Andean
Community countries. Its success may
also be associated with the relative
stagnation of activities and operations
among the large TNCs, presumably
due to financing difficulties. The firm’s
expansion has been based on
diversification of its activities towards
telecommunications and the
implementation of a common energy
strategy in the subregion.
Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies of the Division of Production, Productivity
and Management, on the basis of information provided by Interconexión Eléctrica (ISA) (http://www.isa.com.co).
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US$ 380 million), the municipal and provincial
governments’ refusal to put their shares in the distribution
firms up for auction and widespread popular protest. In
May 2002, the concession of Empresa Eléctrica del
Ecuador (EMELEC), which supplies Guayaquil, also fell
through, after Unión Fenosa and AES Corporation had
shown interest in taking over the company. As a result,
100% of EMELEC passed into the hands of the Deposits
Guarantee Agency (AGD), under the supervision of the
National Electricity Council, until such time as it can be
transferred to a private investor.
The electric power subsector in Andean countries has
clearly undergone major changes in recent years. In most
cases –albeit with differing results– the national authorities
have encouraged participation by private capital as a way
of upgrading and expanding their countries’ electricity
infrastructure, which has degraded over time due to a lack
of public investment. These privatization programmes
began with a great deal of optimism in Peru and Colombia,
but social pressure and other difficulties steadily
undermined foreign firms’ interest. The Andean countries
were no exception to the Latin American trend, however,
and two of the largest TNCs in the subsector, Endesa-
España and AES Corporation, managed to acquire several
of the most important assets. Furthermore, unlike the great
majority of the other TNCs present in the subregion, these
two firms, together with ISA, are also notable for the fact
that they have displayed what could be described as a pan-
Andean vision.
(c) Other infrastructure sectors
The authorities in Andean countries see concession
programmes as a way of overcoming the infrastructural
shortcomings from which many of their economies suffer,
and they have been using such mechanisms to transfer
the construction, maintenance and administration of
highways, ports and airports to private investors.
During the first half of the 1990s, the Colombian
Government implemented a system of highway
concessions aimed at encouraging participation by private
investors, both local and foreign, in the construction of
infrastructure. The programme included contracts to
rehabilitate, build or maintain, as appropriate, different
segments of various roadways.  These contracts have been
awarded in three stages. The first lasted from 1994 to
1997, the second from 1997 to 1999, and the third round
began in 2000. Between 1994 and 1999, the government
granted 13 highway concessions, for a total value of
US$ 985 million, to rehabilitate 1,220 km of roads and
build another 306 km. The largest of these have been the
Armenia-Pereira-Manizales expressway, under
concession to Autopistas del Café S.A., and the Tobia
Grande–Puerto Salgar expressway, which was awarded
to Concesionaria del Magdalena Medio S.A. Construction
work on the latter is currently suspended owing to a legal
dispute between the government and the concession holder.
The third phase of the concessions programme was
launched in 2000 with the aim of strengthening export
promotion policies by providing better links between the
interior of the country and its border areas. This phase,
which is designed to cover 3,840 km of highways,
encompasses eight projects spread across the country
having a total value of US$ 2.146 billion. These projects
include construction of the La Línea tunnel (US$ 222
million), which forms part of the improvement plan for
the Bogotá-Buenaventura corridor (US$ 950 million);
rehabilitation of the Atlántico–Bolívar–Córdoba–Sucre
highway system, involving an investment estimated at
US$ 220 million; and rehabilitation and expansion of the
Zipaquirá–Santa María highway, which is expected to
require an investment of around US$ 167 million
(CONFIS, 2001; DNP, 2001). In addition, the authorities
in Peru are implementing a concessions scheme to upgrade
and operate 11 expressway extension projects, the first of
which was awarded in May 2002. Similar programmes
have been implemented in Ecuador, where 1,212 km of
highways have been placed under concession to private
investors.
The remodelling and management of airports is
another activity that has kindled interest among foreign
investors. In 2000 an international tender was held for
the concession of the Jorge Chávez Airport in the City of
Lima; this contract was won by a consortium led by the
German firm Flughafen Frankfurt Main, which runs the
Frankfurt airport and another five airports in various
countries. To obtain the 30-year concession, the
successful bidders made a US$ 1.2 billion investment
commitment and agreed to pay 46.51% of their profits
to the State (EIU, 2002c). During the first year of
operations, the concession-holder paid US$ 43 million
to the Peruvian Treasury. In 2001, a decree was signed
empowering the municipalities of Quito and Guayaquil
to award a concession to build new airports in those cities.
In November 2002, the Mariscal Sucre International
Airport in Quito was transferred to a privately-owned
export contracting agency, the Canadian Commercial
Corporation (CCC). This consortium also signed a
US$ 300 million contract to build a new terminal.49 In
addition, agreement was reached on a 35-year concession
for the operation and maintenance of both the existing
airport and the new one (Puembo) with a view to their
eventual merger.
49 The Canadian firm will operate Mariscal Sucre until the new Quito airport is finished.
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Mention should also be made of the 30-year
concession to operate and manage the water and sewerage
system in the City of Guayaquil, which was won by
International Water Supply (IWS).  This consortium
consists of the British firm United Utilities (one of the
leading public service providers in Europe), the United
States firm Bechtel (one of the world’s largest engineering
and construction firms) and Edison SpA (Italy’s largest
private energy supplier).
(d) The banking sector: the early bird gets the worm?
In the wake of the debt crisis of the 1980s, the
Andean countries’ banking systems suffered from
problems of insolvency and inadequate supervision. In
the early 1990s, most Andean Community countries
began to introduce far-reaching reforms in their financial
systems.  These reforms entailed such measures as the
privatization of State entities, the liberalization of
operating rules, the elimination of most controls on
interest rates, the establishment of capital requirements
and expenditure limits, the reinforcement of prudential
supervision measures and the lifting of restrictions on
foreign participation in local financial institutions. Two
of the pioneers in this process were Peru and Colombia
(the latter was in a particularly strong position thanks to
the banking supervision measures it implemented, which
were second only to those of Chile among the Latin
America countries). Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela
followed close behind, and banking activity grew strongly
against this backdrop while the presence of foreign
players in local financial systems also expanded.50
Nonetheless, this new state of affairs did not last
long; between 1994 and 1998, one by one, the Andean
countries’ banking systems began to run into difficulties.
• In 1994-1995, the Venezuelan financial system slipped
into a crisis that engulfed half of the country’s banks
and cost the State around US$ 11 billion (EIU, 2002b).
Today, although the situation has improved, the
banking sector in that country still suffers from serious
problems of decapitalization and inefficiency.
• In Colombia, the situation worsened in 1998. The
economic recession, together with depreciating asset
values and high interest rates, undermined the strength
of the banking system. Regulatory agencies had to
intervene in the management of several institutions,
and some of the smaller ones merged or closed their
doors; a US$ 4.2 billion bailout package was put
together, and those institutions that continued operating
did so under strict oversight and supervision measures.
• In Peru, the effects of El Niño, compounded by
external shocks and the devaluation of the local
currency, created serious problems for the financial
system in 1998. Although there was no risk of
outright collapse, the government intervened with a
bailout package in order to restore the payments
chain. The banking sector avoided default, but it has
been faced with serious difficulties due to the high
proportion of non-performing loans in its portfolio.
As a result of this instability, about 70% of deposits
in the Peruvian banking system are held in dollars.
• In Ecuador, the banking system was on the verge of
total collapse in 1999, and the authorities had to issue
US$ 862 million in bonds to reimburse clients who
had held deposits in the State banks that closed down.
In 1999, the authorities had to intervene in the
management of Ecuador’s largest bank in terms of
assets, Filanbanco, and the bank was eventually forced
to close down following the July 2001 liquidity crisis
and the government’s failure to find a buyer for the
bank’s most attractive assets.51 Filanbanco’s collapse
sent shockwaves throughout the financial system;
between 1998 and 1999, the State took control of 16
banks, four of which were merged into two units,
while the remaining 12 were closed down.
During this turbulent period, the presence of foreign
institutions in the Andean countries’ banking systems
grew substantially (see figure II.4). Despite the risk
associated with these economies, international firms that
were striving to consolidate and expand their presence
in Latin America took advantage of the opportunities
opened up by the banking crisis in the subregion. The
Spanish banks Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA)
and Santander Central Hispano (SCH) warrant special
mention in this connection.
These two Spanish banks are the largest foreign
institutions currently operating in Andean financial
markets. In the mid-1990s, SCH and BBVA engaged in
fierce competition to secure the best banking assets
throughout Latin America, and the Andean Community
was no exception (Calderón, 2002). SCH rapidly
succeeded in its bid to establish a strong and
homogeneous regional presence, first in the countries of
the Southern Cone, then in the Andean economies, and
finally in the largest and most developed markets (Brazil
and Mexico) (see table II.6). Like its rival, BBVA first
consolidated its presence in the medium-sized markets
(including Colombia, Peru and Venezuela) before turning
to the larger ones.
50 See chapter III of this report.
51 Non-performing loans amounted to 62% of Filanbanco’s total portfolio (EIU, 2001).
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Figure II.4
COLOMBIA, PERU AND VENEZUELA: SHARE OF FOREIGN BANKS










1990 1994 1999 2000 2001
Colombia Peru Venezuela
Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies of the Division of
Production, Productivity and Management, on the basis of information presented in chapter III of
this report.
Table II.6
SANTANDER CENTRAL HISPANO (SCH) AND BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA (BBVA): PRESENCE IN THE
BANKING MARKET OF THE ANDEAN COMMUNITY COUNTRIES, 2001
(Percentages and millions of dollars)
Ranking in Value of
the  local total Market share Year
Local bank Percentage banking assets, of
owned system,  December Lending Deposits entry
by assets 2001 (percentage)(percentage)
SANTANDER CENTRAL
HISPANO
Bolivia Banco Santa Cruz 90 2 634 13.13 15.76 1998
Colombia Banco Santander Colombia 60 12 1 265 2.63 2.68 1997
Peru Banco Santander Perú 100 6 1 312 7.08 5.75 1995
Venezuela Banco de Venezuela 98 3 3 700 12.94 12.31 1997
BANCO BILBAO
VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA
Colombia BBVA Ganadero 99 3 2 557 7.44 9.46 1996
Peru BBVA Continental 50 3 2 999 13.83 19.41 1995
Venezuela Banco Provincial 53 1 4 255 16.61 16.03 1997
Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, Division of Production, Productivity and
Management, on the basis of figures provided in Álvaro Calderón, Spanish Banks in Latin America: Do they need each
other?, document presented at the Conference on Spanish Investment in Latin America, Transnational and Comparative
Studies Center, Florida International University (Miami, Florida, 18-19 October 2002).
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The Spanish banks also viewed pension-fund
management as an attractive alternative for diversification
and expansion, given its strong growth potential in the
different regional environments. By late 1998, BBVA had
become the second-largest pension-fund manager in the
region, with an average weighted market share of 25%
in the countries where it was present, and market
leadership in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. In May 1999,
BBVA consolidated its leadership in Latin America with
the indirect purchase of 40.7% of Provida, the largest
pension-fund manager in Chile. Thus, having begun its
activities in Ecuador, it then went on to strengthen its
position in Colombia and Peru.
In general, the market strategies pursued by
foreign-owned banks have focused on attracting savers’
deposits, thereby introducing new patterns of
competition in the industry. Greater competition has not
led to lower costs, however (see chapter III of this
report).
(e) Retail trade
In Colombia, the supermarket business underwent
profound changes during the 1990s. The entry of
international retail chains fuelled competition, and
supermarkets increased their share of total retail sales.
The consumer boom of the early 1990s also stimulated
foreign investment: in 1996 the Dutch firm Makro entered
the subregion, and this was followed in 1998 by the arrival
of the French chain Carrefour. In September 2001,
Carrefour invested US$ 26 million to open four new
hypermarkets in Bogotá.  The French chain currently
plans to open two new hypermarkets in Colombia every
year (EIU, 2002a). Its operations in the country are part
of a joint venture in which Carrefour has a 55% stake,
Grupo Empresarial Bavaria  has a 35% share and Grupo
Sigla holds a 10% interest.
In recent years, retail trade has burgeoned in Peru,
both in the supermarket segment and among large
department stores (the Chilean firms Ripley and Saga-
Falabella are examples).  These retail establishments have
spread rapidly both in Lima and in other cities in the
interior of the country. In 2001, Ripley was the country’s
largest importer of consumer goods, with total imports
exceeding US$ 36 million. Over the last three years, the
Santa Isabel supermarket chain (a subsidiary of Royal
Ahold of the Netherlands and Disco of Argentina) has
doubled its number of outlets in Lima, in addition to
operating the Plaza Vea chain. Santa Isabel has 20 stores
at the present time, and it was planning to add a further
five during 2002.
C. CONCLUSIONS
During the last 50 years, ownership of major production
assets in the Andean countries has undergone striking
changes. In some periods the dominant players have been
TNCs, while at other times national governments have
exercised strong monopoly power. Since the mid-1980s,
and especially since the early 1990s, the Andean
economies have been carrying forward sweeping
economic reforms that have resulted in the withdrawal
of the State from most production activities –with the
partial exception of the hydrocarbons sector– and the
lifting of restrictions on foreign investment.
This new regulatory context attracted large FDI
inflows into the Andean Community. Despite serious
economic and political difficulties in several countries, the
subregion took in nearly 13% of total FDI in the region
and maintained high and stable levels of foreign investment
throughout 1998-2002. In fact, FDI flows have grown
faster in the Andean Community than in Latin America
overall. Nonetheless, investment has been heavily
concentrated in a few activities which, by their very nature,
have little to do with specific policies, the macroeconomic
situation, market conditions or other traditionally important
factors. In such cases, the relevant question has been
whether or not transnational firms could participate in the
activities concerned. The pro-market reforms introduced
in the early 1990s were decisive, and this was particularly
true of the countries’ privatization programmes and the
decision to grant partial access for exploration and
exploitation of hydrocarbons in association with State oil
companies in Andean countries.
FDI has tended to target the exploration and
production of natural resources –hydrocarbons and metal
ores– together with the basic services and infrastructure
sectors. As a result of private investment in new mining
and drilling projects, exports have increased considerably
and these sectors’ share of the world market has grown.
The fact remains that, although the international
competitiveness of the Andean subregion has improved
on the whole, this has not occurred in activities that are
gaining ground in world trade flows. On the other hand,
the arrival of foreign investors has brought major
improvements in the coverage and quality of public
services and infrastructure, and hence an increase in the
subregion’s systemic competitiveness.
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The fact that Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and
Venezuela are involved in a process of economic
integration does not seem to have had much impact on
decisions taken by TNCs. An analysis of the  types of
activities that are of greatest interest to foreign investors
makes it quite clear that the potential of an expanded
market is not one of the main determinants for them. Firms
seeking natural resources go where they have access to
them, while the new transnational service providers include
Andean Community countries within their strategies for
Latin America as a whole, seeking to gain market access
wherever favourable conditions exist. Examples include
the strategies pursued by BellSouth and TIM in
telecommunications; Endesa-España, AES Corporation
and ISA in electric power; and BBVA and SCH in financial
services (banking and pension-fund management). Given
the size of local markets, FDI in manufacturing is found
only on a very minor scale and is concentrated in the larger
and relatively more developed countries (Colombia and
Venezuela). The possibility of exporting to other Andean
Community countries has been a major location factor only
for a few very specific types of manufacturing activities,
such as the automotive sector and the chemical-
pharmaceutical industry in Colombia and Venezuela.
Undoubtedly, the improvement that has taken place
in political and economic conditions in Andean
Community countries will be a decisive factor in
maintaining and, wherever possible, increasing their
attractiveness for foreign investors. In addition, the
possibility of deepening subregional integration
agreements, while extending and diffusing this process
throughout civil society and, in particular, the Andean
business sector, could be an important additional factor
in attracting FDI in the future. This could enhance the
strategic nature of the Andean Community’s geographic
location for trade with the United States, Europe, Asia-
Pacific and Latin America. Nonetheless, it is clear that
an effort also needs to be made to ensure that foreign
investment effectively contributes to the productive
development of the subregion. Given the characteristics
of FDI in the Andean Community economies, the lack
of production linkages, weak demand for skilled human
capital and low levels of value-added are some of the
key challenges to be addressed in the years to come.
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Table II-A.1
ANDEAN COMMUNITY: MAIN PRIVATIZATIONS WITH PARTICIPATION BY FOREIGN FIRMS, 1991-2002
(Percentages and millions of dollars)
Recipient Investing Percent- Amount
country Activity Date Firm Buyer country age paid
Bolivia Oil 1997 Empresa Petrolera Chaco S.A. Amoco United States 50.0 307
Bolivia Oil 1997 Empresa Petrolera Andina YPF/Pérez Companc Argentina 50.0 265
Bolivia Oil 1997 Transredes Enron Corp. United States 50.0 264
Royal Dutch-Shell Group Netherlands
Bolivia Telecoms 1996 Empresa Nacional de Telecom. Italia Italy 50.0 610
Telecomunicaciones (ENTEL)
Colombia Electric power 1998 Corporación Eléctrica de la Reliant Energy United States 32.5 658
Costa Atlántica (CORELCA)–
Electrocosta y Electrocaribe
Colombia Electric power 1997 Codensa S.A. Endesa España (26.4%)/ Spain 48.0 1 085
Enersis (12.5%)/
Chilectra (9.1%)
Colombia Electric power 1997 Central Hidroeléctrica Chivor Gener S.A. Chile 99.9 646
Colombia Electric power 1997 Gas Natural E.S.P. Gas Natural SDG Spain 53.7 155
Colombia Electric power 1997 Empresa de Energía del Reliant Energy United States 28.2 150
Pacífico S.A. (EPSA)
Colombia Electric power 1996 Central Hidroeléctrica de Endesa Chile Chile 100.0 489
Betania
Colombia Electric power 1996 Promigas Enron Corp. United States 39.0 101
Colombia Mining 2000 Mina de Carbón Cerrejón Anglo American Plc. United Kingdom 50.0 384
Zona Norte (CZN) Billiton Plc. United Kingdom
Glencore International Switzerland
Colombia Mining 1997 Cerro Matoso Billiton Plc. United Kingdom 46.6 166
Peru Electric power 2001 Electroandes Public Services Enterprise United States 100.0 227
Group (PSEG)
Peru Electric power 2000 Empresa de Generación Duke Energy United States 30.0 112
Eléctrica Norte (EGENOR)
Peru Electric power 1995 Empresa de Generación Endesa Chile (32.6%) Chile United States 60.0 525
Eléctrica de Lima (EDEGEL) Entergy Power Group
(EPG) (27.4%)
Peru Electric power 1995 Empresa de Generación Dominion Resources United States 60.0 228
Eléctrica Norte (EGENOR)
Peru Electric power 1995 ETEVENSA Endesa España Spain 60.0 120
Peru Electric power 1994 Empresa de Distribución Chilquinta S.A. (36%) Chile 60.0 212
Eléctrica de Lima Sur HydroOne Inc. (24%) Canada
(EDELSUR)
Peru Electric power 1994 Empresa de Distribución Chilectra/Enersis Chile 60.0 176
Eléctrica de Lima Norte S.A. Endesa España Spain
(EDELNOR)
Peru Finance 1995 Banco Continental Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Spain 60.0 287
Argentaria (BBVA) (30%)
Grupo Brescia (30%) Peru
Peru Metallurgy 1995 Refinería de Zinc Cajamarquilla Cominco Ltd. (82%) Canada 100.0 191
Marubeni Corporation (17%)  Japan
Peru Mining 1994 Yacimiento Tintaya Broken Hill Propietary Australia 100.0 277
Peru Oil 1996 Refinería La Pampilla Repsol–YPF (48%) Spain 60.0 181
(RELAPSA) Mobil Oil (3%) United States
Peru Telecoms 1994 Telefónica del Perú S.A. Telefónica de España Spain 40.0 2 000
Venezuela Finance 1997 BBVA Banco Provincial Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Spain 40.0 299
Argentaria (BBVA)
Venezuela Finance 1996 Banco de Venezuela Santander Central Spain 90.0 338
Hispano (SCH)
Venezuela Metallurgy 1997 Siderúrgica del Orinoco Consorcio Siderurgia Argentina 70.0 1 800
(SIDOR) Amazonia
Venezuela Telecoms 1991 Compañía Anónima Nacional GTE Corporation United States 40.0 1 900
Teléfonos de Venezuela Telefónica de España Spain
(CANTV) American Telephone and United States
Telegraph (AT&T)
Venezuela Transport 1991 Viasa Iberia Líneas Aéreas Spain 60.0 146
de España S.A.
Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies of the Division of Production, Productivity and Management.
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Table II-A.2
ANDEAN COMMUNITY: MAIN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS WITH PARTICIPATION BY FOREIGN FIRMS, 1992-2002
(Percentages and millions of dollars)
Recipient Investing Percent- Amount
country Activity Date Firm Buyer country age paid
Bolivia Electric power 2002 Transmisora Eléctrica Red Eléctrica de España Spain 99.0 88
Boliviana (TDE) (REE)
Bolivia Electric power 2000 Emp. de Luz y Fuerza Pennsylvania Power & United States 91.9 49
Eléctrica Cochabamba Light (PP&L)
Bolivia Finance 1998 Banco Santa Cruz Santander Central Hispano Spain 90.0 180
Colombia Food 1998 Productos Klim Nestlé Switzerland 100.0 313
Colombia Cement 1998 Diamante Samper Valenciana de Cementos Spain 90.0 346
Colombia Commerce 1999 Almacenes Éxito Casino Guichard-Perrachon France 25.0 205
Colombia Electric power 2000 Corporación Eléctrica Unión Fenosa Spain 32.6 135
de la Costa Atlántica
Colombia Electric power 2000 Empresa de Energía del Unión Fenosa Spain 28.2 100
Pacífico
Colombia Electric power 2000 Empresa de Energía del Unión Fenosa Spain 36.1 225
Pacífico
Colombia Finance 2001 Banco Ganadero Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Spain 10.0 44
Argentaria
Colombia Finance 2000 Banco Ganadero Banco Bilbabo Vizcaya Spain a 260
Argentaria
Colombia Finance 1998 Banco Ganadero Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Spain 15.0 177
Argentaria
Colombia Finance 1997 Banco Santander Colombia Santander Central Hispano Spain 60.0 155
(ex Bancoquia)
Colombia Finance 1996 Banco Ganadero Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Spain 40.0 329
Argentaria
Colombia Mining 2002 Intercor (50% Cerrejón Anglo American United Kingdom 50.0 200
Zona Norte) BHP Billiton Australia
Glencore Switzerland
Colombia Oil 2000 CIT Colombiana Enbridge Canada 50.0 117
Colombia Telecoms 2002 Celcaribe América Móvil Mexico 95.0 100
Colombia Telecoms 2002 Comunicación Celular América Móvil Mexico 13.8 52
Colombia Telecoms 2000 Compañía Celular de Celumóvil Colombia 100.0 414
Colombia (COCELCO) BellSouth Corporation United States
Colombia Telecoms 2000 Celumóvil BellSouth Corporation United States 33.8 295
Colombia Telecoms 1998 Occidente y Caribe Bell Canada Canada 68.4 302
Celular (OCCEL)
Ecuador Food 2002 Compañía de Cervezas Cervecería Bavaria Colombia 25.0 152
Nacionales
Ecuador Oil 2000 CMS Oil Ecuador Crestar Energy Inc. Canada 100.0 142
Ecuador Oil 1999 Villano Oilfield AGIP Italy 60.0 214
Ecuador Telecoms 2000 Consorcio Ecuatoriano de Teléfonos de México Mexico 60.0 153
Telecom. (Telmex)
Ecuador Telecoms 1996 Conecell FirstCom Corporation United States 53.0 100
Peru Food and 2002 Unión de Cervecerías Cervecería Bavaria Colombia 27.0 568
beverages Backus Johnston
Peru Food and 2002 Unión de Cervecerías Backus Cervecería Bavaria Colombia 24.5 420
beverages Johnston
Peru Food and 2002 Unión de Cervecerías Backus Cervecería Regional Venezuela 16.0 200
beverages Johnston
Peru Food and 2002 Unión de Cervecerías Backus Grupo Polar Venezuela ... 77
beverages Johnston
Peru Food and 2001 Unión de Cervecerías Backus Grupo Polar Venezuela 12.8 110
beverages Johnston
Peru Food and 1999 Inca Kola The Coca-Cola Company United States 50.0 200
beverages
Peru Food and 1999 Embotelladoras Coca-Cola Coca-Cola Embonor S.A. Chile 100.0 186
beverages Perú
Peru Food and 1997 Industrias Pacocha Unilever United Kingdom 50.0 72
beverages
Peru Electric power 2000 Emp. de Generación Eléctrica Skanska BOT AB/ Sweden 60.0 48
de Cahua y Pariac Nordic Power
Peru Electric power 1999 Empresa de Generación Duke Energy United States 29.4 92
Eléctrica Norperú
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Table II-A.2 (concluded)
Recipient Investing Percent- Amount
country Activity Date Firm Buyer country age paid
Peru Electric power 1999 Luz del Sur S.A. Sempra Energy United States 37.0 90
Peru Electric power 1997 Inversiones Dominion Perú AES Gener S.A. Chile 49.0 123
Peru Electric power 1997 PlantaTermoeléctrica de Ilo Power Fin Belgium-Luxembourg 100.0 44
Peru Finance 1999 Banco Wiese Sudameris Banco Sudameris France 64.8 180
Peru Pension funds 1999 AFP Unión Santander Central Hispano Spain 100.0 135
(via AFP Nueva Vida) a
Peru Mining 1992 Hierro Perú Shougang China 100.0 162
Peru Telecoms 2000 Telefónica del Perú Telefónica de España Spain 56.7 3 218
(formerly ENTEL)
Peru Telecoms 1999 BellSouth Perú (Tele 2000) BellSouth Corporation United States 15.6 167
Peru Telecoms 1997 BellSouth Perú (Tele 2000) BellSouth Corporation United States 58.7 112
Venezuela Food 1998 Grandes Molinos de Venezuela Cargill Incorporated United States 60.0 140
Venezuela Food and 1997 Panamco Venezuela Panamerican Beverages Mexico 100.0 1 112
beverages Inc. (Panamco)
Venezuela Cement 1994 Vencemos Cementos Mexicanos Mexico 51.0 300
(Cemex)
Venezuela Commerce 2000 Cadena de Tiendas Casino Guichard-Perrachon France 50.0 48
Venezolanas
Venezuela Electric power 2000 Electricidad de Caracas AES Corp. United States 81.3 1 658
Venezuela Electric power 1999 Electricidad de Caracas Brown Brother Harriman United States 13.0 158
& Co.
Venezuela Finance 2000 Banco Caracas Santander Central Hispano Spain 93.0 316
(via Banco de Venezuela)
Venezuela Finance 2000 Interbank Venezuela Banco Mercantil Venezuela 97.0 218
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Spain
Argentaria
Venezuela Finance 1997 Banco del Caribe Bank of Nova Scotia Canada 26.6 88
(Scotiabank)
Venezuela Mining 2001 Mina Las Cristinas Vannessa Ventures Canada 70.0 100
Venezuela Telecoms 2001 Rodven Telefónica Media Spain 100.0 48
Venezuela Telecoms 2000 Corporación Digicel Telecom Italia Italy 56.6 600
Venezuela Telecoms 1998 Comtel Comunicaciones BellSouth Corporation United States 60.0 210
Venezuela Telecoms 1991 Telcel Venezuela BellSouth Corporation United States 78.0 98
Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies of the Division of Production, Productivity and Management.
a
 Through a capital increase of US$ 260 million, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria became the owner of 85.12% of the equity of Banco Ganadero.
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Table II-A.3
ANDEAN COMMUNITY: LARGEST FIRMS WITH FOREIGN OWNERSHIP, BY SALES, 2001
(Millions of dollars)
Foreign Country
Firm Country Activity Sales Investors capital of Exports
  (%) origin
1 Compañía Anónima Nacional Venezuela Telecoms 3 012 Verizon Communications (28.5%) / 35.4 United States -
de Teléfonos de Venezuela Telefónica de España (6.9%)
(CANTV)
2 ExxonMobil de Colombia Colombia Oil 1 396 ExxonMobil 100.0 United States  ...
3 Telcel BellSouth Venezuela Telecoms 1 261a BellSouth Corporation 78.2 United States -
4 Telefónica del Perú Peru Telecoms 1 033 Telefónica de España S.A. 96.7 Spain -
5 Siderúrgica del Orinoco Venezuela Metals 957a Hylsamex (35%)/Tubos de Acero de 70.0 Mexico/Argentina ...
(SIDOR) México S.A. (TAMSA) (12.5%)/
Siderar (17.5%)/Techint (5%)
6 Electricidad de Caracas Venezuela Electric power 778 AES Corporation 82.4 United States -
(EDC)
7 Comercializadora Makro Venezuela Commerce 679a Makro Atacadista 100.0 Brazil -
8 General Motors de Venezuela Venezuela Automotive 676a General Motors 100.0 United States …
9 Texaco Colombia Colombia Oil 665 ChevronTexaco Corporation 100.0 United States …
10 Southern Peru Copper Corp. Peru Mining 658 Grupo Minero México (54.2%)/ 100.0 Mexico/ 611
Phelps Dodge Corp. (14%) United States
11 Cemex Venezuela S.A.C.A. Venezuela Cement 624 Cemex 51.0 Mexico …
12 Cigarrera Bigott C.A. Venezuela Tobacco 579a British American Tobacco Plc. (BAT) 100.0 United Kingdom …
13 Panamco de Venezuela Venezuela Food and 557 Panamerican Beverages Inc. 100.0 Mexico/ ...
beverages (PANAMCO) (The Coca-Cola United States
Company)  ...
14 Minera Yanacocha Peru Mining 529 Newmont Mining Corporation 51.4 United States 529
15 Proctor & Gamble Venezuela Venezuela Chemicals 427a Proctor & Gamble 100.0 United States ...
16 General Motors Colmotores Colombia Automotive 409 General Motors 100.0 United States ...
17 Industrias Alimenticias Noel Colombia Food and 400 Danone ... France ...
beverages
18 Sofasa-Renault Colombia Automotive 385 Renault (24%)/Toyota Motors (24%) 49.0 France/Japan  ...
19 Panamco de Colombia Colombia Food and 385 Panamerican Beverages Inc. 100.0 United States ...
beverages (PANAMCO) (The Coca-Cola
Company)
20 Refinería La Oroya Peru Metals 371 The Doe Run Company 51.0 United States 371
21 Drummond Colombia Mining 370 Drummond Company Inc. 100.0 United States 363
22 Empresa Generadora de
Energía Eléctrica (EMGESA) Colombia Electric power 360 Endesa Chile (24%)/Endesa España 49.0 Spain/Chile -
(24%)
23 Ford Motors de Venezuela Venezuela Automotive 353a Ford Motors 100.0 United States ...
24 BellSouth Colombia Colombia Telecoms 334 BellSouth Corporation 66.0 United States -
25 International Colombia Colombia Mining 330 Exxon Corporation 100.0 United States 326
Resources Corporation
(INTERCOR)
26 Toyota Venezuela Venezuela Automotive 287a Toyota 100.0 Japan ...
27 Comunicación Celular S.A. Colombia Telecoms 287 América Móvil 91.0 Mexico -
(Comcel)
28 Mitsubishi Venezuela C.A. Venezuela Automotive 286a Mitsubishi Corporation 100.0 Japan ...
Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies of the Division of Production, Productivity and Management, on
the basis of figures published in América Economía, “500 mayores empresas de América Latina”, 12-25 July 2002; Semana “Las 100 empresas
más grandes de Colombia”, 22-19 April 2002; and Dinero “200 empresas líderes de Venezuela”, September 2001.
a
 Figures corresponding to 2000.
Foreign investment in Latin America and the Caribbean,  2002 97
Table II-A.4
ANDEAN COMMUNITY: INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS
IN THE CONTEXT OF WORLD IMPORTS, 1985-2000
(Percentages)
1985 1990 1995 2000
I. Market share 1.30 0.91 0.89 0.89
Natural resources a 3.31 3.15 3.66 4.05
Manufactures based on natural resources b 2.23 1.56 1.34 1.39
Manufactures not based on natural resources c 0.14 0.15 0.20 0.18
- Low technology d 0.26 0.31 0.35 0.36
- Medium technology e 0.13 0.13 0.21 0.19
- High technology f 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04
Other g 0.60 0.41 0.48 0.55
II. Structure of exports 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Natural resources a 61.3 59.9 60.5 61.7
Manufactures based on natural resources b 31.3 28.2 22.9 22.1
Manufactures not based on natural resources c 6.0 10.4 14.8 13.7
- Low technology d 2.8 5.6 6.5 6.3
- Medium technology e 2.9 4.4 7.4 6.4
- High technology f 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.9
Other g 1.4 1.5 1.8 2.4
III. Top 10 exports by share h i 78.4 72.9 67.0 69.2
333 Petroleum oils, crude + 32.2 29.8 30.5 37.6
334 Petroleum products, refined - 22.9 18.1 11.4 12.5
057 Fruit and nuts (not including oil nuts), fresh or dried + 3.3 4.9 4.9 4.4
071 Coffee and coffee substitutes - 12.0 7.0 7.0 3.8
322 Briquettes, lignite and peat + 0.4 2.0 2.3 2.5
081 Feeding stuff for animals (not including unmilled cereals) + 0.6 1.6 2.2 1.8
036 Crustaceans and molluscs, whether in shell or not - 1.5 2.3 2.5 1.8
684 Aluminium * - 1.8 2.8 2.3 1.6
292 Crude vegetable materials + 1.0 1.4 1.7 1.6
287 Ores and concentrates of base metals - 2.7 3.0 2.2 1.6
Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies of the Division of Production, Productivity and Management, on
the basis of the computer programme TradeCAN 2002 Edition, ECLAC. Product groups based on the Standard International Trade Classification
(SITC, Rev. 2).
a
 Contains 45 basic simple manufactured products; include concentrates.
b
 Contain 65 groups: 35 agriculture/forestry and 30 others (mostly metals – except steel – petroleum products, cement, glass, etc.).
c
 Contains 120 groups representing the sum of d + e + f.
d
 Contains 44 groups: 20 from the textiles and clothing sector, plus 24 others (paper products, glass and steel, jewellery).
e
 Contains 58 groups: five from the automotive industry, 22 from the processing industry, and 31 from the engineering industry.
f
 Contains 18 groups: 11 from the electronics sector, plus seven others (pharmaceutical products, turbines, aircraft, instruments).
g
 Contains nine unclassified groups (mostly from section 9).
h
 (*) Groups corresponding to the 50 most products dynamic in terms of world imports, 1985-2000.
I
 Groups in which the Andean Community gained (+) or lost (-) market share in world imports, 1985-2000.
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Table II-A.5
ANDEAN COMMUNITY: STRUCTURE OF EXPORTS AND MAIN EXPORT PRODUCTS,
BY COUNTRY, 1985-2000
(Percentages)
1985 1990 1995 2000
Bolivia I. Export structure 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Natural resources 74.2 52.8 46.0 52.1
Manufactures based on natural resources 14.9 30.2 32.9 28.6
Manufactures not based on natural resources 2.6 7.7 17.1 15.4
Other 8.3 9.3 4.0 3.8
II. Top five exports by share 65.5 53.5 40.6 48.1
081 Feeding stuff for animals (not including unmilled cereals) 0.9 2.6 7.1 15.6
341 Natural gas 53.9 30.1 9.2 10.2
287 Ores and concentrates of base metals 10.6 17.8 11.2 9.7
423 Fixed vegetable fats and oils 0.0 0.5 2.9 7.2
897 Jewellery, goldsmiths’ and silversmiths’ wares, and other articles 0.1 2.5 10.2 5.4
Colombia I. Export structure 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Natural resources 73.7 67.3 60.3 59.7
Manufactures based on natural resources 13.7 14.5 13.6 13.0
Manufactures not based on natural resources 10.4 15.5 21.9 22.8
Other 2.2 2.7 4.2 4.5
II. Top five exports by share 70.8 63.5 55.7 57.7
333 Petroleum oils, crude 3.0 19.4 17.5 28.5
071 Coffee and coffee substitutes 51.9 24.9 21.6 11.2
322 Briquettes, lignite and peat 2.3 6.7 6.7 7.6
057 Fruit and nuts (not including oil nuts), fresh or dried 7.2 6.9 6.5 6.0
334 Petroleum products, refined 6.4 5.6 3.4 4.4
Ecuador I. Export structure 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Natural resources 88.0 87.8 81.7 76.2
Manufactures based on natural resources 9.3 9.0 11.3 15.2
Manufactures not based on natural resources 2.3 2.7 5.8 7.2
Other 0.4 0.5 1.1 1.3
II. Top five exports by share 76.9 80.2 72.1 73.2
333 Petroleum oils, crude 48.9 30.4 26.7 31.6
057 Fruit and nuts (not including oil nuts), fresh or dried 14.4 28.2 23.7 22.8
036 Crustaceans and molluscs, whether in shell or not 8.1 15.7 15.1 9.8
037 Fish, crustaceans, molluscs, prepared or preserved 0.9 1.3 3.3 5.1
334 Petroleum products, refined 4.6 4.6 3.3 3.9
Peru I. Export structure 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Natural resources 48.4 48.3 54.0 51.7
Manufactures based on natural resources 38.1 33.5 29.5 25.7
Manufactures not based on natural resources 11.5 16.2 14.7 17.5
Other 2.0 2.1 1.7 5.1
II. Top five exports by share 39.6 52.3 50.9 46.2
682 Copper 13.9 18.5 14.4 13.3
081 Feeding stuff for animals (not including unmilled cereals) 2.9 11.0 15.3 12.8
287 Ores and concentrates of base metals 16.0 18.0 14.3 11.2
071 Coffee and coffee substitutes 6.5 3.5 4.8 4.6
845 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories 0.3 1.3 2.1 4.3
1985 1990 1995 2000
Venezuela I. Export structure 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Natural resources 52.6 53.6 57.3 62.2
Manufactures based on natural resources 42.4 37.5 28.9 27.5
Manufactures not based on natural resources 4.1 8.3 13.1 9.2
Other 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.7
II. Top five exports by share 88.9 82.0 75.2 81.1
333 Petroleum oils, crude 46.9 43.8 47.4 53.5
334 Petroleum products, refined 37.6 31.1 21.1 21.7
684 Aluminium 3.5 5.5 4.9 3.2
341 Natural gas 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.4
278 Other crude minerals 0.1 0.8 0.9 1.3
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of the computer programme TradeCAN 2002 Edition. Product groups based on the Standard International Trade Classification
(SITC, Rev. 2).
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Figure II-A.1
ANDEAN COMMUNITY: DISTRIBUTION OF OIL RESERVES BY MEMBER COUNTRY, 1970-2001
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Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies of the Division of Production, Productivity





ANDEAN COMMUNITY: DISTRIBUTION OF OIL PRODUCTION BY MEMBER COUNTRY, 1970-2001
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and Management, on the basis of figures provided by the Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE).
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Figure II-A.3
ANDEAN COMMUNITY: DISTRIBUTION OF NATURAL GAS RESERVES BY MEMBER COUNTRY, 1970-2001
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Figure II-A.4
ANDEAN COMMUNITY: DISTRIBUTION OF NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION BY MEMBER COUNTRY, 1970-2001
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Source: ECLAC, Information Centre of the Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies of the Division of Production, Productivity
and Management, on the basis of figures provided by the Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE).
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III. TRANSNATIONAL BANKS IN LATIN AMERICA:
CORPORATE STRATEGIES AND REGIONAL
IMPACT
INTRODUCTION
1 This freedom of action attracted foreign banks to Latin America because it coincided with the way they operate in their own countries.
Even though regulatory changes have a major impact on the decision to enter a country, they are made by the domestic authorities, and
should thus be classified among the "domestic or local determinants".
This chapter will examine the corporate strategies pursued by transnational banks and
the impact they have had on the region's financial system. The analysis does not include
offshore financial centres and banks, which have only indirect effects on the Latin
American countries' financial structures and on the macroeconomic impact of those
structures. The analysis therefore has a dual purpose: to review the factors that have
triggered changes in business strategies –factors impinging on the microeconomic
domain– and to evaluate the macroeconomic consequences of those changes.
The major presence that foreign banks had gained in Latin
America by the late 1990s was the outcome of both
domestic and international forces. Domestically, financial
crises and subsequent bank restructuring processes,which
unfolded in an institutional setting favourable to the entry
of foreign banks, undoubtedly played a key role.
Regulatory changes allowed banks to operate not only
in traditional commercial banking, but also in other
segments of the financial market.1  Another decisive
factor was the political climate, which was also more
favourable to the entry of other banks.
Governments in Latin American countries also had
high hopes that the entry of foreign players would help
solve the structural problems that had long afflicted
domestic financial systems. These included a
significant credit squeeze, low levels of bank
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penetration in the system, high borrowing costs and
very short maturities.
International determinants, on the other hand, include
the tendency of large banks in developed countries to
expand into other markets. This trend was driven by
changes in the world macroeconomic climate, innovations
in information and communication technologies, and
liberalization and deregulation in developed-country
financial markets. Such changes promoted fierce
competition to capture new market segments. At the
same time, the quest for economies of scale prompted
banks to increase both their size and the number of
their customers, and thus to expand into emerging
markets.
Not all transnational banks responded in the same
way to the incentives being generated in the region,
however, nor did they all expand to the same extent or in
the same market segments. Accordingly, it is necessary
to analyse the specific features of corporate strategies.
For example,the leading role currently being played by
Spanish banks in Latin America –unforeseen a decade
ago– reflects, among other important factors, their
response to competitive challenges in the European Union
and the cultural ties that exist between Spain and Latin
America. Maintaining a presence in Latin America entails
costs and benefits, which each bank evaluates differently
before adopting a specific strategy in each case.
Once the reasons why transnational banks entered
the Latin American market have been considered, the next
step is to ask what effects their presence has had on the
performance of the local banking system and on the
macroeconomic situation in general. The microeconomic
impacts can be measured through indicators of the banks'
operational efficiency, lending and risk management. The
macroeconomic impact, on the other hand, can be
measured in terms of effects on the supply and cost of
credit and on the stability of the system. The analysis
will be incomplete, however, unless it first considers the
situation financial markets were in when foreign banks
entered the host country, in addition to the institutional
framework in which they have operated and the way they
have adapted to the new market. Given that foreign-bank
penetration in Latin America is a relatively recent
phenomenon, the evaluation presented here is only
preliminary, and the longer-term impact of this
development cannot yet be projected.
The chapter is therefore divided into four sections.
The first begins by analysing the structural problems of
the region's banking systems, together with the regulatory
changes and banking crises that have occurred, with a
view to understanding how they engendered a more
propitious environment for the entry of foreign banks
into the region. The second section describes the factors
that led transnational banks to seek new markets and the
way these banks adapted to the new conditions in the
international financial market. The third section analyses
the strategies deployed by transnational banks in Latin
America and the consequences of those strategies for
their financial results, considering both costs and
benefits. The fourth section discusses various indicators
that measure the impact of foreign-bank participation in
the region, comparing their performance with that of the
local banking system and assessing their macroeconomic
effects. The chapter ends by drawing together the
conclusions of each section, and is followed by a number
of tables included as an annex.
A. THE LATIN AMERICAN BANKING SECTOR: STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS,
CRISES AND RESTRUCTURING
The domestic banking crises of the 1990s and the bank
restructuring processes that ensued engendered a
favourable attitude in Latin America towards foreign
banks' entering the region. The local economic authorities
hoped this would have positive effects on the long-
standing structural problems persisting in the region's
financial systems. These included a significant credit
squeeze, low levels of bank penetration in the system,
high borrowing costs and the predominance of short
maturities.
Accordingly, this section starts by giving a brief
description of the Latin American banking system in the
early 1990s, drawing attention to its main structural
problems. It then analyses the financial liberalization
processes and subsequent banking crises that occurred,
with a view to identifying the local factors that
encouraged a more receptive attitude towards foreign
banks, and the government expectations and regulatory
changes that facilitated their entry.
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2 This refers to the proportion of businesses and families with access to credit.
3
 In the literature on Latin America, this phenomenon is called "financial repression".
1. Structural characteristics and problems of banking systems prior to the 1990s
For the purpose of this analysis, attention needs to be
drawn to four basic characteristics of the Latin American
financial system, which have been present throughout
its history and in some cases still persist today:
- Firstly, the region's banks have predominantly
focused on traditional commercial-banking
activities, while the securities market remained very
poorly developed or even non-existent in many
countries;
- Secondly, despite the systemic importance of banks,
the volume of lending in relation to GDP was and is
very small;
- Thirdly, the State has traditionally played a major
role in the financial sector, and this has been
associated (albeit with no proven causal
connection) with a concentration of private-sector
banking activity in the short-term credit segment.
Public-sector financing institutions have tended to
specialize in long-term funding, generally linked
to the national development plans that were
commonplace until the 1970s and to certain areas
regarded as high priorities, such as agriculture and
the export sector;
- Lastly, the region's banking systems have always
been characterized by their low degree of financial
deepening and narrow coverage.2  This has meant
that a significant fraction of firms and families have
little or no access to credit. With the liberalization
of the financial system, the credit subsidies3
formerly provided were replaced with large spreads,
and thus high interest rates, on loans and very short
maturities for private financing.
Government policy to attract foreign banks stemmed
directly from the need to solve these structural problems
in the banking sector. So-called "first-generation"
financial reforms (see table III.1 and box III.1)
represented an attempt to increase the sector's
competitiveness and efficiency by liberalizing its
operations and reducing State intervention -both directly
(downsizing of the public financial sector) and indirectly
(lower reserve requirements, together with deregulation
of interest rates and directed credit mechanisms).
Table III.1
LATIN AMERICA: FIRST-GENERATION REFORMS OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
Liberalization Start of an Adoption of  Bank reserves Tension (1) or
of interest intensive capital  (%)  systemic crises
rates period of  adequacy  following reform
privatization requirements 1990 2000 (2)
Argentina 1989 1995 1991 24 4 1995 (2)
Bolivia 1985 1992 1995 25 9 1985 (1)
Brazil 1989 1997 1995 15 12 1994 (1)
Chile 1974a 1974 and 1987 1989 6 5 1982 (2)
Colombia 1979 1993 1992 38 8 1998 (2)
Costa Rica 1995 1984 1995 43 18 1994 (1)
Mexico 1988 1992 1994 5 7 1994 (2)
Paraguay 1990 1984 1991 33 26 1995 (1)
Peru 1991 1993 1993 31 26 1995 (1)
Uruguay 1974 1974 1992 45 22 1982 (2)
Venezuela 1989 1996 1993 18 29 1994 (2)
Source: ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, on the basis of ECLAC, Reformas económicas en América Latina:
una síntesis de la experiencia en once países (LC/R.1606), Santiago, Chile, 1995; and Strengthening development: the
interplay of macro- and microeconomics (LC/G.1898(SES.26/3)), Santiago, Chile, July 1996.
a
 The authorities intervened in the banks between 1982 and 1984; the system was reliberalized starting in 1985.
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The structural reforms created a new macroeconomic
environment which, in turn, affected the way banks
operated. In many cases, this interaction between the
performance of the banking system and the new
macroeconomic climate generated tensions or banking
crises that had two broad consequences: firstly, the
introduction of a new wave of "second-generation"
reforms aimed at strengthening the institutional
framework (through new regulation and supervision); and
secondly, the adoption of an explicit policy to attract
transnational banks, which led to privatization and
acquisition processes.
Box III.1
FIRST- AND SECOND-GENERATION FINANCIAL REFORMS IN LATIN AMERICA
OVER THE PAST TWO DECADES
The financial reforms introduced in
Latin America over the past two
decades have differed from country to
country, not only in terms of when the
reforms were implemented but also in
their intensity and scope. To simplify
the analysis, however, they can be
divided into two phases, in some cases
overlapping in time. The first phase,
which can be described as first-
generation reforms, entailed
dismantling State controls on the
returns to financial assets (especially
interest rates), the allocation of
financial resources and the entry of
agents into the system (lowering of
entry barriers). All of this was
accompanied by a process of opening
the financial system to foreign
participation.
In terms of regulatory reform, this
phase also included the adoption of
capital requirements in compliance
with the Basel Agreement of 1988.
As shown in table III.1, this process
took place between 1989 and 1995 in
many countries, and it was often
followed by economic crises, frequently
stemming from the exponential growth
in bank lending that had occurred
earlier.
Given the problems of stability that
emerged from the mid-1990s onward,
many countries began to implement
second-generation reforms aimed at
enhancing regulatory and supervisory
mechanisms, in order to make their
domestic banking systems sounder.
These reforms were particularly
intensive following the "tequila" crisis,
which in many countries had
destabilized the financial system, and
in others had triggered an outright
banking crisis.
This second wave of reforms
required banks to maintain a level of
capital that was adequate in relation to
the risk attached to their banking
assets; to evaluate and rate their loan
portfolios more carefully according to
the structure of those risks; and to
provide more transparent information to
supervisory bodies.
The pace and depth of regulatory
and supervisory reform in each
country were directly related to the
strength of the effect of the "tequila"
crisis on the banking sector in question
and to the domestic authorities' desire
to rapidly restore "business as usual"
in institutions and markets. For
example, while the regulatory
adjustments made in Chile in the
second half of the 1990s were minimal,
the earlier ones made in Argentina,
Brazil and Mexico were much more far-
reaching.
In most of the countries hit by the
crisis, reform began with a
restructuring of the domestic banking
sector; this process was accompanied
by State guarantees, and usually
included an injection of liquidity into the
system, all of which facilitated bank
mergers and acquisitions. In this
process, providing incentives for the
entry of foreign banks became an overt
policy. The State guarantees extended to
the financial system were generally
accompanied by stipulations relating to
deposit insurance, capital requirements
and greater liquidity (Stallings and
Studart, 2001).
The financial reforms of the 1990s
openly encouraged the entry of foreign
banks. First-generation reforms had
allowed banks to operate in markets
that had previously been off-limits
-providing services such as factoring and
leasing, for example- and had also
facilitated stock-market operations,
particularly brokerage, underwriting
and pension fund management. As will
be discussed below, these additional
freedoms and broader scope of action
were fundamental for the operations of
international banks, particularly as their
strategy had now shifted towards
universalization.
In aiming to grant equivalent legal
status to all nations, second-generation
reforms created a regulatory and
supervisory environment similar to that
prevailing in developed economies,
thereby opening the door to foreign
banks. In this respect, as will be seen in
sections B and C of this chapter, the
two generations of reforms
complemented each other to create a
climate more suited to the expansion
strategies of international banks.
Source: ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies.
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(a) Financial-market liberalization, crisis and
restructuring: from the "tequila" crisis
to 1997
An essential bit of background for understanding
the current development of the Latin American banking
system is the financial liberalization that took place
between the 1970s and the 1990s, both locally and
internationally. While only a few countries -among them
Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Uruguay- introduced
financial liberalization, to varying degrees, as early as
the 1970s, the processes triggered by liberalization,
especially the financial crises of the early 1980s,4 were
the reason behind the subsequent push for tighter banking
regulation and supervision. The sequence of
liberalization, crisis and improved supervision and
regulation was nonetheless repeated in countries that did
not begin the process until the 1990s.
Starting from a system in which State authorities
set the interest rate, directed credit and required a high
proportion of bank deposits to be held as reserve
requirements, commercial banks were then given
freedom to decide how much to lend to whom and at
what price. More or less at the same time, capital-market
liberalization enabled local banks to borrow in foreign
currency and allowed foreign banks to operate in the local
market. Frequently, these changes were implemented
without an adequate system of banking regulation and
supervision in place, which in several instances led to
problems in regional banks whose executives had little
or no experience in analysing local credit, let alone the
international market.
The initial financial deregulation also affected
business goals. Existing institutions could now engage
in new activities and become "universal banks". This
allowed them to operate in securities and insurance
markets, provide asset-management services and hold
equity positions in non-financial firms. The process to some
extent mirrored what was happening in the industrialized
countries, but with the difference that the securities
market in the region remained very underdeveloped.
Accordingly, despite greater diversification, bank
portfolios were restricted to short-term securities dealing,
insurance products and real-estate activities.
Financial liberalization and deregulation did not
yield the expected results, however. Instead, they gave
rise in many cases to credit booms, mismatches between
currencies and maturities and, ultimately, banking crises.
As had happened in Chile and Argentina during the
external debt crisis and then in Mexico in 1994, South-
East Asia in 1998 and Argentina in 2001, mistakes made
by local actors were serious enough in themselves to
trigger crises, but when they were compounded by
external shocks, the situation became much worse (Held
and Jiménez, 2001).
In a reprise of the pattern already observed in the
early 1980s, banking crises and subsequent bailouts by
governments had become commonplace in Latin America
by the mid-1990s. Initially, these operations were limited
to non-recoverable portfolios, but this was later followed
by bank recapitalization, then liquidation or mergers and
acquisitions by foreign banks. Subsequently, in order to
avert future crises, banking regulation and supervision
were introduced, greater information and transparency
were required, and in some cases deposit insurance was
put in place, although some countries had already begun
using this instrument after the crisis of the early 1980s.
As a result of these crises, the initial expectations
raised by financial reform changed: financial
liberalization was and still is a condition for long-term
market development, but the latter cannot be achieved
without stability in the system. This aim gave rise to a
debate which clearly highlighted two specific needs:
firstly, to regulate and supervise the sector, and secondly,
to attract foreign banks.
(b) The macroeconomic environment
In contrast to what had happened in the preceding
decade, the macroeconomic climate of the 1990s (prior
to the Asian crisis) was one of accelerating growth, which
fostered the rapid expansion of short-term lending to
consumers and firms. Capital-market liberalization, at a
time of abundant liquidity in the international financial
market, attracted foreign capital inflows, thereby
removing the traditional external constraint on the
expansion of demand and imports. This facilitated low-
inflation growth, particularly in countries that had
adopted stabilization programmes based on an exchange-
rate anchor. In this situation, the banks encountered strong
demand for short-term credit and were able to expand
their operations merely by accommodating it.
Furthermore, international conditions allowed all
banks, local and foreign alike, to increase their external
financing. This phenomenon was related to more stable
exchange rates and the development of the international
derivatives market, which enabled financial investors to
partially hedge exchange-rate risk and uncertainty.
4 See the now-classic article by Díaz-Alejandro (1985).
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(c) From changes in financial regulation and
supervision to the entry of international banks
A major obstacle to the development of the financial
system in the Latin American countries, and particularly
to efforts to attract foreign banks, was the absence of
appropriate institutions for regulation and supervision
–a key element for the development of market
infrastructure– in most of the region's countries. This
shortcoming had discouraged foreign banks from
engaging in credit transactions with local consumers or
firms. Laws on guarantees were ineffective or non-existent,
for example, and legal rulings could be indefinitely
postponed or arbitrarily overturned once adopted. The
Anglo-Saxon laws that applied to the international financial
market were not implemented in the region, and in general
there were no legal precedents in this area, which made the
outcome of litigation unpredictable.
Given that the development of certain segments of
the financial system generally requires the conclusion
of long-term contracts, regulatory shortcomings
prevented such development –and in many cases still
prevent it– by leaving foreign banks permanently exposed
to the risk of contracts being breached. This undermined
their competitive advantages because, in the absence of
appropriate legislation, the use of information and the
knowledge of potential clients and of the authorities
become particularly important, and local institutions
clearly had an advantage in these areas.
The reforms of financial regulations formally or
informally removed the entry barriers facing foreign
banks, enabling them to move into the region and gain
an increasingly large market share (see table III.2). Three
vehicles were used in this process: privatizations, mergers
and acquisitions, and greenfield investments driven by
the expansion needs of individual corporations. As a
result, within a few years foreign banks owned over half
of the region's largest banks, measured by the amount of
their assets (see annex table III.A.1).
Table III.2
FOREIGN BANK SHARE OF LATIN AMERICAN BANKING ASSETS, 1990-2001
(Percentages)
1990 1994 1999 2000 2001
Argentina 10 18 49 49 61
Brazil 6 8 17 23 49
Chile 19 16 54 54 62
Colombia 8 6 18 26 34
Mexico - 1 19 24 90
Peru 4 7 33 40 61
Venezuela 1 1 42 42 59
Source: ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, on the basis of International Monetary Fund (IMF), International
Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects and Key Policy Issues, Washington, D.C., 2000; Bank for International Settlements
(BIS), "The Banking Industry in the Emerging Market Economies: Competition, Consolidation and Systemic Stability", BIS
Papers, No. 4, Basel, 2001; and Salomon Smith Barney, Foreign Financial Institutions in Latin America, 2001 Update, New
York, November 2001.
Another change stemming from the liberalization
policy was the acceptance of greater concentration in the
banking industry, since the number of banks decreased
as a result of privatizations, mergers and acquisitions.
As shown in table III.3, this phenomenon has not been
exclusive to the region, since Asia and, to a lesser degree,
Central Europe have experienced a similar trend, albeit
with certain differences. Whereas concentration has
generally declined in Asia and Central Europe, in Latin
America the market shares of the three largest and 10
largest banks have increased, with numerous smaller
institutions disappearing altogether.
(d) The environment in which foreign banks
entered the region in the 1990s
In contrast to the pattern in industrialized countries,
the financial sector in Latin America continues to be
dominated by banks, with little development of other
types of financial institutions. Nonetheless, significant
changes have occurred in recent years.
Firstly, markets have become broader and deeper.
This was made possible in part by the spectacular
reduction in inflation rates throughout the region. As a
result, families and firms are now more willing to hold
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Table III.3
INDICATORS OF CONCENTRATION IN THE BANKING SECTOR, 1994-2000
(Share of total deposits)
1994 2000
Number 3 largest 10 largest Number 3 largest 10 largest
of banks banks (%) banks (%) of banks banks (%) banks (%)
Latin America
Argentina 206 39.1 73.1 113 39.8 80.7
Brazil 245 49.9 78.8 193 55.2 85.6
Chile 37 39.5 79.1 29 39.5 82.0
Mexico 36 48.3 80.8 23 56.3 94.5
Venezuela 43 43.9 78.6 42 46.7 75.7
Asia
Republic of Korea 30 52.8 86.9 13 43.5 77.7
Malaysia 25 44.7 78.3 10 43.4 82.2
Philippines 41 39.0 80.3 27 39.6 73.3
Thailand 15 47.5 83.5 13 41.7 79.4
Central Europe
Czech Republic 55 72.0 97.0 42 69.7 90.3
Hungary 40 57.9 84.7 39 51.5 80.7
Poland 82 52.8 86.7 77 43.5 77.7
Turkey 72 40.7 79.1 79 35.9 72.0
Source: Barbara Stallings and Rogério Studart, "Financial Regulation and Supervision in Emerging Markets: The Experience of
Latin America since the Tequila Crisis", WIDER Discussion Paper, No. 2002/45, Helsinki, United Nations University (UNU),
2001; on the basis of International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects and Key
Policy Issues, Washington, D.C., 2001, p. 11.
money and other financial assets in the system, thereby
fulfilling a basic requirement for the system's
development. The strengthening of the institutional
framework through financial regulation and supervision
complements the behaviour of individual agents.
Table III.4 gives an idea of the trend of market
deepening, as measured by the ratio of money supply
(M2) to GDP. The table records a significant increase in
four of the six most financially developed countries in
Latin America between 1992 and 2000. In contrast, the
Asian countries display higher levels of M2, and also
higher rates of increase in all cases.
Table III.4
MONEY SUPPLY (M2) AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
Latin America
Argentina 14 21 23 29 32
Brazil ... ... 28 31 29
Chile 38 37 43 46 50
Colombia 20 20 20 24 26
Costa Rica 32 32 33 33 35
México 29 28 26 28 21
Asia
Republic of Korea 39 41 43 58 80
Malaysia 72 80 92 95 103
Philippines 36 47 56 61 62
Thailand 75 78 81 103 106
Source: Barbara Stallings and Rogério Studart, "Financial Regulation and Supervision in Emerging Markets: The Experience of
Latin America since the Tequila Crisis", WIDER Discussion Paper, No. 2002/45, Helsinki, United Nations University (UNU),
2001; on the basis of International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Financial Statistics, Washington, D.C., June 2002.
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Some diversification has also taken place in the
capital market, in response to multiple factors: increased
capital flows up to 1998, privatization of social security
and deregulation of institutional investors, which led to
increased investment in securitized instruments and
generated a virtuous circle in several of the region's
economies. Table III.5 presents an indicator of this process,
namely the value of debt securities traded on local markets
(in absolute terms and as a proportion of the world total)
between 1989 and 2000. As shown in the table, this value
expanded rapidly in Latin America during the period, more
than doubling between 1992 and 2000.
Table III.5
OUTSTANDING STOCKS OF DEBT SECURITIES ISSUED ON DOMESTIC MARKETS
(Billions of dollars and percentages)
                  Billions of dollars                   Percentage of total
1989 1993 1997 2000 1989 1993 1997 2000
United States 6 682.8 9 226.7 1 205.9 14 545.9 47.6 44.9 47.4 48.9
Japan 2 626.7 4 010.1 4 399.3 6 072.3 18.7 19.5 17.3 20.4
France 557.6 995.7 1 102.5 1 068.1 4.0 4.8 4.3 3.6
Germany 668.4 1 458.4 1 732.1 1 711.6 4.8 7.1 6.8 5.8
United Kingdom 332.9 446.1 777.7 895.9 2.4 2.2 3.1 3.0
Latin America 172.1 296.7 490.6 482.8 1.2 1.4 1.9 1.6
Argentina 113.5 39.0 70.1 85.2 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.3
Brazil  - 189.9 344.5 292.5 .... 0.9 1.4 1.0
Chile 7.5 19.2 36.5 34.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Mexico 51.1 47.9 37.6 67.3 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.2
All issuers 14 042 20 565 25 464 29 733 100 100 100 100
OECD ª 13 559 19 967 24 452 28 580 96.6 97.1 96.0 96.1
Source: Barbara Stallings and Rogério Studart, "Financial Regulation and Supervision in Emerging Markets: The Experience of
Latin America since the Tequila Crisis", WIDER Discussion Paper, No. 2002/45, Helsinki, United Nations University (UNU),
2001; on the basis of data provided by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
a Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
B. UNIVERSALIZATION AND GLOBALIZATION: DETERMINANTS OF THE
STRUGGLE FOR NEW MARKETS
A decision by a bank to operate in new market segments,
whether in its own country or elsewhere, should be seen as
an element of its competitive strategy, equivalent to
launching a new product on the market or exploring original
technologies. According to Schumpeter (1964), opening
up to new markets is no less an innovation than new
products or production processes. From this standpoint,
the processes of universalization and globalization5  should
be viewed as financial innovations that set the predominant
trend in the banking sector in the 1990s.
1. New trends in the international banking market
Although universalization and globalization emerged
strongly in the 1990s, their roots stretch back further than
this. It should be recalled that security and soundness
have traditionally been considered the prime virtues of
the banking business. Prudent evaluation of risk when
granting loans, together with efforts to maintain long-
5 Universalization consists of participation by commercial banks in more segments pertaining to the capital market, such as trading in
bonds, equities and securities of all types, participation in investment funds and asset management. Globalization, on the other hand, refers
to the geographical diversification of the banking business.
Foreign investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2002 111
6 An example of the traditional attitude taken by commercial banks until recently is provided by J.P. Morgan. As described in Euromoney
(2000), the traditional Morgan strategy was to serve an elite group of clients. It was assumed that these clients would approach the bank to
obtain its financial services, not that the bank would have to seek clients. In fact, one of the reasons for J.P. Morgan's merger with Chase
Manhattan was precisely the fact that it had problems in expanding its client base.
7 The spread of automated teller machines (ATMs) reduced operating costs significantly, making it possible to multiply the volume of
business. Direct funds transfer at point of sale (POS), access to the banking system from home, remote banking and smart cards paved the
way for the virtual banking revolution. Nonetheless, these changes did not always gain immediate acceptance (see The Economist, 21
November 1998).
8 The Agreement, though currently under review, is still in force. The text of the original Agreement and the most recent version released for
comment can be found on the web site of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (www.bis.org).
term relationships with clients, represented a bank's seal
of quality.6  Nonetheless, a few decades ago, factors
emerged that helped to alter the relatively conservative
attitude that banks had historically shown towards
innovation (Carvalho, 1997; BIS, 1996a; The Economist,
1993a, 1993b, 1994a, 1997 and 2002). Three of these
are particularly important: heightened instability in the
economic climate; technological progress; and greater
deregulation and liberalization of the financial and capital
markets.
(a) Heightened instability in the economic climate
The exceptionally unstable economic environment
that prevailed in the world from the 1970s onward had a
direct effect on the performance of the financial system.
The main sources of that instability were rising inflation
in the United States, the abandonment of the Bretton
Woods rules, successive oil crises and the
macroeconomic policies adopted by industrialized
countries. Together, these phenomena had a decisive
impact on the strategy of the banking sector by generating
sharp volatility in the exchange rates of developed-
country currencies and destabilizing interest rates. The
volatility of these key prices not only rendered obsolete
the risk-management knowledge previously accumulated
by financial institutions, but also generated new risks that
had to be considered in banking activities. The virtual
bankruptcy of Latin American debtors in the early 1980s,
which hit the large United States banks and weakened
them for a decade, illustrates the high cost of the credit
risk caused by interest-rate instability. The banking
system's response was to securitize its loan portfolio and
develop derivative instruments, as discussed below.
(b) Progress in information and communication
technologies (ICT)
Advances in ICT have changed the financial sector's
competitive functioning for producer and distributor
alike, by generating incentives for greater efficiency. The
new technologies have drastically and systematically
reduced transaction costs, provided wider access to
financial services and enhanced the liquidity of the assets
traded in the system.7  As a result, markets in different
countries and continents can now connect to each other
in real time, with consequences for the structure and
complexity of contracts. This process has led to global
interconnections between financial markets and clients.
In addition, the availability of more productive
information management tools has made it possible to
monitor the different services and products and focus on
specific clients. This has led to the development of
strategies based on the marketing and mass distribution
of standardized products, thereby giving retail consumers
and small businesses access to such services. In these
market segments, electronic channels such as the Internet
have multiplied the capacity to provide services without
the need for a physical presence, and banks have been
investing large sums in e-business to adapt their services
to this medium.
(c) Liberalization and deregulation of financial
and capital markets
The third force behind the banks' change of attitude
was the liberalization and deregulation of the
international financial market, the main consequence of
which was to give banks greater freedom to pursue their
own strategies. The most important initiative in terms of
international banking regulation was the Basel
Agreement, adopted in 1988.8
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, made
up of specialists from all the industrialized countries, was
formed to adopt an agreement among the signatory
countries on convergence towards a common regulatory
system. The Committee pursued two objectives: to create
common regulatory rules of the game for all banks
operating internationally, and to devise a new regulatory
strategy to replace the one prevailing up until that time,
which had become obsolete.
Once these changes had been agreed upon, financial
supervision, instead of focusing on specific balance-sheet
items, concentrated more on the overall risk assumed by
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banks, thereby affording them greater autonomy. In
addition, such supervision only covered the tools of
traditional commercial banking; in other words,
intermediation between depositors and borrowers. As
there were no regulations on capital-market risk, banks
began to focus on their dealings in this market and also
to shift their portfolio risk onto other investors, thereby
reducing their capital requirements. In short, following
the 1988 Basel Agreement, the banks began to develop a
series of highly sophisticated financial instruments, partly
as a strategy to elude regulation and partly to lobby for
greater liberalization of national financial systems. The
result was that the rules of the Agreement were rapidly
overtaken by events (see box III.2).
Box III.2
FINANCIAL REFORMS IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES
Over the past few decades, but most
intensively in the 1990s, the United
States, Japan and the European Union
introduced reforms that had profound
effects on the strategies of
transnational banks.
Three types of financial institution
existed in the United States: banks that
performed intermediation operations
between deposits and loans;
institutions dealing in securities; and
insurance companies. The law
originally prevented any of these
institutions from participating in all
three markets simultaneously. Between
1980 and 1990, this restrictive
legislation was progressively
weakened, however, as the United
States Federal Reserve Bank began to
grant permits for specific mergers
between commercial and investment
banks. Restrictions were removed
completely when the Glass-Steagall
Act was repealed and replaced with
the Gramm-Leach-Biley Act, passed
in 1999.
Other restrictions in force at the
state level were also eliminated
through the reform of the
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act. This made it
possible to unify the regulations under
federal law, which in turn stimulated an
intensive process of interstate bank
mergers and acquisitions aimed at
creating national banks similar to those
existing in other countries (Rhoades,
2000).
In Japan, another important
regulatory change, known as the "big
bang", removed a number of financial
restrictions similar to those established
in the Glass-Steagall Act. This change
made it possible to form universal
banks by facilitating mergers and
acquisitions between financial
institutions and introducing new rules
to promote greater competition in the
market. The most notable operation of
this type produced the world's largest
bank in terms of financial assets,
belonging to the Mizuho financial
group. Nonetheless, the mergers and
acquisitions process in Japan was on a
smaller scale than the one in the United
States, given the unfavourable economic
situation prevailing in that country in the
1990s.
Lastly, the European Union took an
initiative that should have had effects
similar to those of the reforms that
eliminated barriers to interstate banking
in the United States. This was the
"European passport" legislation entitling
banks in one European country to
operate in any other member country. In
contrast to what had happened in the
United States, however, the new
regulation did not lead to a major
geographical expansion of banks within
the Union because differences between
the countries' legal and tax systems,
compounded by cultural barriers, proved
to be too strong. The hurdles faced by
each European Union member in trying
to enter other member countries
encouraged large European banks that
wanted to grow globally to target the
emerging economies, and this partly
explains the presence of Spanish banks
in Latin America.
Source: ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, on the basis of Fernando J. Carvim de Carvalho, International
Expansion and the Transformation of Modern Banking, 2002.
2. The development of new financial instruments
Financial intermediaries were hard hit by the heightened
volatility in asset prices, interest rates and exchange rates,
which exposed them not only to credit risk but also to
specific financial and exchange-rate risk. The desire to
find safer ways to operate was a key reason for the
introduction of two major changes in the system: the
development of securitization9  and the derivatives market.
The term "securitization" refers to the transformation
of assets that previously had not been generally tradable
–such as the loan portfolio of the banking system– into
instruments that could be purchased by third parties.
Securitization gave banks a way to shift credit risk to
other investors. Moreover, by becoming securities
dealers, banks were able to replace their income at risk
with commissions.
9 According to BIS (1996b), about 60% of financial-market growth in 1995 stemmed from banks' acceptance of securities, somewhat to the
neglect of the traditional component of bank liabilities, namely deposit-taking.
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Increased volatility and risk gave rise to another
major innovation in the financial market, namely
derivative contracts. Derivatives originated some time ago
in commodity transactions, but their use in the financial
market enabled investors to identify the portion of
portfolio risk they could manage and shift the rest on to
third parties. There are as many different ways of doing
this as there are types of instruments on the market.
Nonetheless, a distinction can be made between relatively
simple instruments with varying degrees of flexibility
(forwards, swaps, options) and more complex structures
based on combinations of these.
As in the case of securitized instruments, the supply
of these new securities tended to be restricted to a select
group of large banks. Mastery of the relevant technology,
the specific nature of the business and contacts with large
transnational corporations (the main users of these
instruments) contributed to the high degree of
concentration in this market.
Market deregulation and the emergence of new
financial instruments fostered the development of
institutional investors, which became new competitors
in financial segments that were increasingly coveted by
the banks. The mere fact that the new legislation allowed
heavyweight players (investment banks, mutual funds
and institutional investors) to invest in securitized
instruments rapidly forced up prices on the secondary
market. This created a virtuous circle of rising asset prices
and expanding markets: as financial wealth increased and
agents' expectations were fulfilled, this in turn
encouraged further financial investments.
Table III.6 reveals a steady decline in the importance
of bank loans as a means of financing. In the United
States, for example, public and corporate debt bonds grew
substantially between 1997 and 2001, while bank credit
fell in both absolute and relative terms; figures for the
European Union in 1990-1997 show a similar trend (see
table III.7).
Table III.6
UNITED STATES: FINANCIAL MARKET INSTRUMENTS, 1997-2001
(Billions of dollars)
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Open-market operations 184.1 193.1 229.9 207.6 -164.4
United States government
bonds 236.0 418.3 520.7 137.6 623.8
Municipal bonds 71.4 96.8 68.2 35.3 117.6
Corporate and foreign
bonds 430.8 563.7 462.2 400.8 653.4
Bank loans 128.2 145.0 69.0 112.8 -75.8
Other loans and advances 93.2 166.3 158.5 142.7 50.3
Mortgages 337.2 514.6 570.0 565.6 705.6
Consumer credit 57.5 75.0 99.5 139.0 110.2
Total 1 538.5 2 172.8 2 178.0 1 741.3 2 020.7
Source: ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, on the basis of Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Flow of Funds, 16 September 2002, and "Statistics, Releases and Historical Data" (www.federalreserve.gov), 16 September
2002.
Table III.7




Percentage of total assets Loans 51 44
Securities 13 22
Other 36 34
Percentage of total income Interest income 70 58
Other income 30 42
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Private Bank Profitability: Financial Statements of
Banks, Edition 2000 (www.oecd.org), 2000.
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10 Berger and Mester (1997 and 2001) claim that economies of scale improved efficiency by enhancing revenues, while the effect of mergers
on cost reduction is less clear. This seems to be due to the fact that large banks developed higher-quality and more profitable financial
products which, however, were also more costly. Bassett and Brady (2002) argue that the large banks' advantages are not sufficient to drive
small banks out of the market.
These changes have had major consequences for the
banking business. In an environment characterized by
higher risk and strong competition from non-bank
financial institutions, together with new corporate
financing mechanisms, the banks expanded their
operations into the provision of new financial services
and risk management. In this situation, the ability to take
on investment-banking business became an essential
survival skill for large banks. As will be seen in the
following subsection, attaining the scale needed to
operate in multiple markets and with different types of
clients became a fundamental part of the banks' strategy.
3.  The banks' strategies for responding to change
Open competition between banks, and between them and
non-bank financial institutions, to capture new segments
of the financial market gave rise to two trends in
developed-country financial systems: a trend towards
high market concentration and the predominance of large
institutions (see table III.8), and a trend towards the
emergence of a select group of banks which, with a view
to expanding, conquering new markets or both, pursued
a global strategy to establish a presence in a large number
of countries in different regions and continents.
 Table III.8




United States 11.3 16.6 26.6
Canada 60.2 73.4 77.1
Belgium 48.0 59.9 71.6
France 51.9 68.1 69.3
Italy 46.0 58.4 65.0
Netherlands 73.7 76.1 69.1
Spain 38.3 48.2 -
Source: Group of 10, Report on Consolidation in the Financial Sector, Basel (www.bis.org), 2001.
Most of the mergers that took place in the United
States in the 1990s involved commercial banks. Several
studies explain this by noting that the banks saw mergers
as a means of achieving economies of scale.10
The geographical expansion of large banks was
driven by the need either to generate economies of scale
or to diversify financial activities into segments that were
becoming increasingly profitable, especially when such
diversification was restricted by regulations prevailing
in the country of origin: in this case, operating in other
countries made diversification possible. The behaviour
of United States banks prior to regulatory reform is a
good example of this.
Having opted for globalization, the banks had to
choose between two alternatives: entering new countries
by making equity investments and setting up subsidiaries,
or operating merely through a representation office of
the bank's headquarters. Generally speaking, it has been
shown that investment banks selling securitized products
do not need a local presence, even when large sums of
money are involved. It is sufficient for executives to visit
their clients in specific cases as necessary. In contrast, a
commercial bank targeting the retail segment does require
frequent contact with its customers, so local branches
become essential. Although online and telephone banking
may play a complementary role in this segment, media
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11 According to Berger, Ongena and Smith (2002), multinational firms operating in Europe show a preference for local banks that provide
basic financial services, such as short-term deposits, treasury dealings and current accounts, because their executives are familiar with the
market culture, language and regulatory framework of the host country.
of this type have so far been unable to replace the physical
presence of the branch. The same is true in highly
lucrative businesses such as asset management and
private banking.
As the pursuit of larger size and business
diversification became indispensable strategies for
competing in the market, expansion began to develop
into a defensive tactic –to pre-empt potential
disadvantages stemming from a failure to act. This factor
was also operative in the case of expansion into emerging
markets.
Nonetheless, recent studies (Berger, Ongena and
Smith, 2002; Group of 10, 2001) show that the financial
services industry in general, and commercial banking in
particular, are a long way from achieving the levels of
globalization attained by firms operating in other markets.
This is true both in the United States and in Europe,
despite the incentives generated by the new institutional
framework.
The factors hindering greater globalization of
banking in developed countries consisted mainly of entry
barriers of a cultural nature and information asymmetries
between foreign and local banks that put the latter in an
advantageous position, especially in relation to small and
medium-sized firms. In addition to those obstacles,
transnational firms show a clear preference for local
banks,11  given their interest in having a large number of
branches spread throughout the country, which entails
large sunk costs. Statistics on mergers and acquisitions
(Group of 10, 2001) also show that the financial services
industry's consolidation and greater concentration are
largely the result of transactions between local banks or
institutions operating in different segments of the
financial market in the same country. Mergers and
acquisitions between institutions from different countries
represent a minority.
The opposite is true in emerging economies, where
the entry of foreign banks was encouraged by factors
such as their greater prestige (bearing in mind the
inefficiency of local banks in some countries); lack of
risk-management experience in local banks; the existence
of segments of the financial market, such as asset
management and private banking, from which local banks
were virtually absent; and the privatization of State banks.
Nonetheless, there are major differences between the
main transnational banks in terms of their regional
distribution and the segments in which they operate. With
respect to the financial market segments preferred by
different types of institutions, four basic strategies can
be clearly identified: those followed by large commercial
banks, investment banks, universal banks and niche
banks, respectively.
(a) Large commercial banks
The rapid development of capital markets in the mid-
1990s convinced executives of commercial banks (those
basically operating in the credit market) that they had to
innovate to avoid being driven from the market. To this
end, many commercial banks focused on achieving
economies of scale by expanding in the same business
segment beyond their national borders. This process
involved banks in the United States and also in Europe,
where Spanish banks are the leading exponents. Other
banks sought economies of scope by diversifying their
products and services into new segments of the credit
market.
The area of commercial banking that has been most
successful is consumer finance. This market segment has
been developing a capacity to cater to low- and middle-
income groups, thanks to the creation of mass-market
instruments. Consumer finance currently generates the
largest margins in the market. The commercial banks
engaged in this business have raised their efficiency
substantially, particularly as a result of the development
of information technology and risk-rating models that
use standardized information.
In addition to consumer finance, commercial and
universal banks have successfully exploited the credit-
card segment, which has become an even more profitable
line of business than consumer loans, with the added
advantage of minimal risk. Moreover, credit-card holders
tend to procure a variety of other services while making
their deposits, which has led commercial banks into new
areas such as mutual-fund management and mortgage
instruments.
(b) Investment banks
The leading players in the investment-banking
segment also aspired to become global banks. Size
became essential in this industry because of the need to
enhance the institution's prestige and defend a leading
position in the international market, since these are the
most powerful competitive weapons. Some investment
banks have specialized in specific segments and activities,
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12
 See Euromoney (2001) and The Economist (2001b).
13 These conflicts are related to differences between the two modalities in terms of the treatment of clients (commercial banking favours
long-term relationships, whereas investment banking seeks specific short-term relationships); attitudes towards risk (investment banking
operates in much more volatile market segments); remuneration schemes, etc.
such as mergers and acquisitions and the bond and equity
markets. Nonetheless, to avoid excessive earnings
volatility, banks need to diversify their portfolio into the
largest possible number of segments and activities. Here
again, size is crucial, since it allows banks to maintain
teams of specialists in each business area.
As a result of the 2001 recession in the United States,
the country's investment banks have been less profitable
than they were in the 1990s. At the same time, their
inability to offer integrated service packages has placed
them at a disadvantage in relation to their universal-bank
competitors. Clear evidence of this has been their scant
participation in mergers and acquisitions involving big
corporations. The impossibility of operating with bridge
loans initially, and later in bond placement, has often
left them outside the major transactions. Although
universal banks are in a significantly better position in
this respect, not all investment banks have been able to
universalize. An outstanding example is Merrill Lynch,
which only managed to create a small business entity,
following a failed attempt to forge a partnership with the
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC)
with a view to operating outside the United States.12
(c) Large universal banks
Securities transactions were the new frontier to
which the large financial institutions aspired. Banks
throughout the world began to respond to the strategic
challenge of replacing their traditional income from loans
with revenues obtained from the sale of insurance and
investment products, foreign currency trading and
derivative operations such as swaps, futures and options.
The reorientation of commercial banks towards
investment banking activities was not easy. In some
countries the process was hindered by legislation. As
mentioned above, however, in the United States the
Federal Reserve began in the 1990s to interpret the legal
restrictions in a more flexible manner, until they were
ultimately lifted altogether. In Western Europe, on the
other hand, the difficulty arose from the fact that there
were no large investment banks in existence, so foreign
institutions had to be acquired.
Specialization by traditional commercial banks in
investment-banking activities also encountered a variety
of other problems, including lack of experience, scarcity
of specialized professional staff and clients' perception
that these banks were not leaders in this area. This obliged
the banks to take over investment banks with a pre-
established reputation, or else to merge. Universal banks
were the fruit of these processes.
Universal banks currently embrace a wide variety
of institutional types. In most cases the term refers to
banks that engage in commercial and investment banking
activities simultaneously. Such institutions can receive
deposits, extend credit and deal in asset-backed products.
Nonetheless, the term "universal bank" can also refer to
institutions that supply services other than traditional
banking, such as asset management, financial advice,
custody, mortgage financing and insurance. This is
because universal banks are often identified with the
German rather than the United States banking model,
which the Glass-Steagall Act had restricted to a single
segment of the financial market.
The existence of two different cultures within a
single financial institution has not made it easy for this
new modality to survive. Problems have basically centred
on investment banks' need for highly specialized staff,
which complicates the task of reconciling differences
between the hierarchical structures that characterize the
two types of banks.13  Nonetheless, the imperative of
survival in a market where the investment-banking
segment was growing at an exponential rate explains the
high degree of co-penetration that occurred between
commercial and investment banking, particularly in the
second half of the 1990s, through mergers and
acquisitions.
The rationale for universal banking is premised on
the synergy that is assumed to exist between the supply
of credit and securities trading. Universal banks can make
profits by cross-subsidizing either activity, since this
enables them to supply services at a very low cost which
is offset by earnings from other services. Most
importantly, however, this also enables them to offer
service packages, such as a combination of financial
advice and bridge loans, before bonds are floated or a
merger or acquisition is completed.
Growth in size is essential for universal banks
because, like investment banks, they have to be big
enough to gain the reputation they need to compete in
the market; in addition, they must be in a position to
offer the largest possible number of services, anticipating
their clients' needs (see box III.3 and figure III.1).
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Box III.3
CITIGROUP: ONE OF THE WORLD'S LARGEST UNIVERSAL BANKS
Citigroup is currently one of the
world's largest financial groups,
ranked first in terms of equity capital
and second in terms of assets.
Attaining this status entailed a major
U-turn in its strategy, which occurred
in 1998 when the commercial-
banking-oriented Citibank merged
with Travelers Group. The latter was
focused on investment banking and
on share and insurance brokerage
through its subsidiaries Salomon
Smith Barney, Primerica and
Travelers Life and Annuity. The
merger gave birth to Citigroup and
afforded it a leading position in the
international capital market,
enabling it to supply the full range of
financial services worldwide. Today it
is the world's most highly
internationalized financial
corporation, with 270,000
employees working in subsidiaries
distributed across more than 100
countries.
In recent years the growth of
Citigroup has been based on the
development of new products and
services and on the operation of a
cutting-edge technology platform.
Above all, however, it has been
driven by mergers and acquisitions
involving leading institutions in
market segments that are crucial for
the group's future expansion. In the
years following the merger with
Travelers, the firm merged Salomon
Smith Barney with Schroders to
create the Pan-European Investment
Bank, which gave the group a
presence in the European capital
market. Its subsequent takeover of
Associates First Capital enabled it to
consolidate its consumer financing
segment in Japan and Europe. It
also took over Bank Handlowy, the
leading bank in Poland, to gain a
springboard for expansion in Central
and Eastern Europe; and it merged
with the Fubon Group in order to
enter the insurance market in Taiwan
Province of China and create a
platform for later expansion of this
segment in Asia. It participated in
privatizations and the acquisition of
pension fund managers in
Argentina, Colombia and Mexico, to
position itself as a leader in this
segment in Latin America. It forged
a strategic joint venture with State
Street Bank and Trust Company to
supply management services for
pension, health insurance and other
benefit plans worldwide. Lastly, it
acquired the assets of Mexico's
Banamex-Accival financial group
(Banacci), in the biggest-ever
foreign investment transaction
carried out in Latin America. This
gave it control of 25% of consumer
and corporate banking in Mexico,
the largest financial market in the
region.
The merger between Citibank
and Travelers boosted the activities
of both groups. Placing the two
businesses on a single platform
required organizational
restructuring, not only to reduce
costs but also to take maximum
advantage of progress in
information technology, to turn the
company into a universal provider
of financial services on all
continents.
This not only added value to the
corporation; it also raised the
latter's return on equity from 14% in
1998 to 22% in 2000 (19.7% in
2001) –in the midst of recession in
the United States economy and
slow growth in Europe and Japan.
In the second quarter of 2002, the
firm posted the highest profitability
in the capital market with a pre-tax
profit margin of 36.7%, surpassing
all its main banking competitors
(Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers,
J.P. Morgan, Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley).a In August 2002,
Citigroup was ranked in first place
by the risk-raters Moody's and
Fitch; this enabled it to raise funds
at one of the lowest rates on the
international market.
The restructuring that followed
the merger between Citigroup's
commercial and investment banking
arms was aimed at consolidating
four business segments, grouped
according to the type of client being
targeted by the corresponding
services. This makes it possible to
spread the risk of activities among
different types of clients and to
reduce costs by using a common
client database for all products and
services. The first segment (see
diagram) is structured around a core
consumer financing business called
"Global Consumer", which mainly
involves credit card management, all
types of consumer financing
products and services and elements
pertaining to retail banking in
general. In 2001 this segment
contributed 50% of the group's
profits. The second segment, known
as "Global Corporate", encompasses
investment and corporate banking,
and aims to satisfy all the financial
needs of transnational corporations
in relation to capital markets, service
transaction and private clients. This
segment contributed 40% of profits.
The third segment, "Global
Investment Management and Private
Banking", is aimed at large private
and government institutions,
including pension fund managers.
This segment, which contributed
10% of profits in 2001, specializes in
life insurance, private banking and
asset management. The fourth and
final segment consists of the group's
own investment activities. The first
three segments cover Citigroup's
original market (the United States),
along with all the branches in
Europe, Japan, Asia, Latin America
and Central and Eastern Europe.
Although this strategy has
yielded high profits for Citigroup, it
has also engendered major
problems stemming from the
difficulties inherent in managing a
corporation that has grown so
quickly. Moreover, the cases of
Enron and the telecommunications
giant WorldCom have raised doubts
as to the benefits of mergers
between commercial and investment
banks.
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Source: ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, on the basis of Citigroup, "Quarterly and Annual Earnings
Releases", www.citigroup.com; and Business Week, 9 September 2002.
a
 SEC filings, press release (www.citigroup.com).
Box III.3 (concluded)
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In 2002, however, the universal banking model was
increasingly called into question, since several such
institutions had become embroiled in the scandals
surrounding Enron, WorldCom and other United States
telecommunications firms that year. The banks were
accused of having lent them millions of dollars in order
to secure their asset-management business, from which
the banks earn large commissions, and also came under
fire for the conflict of interest this created between their
commercial and investment-banking businesses. This has
led the United States authorities to reconsider the current
rules of financial regulation and supervision, raising the
question of whether the barrier that formerly existed
between commercial and investment banking should be
re-erected.
(d) Niche banks
The effectiveness of the banks described above
stems from their size. Commercial banks seek economies
of scale to compensate for declining profit margins.
Universal banks have to grow larger in order to gain a
leading position in the international market, either as an
investment bank or as a commercial bank. Nonetheless,
unlike these banks, some institutions operate in market
niches (defined in terms of geography, activity or specific
product) where they can survive even while remaining
small. Commercial banks can prosper perfectly well in
geographical niches, provided that they avoid attracting
the attention of large competitors. Examples are local
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Source: ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, on the basis of
Citigroup, “Quarterly and Annual Earnings Releases”, www.citigroup.com.
to their location in certain niches, they have been able
to survive in an increasingly competitive market. Product
niches, on the other hand, are sustainable in cases where
clients value individualized treatment over general
services. Research, advisory services and private-
banking services are examples of activities that meet
this criterion.
An analysis of the typology described above reveals
that each segment is best suited to certain areas. Universal
banks are at their best dealing with large firms rather than
consumers, whereas commercial banks obtain higher
profits by concentrating on the latter. Nonetheless, the
current development of new services –for which
commissions are charged, often without risk– has added
value to both of these market segments (large firms and
consumers). In practice, the large international banks
nowadays tie their lending to commitments by clients to
purchase other services, even though this procedure may
attract hostility from regulators in some countries.
To summarize, the keen competition prevailing in
the financial market today has prompted banks to seek
economies of scale as never before. As a result, some
banks have grown very large (through mergers or
acquisitions or through internationalization), while others
have taken refuge in market niches where specialization
and efficiency are the secrets of success. In both cases,
emerging countries have become strong magnets for
transnational banks' investments. Latin America has been
no exception to this trend, which was also stimulated and
made viable by the profound economic changes
implemented in the region in the 1990s.
Income (billions of dollars) Share prices Annual pofits








































C. CORPORATE STRATEGIES IN LATIN AMERICA
In pursuing new markets and rapid growth, international
banks expanded into the emerging economies of Asia,
Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America. In
contrast to the situation in the first two regions, however,
the transnational banks that currently have a relatively
strong presence Latin America are few (see figure III.2)
and are not among the world's largest banks, with the
exception of Citigroup14  and, since 2001, Banco
Santander Central Hispano (SCH), commonly known as
Banco Santander, which now ranks 24th in terms of
capital (see annex table III.A.6).
Figure III.2
LARGEST BANKS IN LATIN AMERICA BY SHARE OF REGIONAL LENDING, 2001
(Percentages)
Source: ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, on the basis of Salomon
Smith Barney, Foreign Financial Institutions in Latin America, 2001 Update,
New York, November 2001.
In the past, foreign financial entities –particularly
those from the United States– entered the region through
representation offices and/or small branches, without
making an equity investment. They generally restricted
their services to satisfying the particular needs of clients
from their countries of origin –especially transnational
firms– or operating in market niches, such as large export
firms in the host country, in order to facilitate their
foreign-trade activities. Over time, foreign banks steadily
expanded their operations in countries where the
regulatory framework allowed, bringing in capital and
finally becoming commercial banks, albeit with limited
services essentially aimed at a select clientele.
As mentioned earlier, the changes that took place in
the macroeconomic climate and in the Latin American
financial system in the 1990s coincided with the start of
global expansion by universal banks, as they sought new
markets in pursuit of economies of scale and/or
specialization.
One of the more remarkable aspects of this
phenomenon was the fact that, for various reasons, United
States banks were less interested than their European
counterparts, especially Spanish ones, in expanding into
Latin America -at least until the late 1990s, when
Citigroup began to adopt a more aggressive attitude (see
figure III.3).
14
 Citigroup's presence in the region jumped significantly in late 2000.
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Figure III.3
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This behaviour can be attributed to a number of
factors. In the first place, banks in the United States
underwent an intensive process of consolidation in the
1990s that clearly absorbed a large part of the resources
and energies of the leading banks. The main United States
banking institutions –which had been operating in Latin
America throughout the twentieth century– were involved
in a series of mergers. Examples included Citibank, Chase
Manhattan, Bank of Boston and Bank of America, all of
which were restructured in the 1990s following the lifting
of restrictions on interstate activities, and they began to
aim at universalization.
Secondly, these banks expanded primarily into
countries whose financial markets were more developed
than those of Latin America. The opportunities that
European monetary union had opened up for universal
and investment banking were much more attractive than
those offered by emerging markets. In addition, the
European countries' financial system was undergoing a
reform process similar to the one in the United States, so
banks from the latter country were able to gain leading
positions in markets much larger than those of emerging
countries. Consequently, Latin America –apart from
Mexico, given its status as a party to the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)– was of marginal
importance in their overall strategy of expansion into
developed-economy markets.
A large contingent of European banks also took this
road. Deutsche Bank and UBS Bank, for example, have
focused on entering the United States market. Others
preferred to expand into Latin America, having found it
virtually impossible to break into countries with
developed financial markets, even when this only meant
crossing borders within the European Union.
Thirdly, United States banks may have been wary
of the prospects offered by Latin America, given the
knowledge they had acquired through long experience
in the region. As the debt crisis of the early 1980s had
affected a large part of the United States banking system,
heightened risk aversion caused these banks to shy away
from further involvement in the region's problems, with
which European banks had no experience. The recent
Argentine crisis may have confirmed this apprehension.
Given their deeper knowledge of the institutional
weakness of the Latin American financial system, banks
such as Citicorp, Bank of Boston and Chase opted to
restrict their participation to the corporate and high-
income consumer niches, which are normally safer.
This stands in contrast to the behaviour of the
Spanish banks. Their expansion, which followed a
process of concentration of the financial system in Spain,
was driven by an urgent need to grow; and they chose
Latin America because of obstacles to expansion in the
European market. Their strategy was motivated by the
need to strengthen their competitive position and defend
themselves against possible hostile takeover bids from
their competitors, especially bigger banks in the
European Union.
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1. Strategy for penetrating the Latin American market
Foreign banks entered the region mainly by acquiring
equity holdings in strategic partnerships with local banks
(see annex table III.A.3). Some banks were more
aggressive than others, acquiring a 100% interest in order
to rapidly gain management control. These included
SCH, HSBC, FleetBoston and Citibank. In contrast,
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA) has moved
slowly in terms of ownership control, although, like SCH,
it entered the region aggressively, gaining a major
presence in the main financial markets.
While transnational banks have expanded mainly
into the larger Latin American countries (see figure III.4),
they are also present in the smaller economies, albeit
in limited segments. There are significant differences
between the main banks in terms of regional distribution
and the segments in which they operate. These
differences reflect the banks' global strategy, the types
of risk they are willing to assume in the region, their
historical participation and opportunities that have
arisen in the host countries –such as financial crises
resulting in asset sales or the need for rapid
capitalization, all of which have been taken advantage
of by foreign banks.
Figure III.4


































Source: ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, on the basis of
Salomon Smith Barney, Foreign Financial Institutions in Latin America,
2001 Update, New York, November 2001.
Another factor to be borne in mind is the major growth
potential of traditional commercial banking –and not just
investment banking– in most Latin American countries.
Large segments of the population have no access to
financial products, which, as mentioned above, requires a
local presence and physical proximity to the customer.
The tardy penetration of foreign banks in the region's
largest and most developed financial markets, such as
Mexico and Brazil, was the result of regulatory obstacles
which those countries gradually lifted following the
"tequila" crisis. But, whereas foreign banks acquired a
majority share of the Mexican banking system between
2000 and 2001, in Brazil the strength of the local banking
sector, which had its own brand of development and
competitiveness, prevented foreign banks from gaining
dominant market positions.
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2. Corporate strategies, market share and profitability
Universal banks have generally entered the region using
one of two strategies, which partly determine the scale
of their expansion. One of these is based on size, when
this is one of the entity's main competitive advantages.
This strategy forces the bank to expand steadily and to
maintain a presence not only in the main markets, but
also in the largest possible number of their constituent
segments. The other strategy is based on specific
technological know-how and the use of specialized
instruments. In this case, banks opt to participate in niche
segments. In Latin America, this type of strategy has been
used mainly in treasury management and corporate
banking in large markets. As some banks combine these
two modalities, however, three categories can be
distinguished in the region: banks with a broad regional
presence and universal orientation in the local market;
those that have broad regional dispersion but are
concentrated in the corporate segment, though they may,
in some cases, offer limited consumer banking services;
and entities operating exclusively in large markets, mainly
in the corporate banking segment.
(a) Entities with a broad regional presence as
universal banks
Banks that expanded into more countries and most
of the segments of the Latin American financial market
in the 1990s included the three transnational ones with
the biggest market shares in the region: SCH, BBVA and
Citibank (see table III.9).
Table III.9
LATIN AMERICA: MARKET SHARES OF THE THREE LARGEST TRANSNATIONAL
BANKS IN 2001
(Percentages)
SCH BBVAa Citigroup Total share of
 foreign banks
Loans 10.4 9.3 9.1 63.8
Deposits 10.5 12.0 8.5 64.4
Investment funds 7.9 4.5 7.1 ...
Pension funds 12.1 27.6 16.7 84.0
Source: ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, on the basis of Salomon Smith Barney, Foreign Financial Institutions
in Latin America, 2001 Update, New York, November 2001; and Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Economic Review, 2002.
a Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria.
The Spanish firms SCH and BBVA were the financial
entities with the most successful expansion strategy over
the last decade. They began by entering the market
segment where they had the greatest experience and
strength in their country of origin: consumer banking
(also known as retail banking), which was seen as having
the highest growth potential in the region.
They achieved their rapid penetration by acquiring
large, locally consolidated firms (see box III.4 and annex
tables III.A.4 and III.A.5). They supported this with a
revolutionary strategy for marketing their products and
services, which not only offered attractive rates, but also
incorporated new products and made use of highly
aggressive marketing methods that included prize
drawings for automobiles, trips to Europe and other
prizes, in countries where this was allowed by law.
Entering new markets required major investments.
For example, by late 2001 SCH had invested US$ 16.4
billion, of which 76% was concentrated in Brazil,
Argentina and Mexico, in that order. Meanwhile, BBVA
had spent a total of US$ 9 billion to acquire share holdings
in the region's financial entities (see box III.4).
Citigroup (as Citibank) had been providing
corporate and private banking services -in other words,
focusing on high-income clients- in the region for at
least a century when, in 2001, it made the big leap
into consumer banking by acquiring Banco Nacional
de México (BANAMEX) for US$ 12.5 billion. This
policy forms part of Citigroup's global strategy, which
in recent years has involved restructuring, with major




SPANISH BANKS IN LATIN AMERICA
Spanish banks have been embarked
on an internationalization drive since
the mid-1990s. This process, which
was triggered by the changes that
occurred in the Spanish financial
system two decades ago, intensified as
from 1985 following Spain's entry into
the European Community.
The creation of the single European
market removed obstacles to the free
circulation of capital between member
countries and gave freedom to
establish and provide banking services.
In 1993 the Council of Europe unified
regulations governing credit institutions
and provided for the free circulation of
capital and for the creation of
Community-wide financial institutions
requiring only a single banking licence.
The Spanish government incorporated
these provisions into its financial
legislation by Royal Decree in 1995. As
a result, Spain's financial sector began
to develop new growth and
concentration strategies in order to
adapt to the new competitive
environment. The changes in the
structure and strategies of financial
entities became more radical in
anticipation of the arrival of the single
currency, the euro. These
circumstances compelled banking
institutions either to achieve the
necessary economies of scale (size)
or to offer a competitive advantage in
a specific market segment
(specialization).
Private Spanish banks were forced to
redefine their strategy to focus on
meeting the demands and needs of
their clients (individuals, firms and
institutions). As a result, the focus of
the banking system moved from
products to clients, mirroring the
pattern of financial innovation
internationally. In this context, banks
sought primarily to maintain their profit
levels, for which purpose they made
significant cuts in operating costs.
Measures included staff downsizing, a
reduction in the number of banks –as
concentration was increased through
mergers– and cuts in the number of
branches in their local networks. This
process gathered momentum when
Banco Santander launched a high-
yield current account known as "Súper
Cuenta", an initiative that other banks
were quick to copy.a
Acquisitions by Spanish banks were
concentrated in France, Italy, Morocco,
Portugal and especially Latin
America.b At the same time, these
banks intensified the signing of
cooperation agreements with entities
from different European Union
countries, in order to defend
themselves against competition from
larger banks that had consolidated as
genuinely European entities.
The Latin American countries offered
attractive new business opportunities,
given their high degree of openness
and deregulation. Accordingly, the
financial institutions' strategy was to
expand their core activity, namely
commercial banking, in order to gain a
presence in as many markets as
possible. This is reflected in the
acquisitions process illustrated in the
table below.
As in their country of origin, Banco
Santander and BBVA pursued
strategies aimed at universalization,
with a view to diversifying the market
segments in which they operated and
entering new businesses. These
included investment banking,
insurance and, especially, pension
fund management
Source: ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies.
a The Súper Cuenta was the first current account to pay interest on credit balances, and it enabled Banco Santander to
increase its market share by 50%. This product was followed by others such as "Súper Depósitos" and "Súper Hipotecas",
which forced the larger Spanish banks to intensify their competition in terms of products and market share.
b It is important to note that many large European banks have not opted for an internationalization strategy, but have focused
basically on consolidating their position in their countries of origin.
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Table
BANCO SANTANDER CENTRAL HISPANO (SCH) AND BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA (BBVA)
 IN LATIN AMERICA
       SCH             BBVA
Local bank Owner- Local Year of Owner- Local Year of
ship%  ranking  entry Local bank ship% ranking entry
Argentina Banco Río de la Plata 98 4 1997 BBVA Banco Francés 67 5 1996
Banco de Galicia y Buenos Aires 10 3 1998 Corporación Banca Argentina 100 ... 1999
Bolivia Banco Santa Cruz 90 2 1998
Brazil Banco do Estado de São Paulo 98 2000 Banco Excel-Económico 100 16 1998
(Banespa) (now BBVA Brasil)
Banco Santander Brasil (formerly 100 5 1997
Banco Geral do Comercio)
Banco Noroeste a 76 18 1998
Chile Banco Santander Chile 90 2 1996 Banco Hipotecario de Fomento (BHIF), 56 10 1998
now BBVA Banco BHIF
Banco Santiago b 79 3 1991
Colombia Banco Santander Colombia 60 12 1997 BBVA Ganadero 99 3 1996
Mexico Grupo Financiero Serfín 100 3 2000 BBVA México (formerly Probursa) 68 1995
Grupo Financiero Bital ) 8 4 1993 BBVA Bancomer 35 1 2000
(included Banco Internacional
de México)
Banco Santander Mexicano 100 5 1996
Paraguay Banco Asunción 39 9 1996
Peru Banco Santander Perú 100 6 1995 BBVA Continental 50 3 1995
Puerto Rico Banco Santander Puerto Rico 100 BBVA Puerto Rico 100 3
Uruguay Banco Santander Uruguay 100 10 1997 BBVA Banco Francés 100 5 1995
Venezuela Banco de Venezuela 98 3 Banco Provincial 53 1 1997
  Source: ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, on the basis of Banco Santander Central Hispano (SCH), Informe Anual 2001, 2001;
Latin Trade magazine, "Top 100 banks", September 2002; and Latin Banking Guide & Directory, 2002, supplement of Latin Finance Magazine
(www.latinfinance.com), August 2002.
   a
 In 1998 the various Santander subsidiaries in Brazil began a merger process.
   b
 Currently in the process of merging with Banco Santander.
    Box III-4 (conclusion)
By taking over BANAMEX, Citigroup achieved an
extraordinary increase in its income in the region and in
its number of client accounts (see table III.10). As a result,
income (net of interest paid) in 2001 was up by 59% on
the 2000 figure, having risen from US$ 2.2 billion to
US$ 3.5 billion. At the same time, the total number of
client accounts expanded from 7 million to 23 million
for the whole of Latin America, thanks to the addition of
16 million BANAMEX accounts.
Table III.10
THE IMPORTANCE OF BANAMEX TO CITIGROUP
Total net income Number of clients Average loans
(millions of dollars) (millions) (billions of dollars)
Rest of Latin Rest of Latin Rest of Latin
America Mexico America Mexico America Mexico
1999 1 638 531 7.6 1.4 7.7 3.9
2000 1 656 603 7.2 1.7 7.2 3.7
2001 1 380 2 117 7.1 16.1 7.1 11.3




FOREIGN BANK PARTICIPATION IN PENSION FUND MANAGEMENT
The importance attached to consumer banking by
SCH, BBVA and Citigroup in Latin America led them to
compete with each other for a market that had major
development potential, and also with local banks, which
until recently had been the leading players in that market.
Accordingly, they made a vigorous entry into new
segments, such as credit cards (one of the highest-
yielding instruments in emerging countries), mortgage
banking (which was in its infancy in some Latin American
countries), consumer finance instruments aimed at
specific segments (such as young people or students),
personal banking (for the high-income private client),
loans for the purchase of automobiles, and insurance
products of all types.
While these institutions place major emphasis on
retail banking, they are not neglecting their corporate-
banking activities, where they provide a wide variety of
financial services and products. These include investment
advice, financial planning, brokerage services for stock
and commodity futures, underwriting and marketing of
fixed-income and equity securities for transnational
corporations, and structured and derivative products,
under a strategy aimed at the continuous development
of new products and services.
Citibank remains the leader in this area  with its
traditional orientation towards this market segment. By
combining that orientation with its new strategy,
however, it has now integrated the organization of its
corporate and consumer-banking businesses. The
Spanish banks, meanwhile, as part of their corporate
banking activities, have been developing special
instruments tailored to the needs of small and medium-
sized businesses.
Pension-system reforms created the institutional
conditions needed to enable foreign banks to enter this
market also, which they did by taking blocks of shares
in local pension fund management holding companies.
The fact that regional pension funds are not very large
has not prevented foreign banks from perceiving profit
potential in this business and seeking rapid penetration.
In this market, BBVA is the leading player (see box III.5
and figure III.5).
Pension funds have played a major role
in the provision of long-term financial
resources in developed countries.
Intermediation takes place though
mechanisms that vary widely according
to the depth and robustness of the
respective markets. In the United
States, for example, pension fund
managers acquire long-term securities,
either directly or indirectly, thereby
simultaneously stimulating both
primary and secondary intermediation
in the capital market. As a result, these
institutions play a key role in enhancing
the maturity of financial instruments,
thereby contributing to investment
financing.
The situation is very different in Latin
America. Firstly, pension reform in the
region did not take place until the 1990s
(except in Chile, where it dates back to
the early 1980s); moreover, reform was
often only partial, which reduced the
potential size of the corresponding
funds. Secondly, the lack of capital-
market development, together with the
weakness and instability of private firms,
represent a major risk for investors that
purchase the instruments issued by
these firms. Thirdly, the institutional
framework in the sector has matured
only slowly, and serious regulatory
problems persist in several countries of
the region -even Chile, which boasts
the highest level of institutional
development.
The leading player in this sector has
been BBVA (see figure below); it is
present in nearly all countries where
the pension system has been
reformed, managing 25% of total funds,
or US$ 14 billion. BBVA is currently
followed by Citibank, which, having
acquired the assets of Banacci in
Mexico, manages a total of US$ 11.4
billion. The figure below also shows the
share of other foreign players in the
pension industry, which by mid-2001
jointly accounted for 55% of all pension
funds in the region.


























LATIN AMERICA: SHARE OF FOREIGN BANKS IN PENSION FUND MANAGEMENT,
JUNE 2001
(Percentages)
Source: Salomon Smith Barney, Foreign Financial Institutions in Latin America, 2001
Update, New York, November 2001.
Figure III.5
BANCO SANTANDER AND BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA (BBVA) SHARE PRICES































































S an tand er B B V A
Source: ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, on the basis of Bloomberg.
Box III.5 (conclusion)
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(b) Entities that have broad regional dispersion but
are concentrated in the corporate segment
Among the financial institutions that increased their
share of the Latin American market in the 1990s, covering
a broad range of countries but concentrating their
activities in limited market segments, the standouts are
FleetBoston (outcome of the merger between FleetBoston
and BankBoston in the United States) and the Canadian-
owned Scotiabank.
FleetBoston was one of the first international banks
to establish itself in Latin America, opening a Buenos
Aires office in 1917 to assist New England merchants
in administering their businesses. Today it maintains a
significant presence in the region, with operations in
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Panama,
Peru and Uruguay. Overall, FleetBoston controls about
2% of the loans and deposits of the region's most
important financial markets, and about 3% of total
assets.
The bank has aimed its products and services at
transnationals, large domestic corporations and high-
income individuals. Initially, most of its operations
involved banking, which today represents FleetBoston's
core business in Latin America. More recently, however,
it has gradually expanded into other high-growth areas,
offering new financial services such as insurance,
brokerage, leasing, factoring and pension fund
management.
Scotiabank, meanwhile, has been operating in the
region for over 100 years. Although initially
concentrated in the Caribbean, it began activities in
South America 40 years ago. Its internationalization
strategy focuses on the fastest-growing markets and
economies with low bank penetration and favourable
demographic conditions. In 2000 it was planning to
develop a financial hub operated and managed jointly
in Chile and Argentina –countries in which it had been
building up its assets. The crisis in Argentina, however,
persuaded the bank to withdraw its capital from that
country, and it has since been intensifying its operations
in Mexico, for which purpose it took a controlling 55%
interest in Inverlat in 2001. In 2002 it maintained a
relatively significant presence in Chile, Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Mexico, Panama and Puerto Rico, through
subsidiaries, representation offices and partnerships
with local banks. In 2001 it strengthened its activities
in emerging markets, mainly in Latin America and in
small market niches in Asia. Like FleetBoston, its
expansion strategy includes mutual fund management,
insurance and electronic banking.
(c) Entities operating exclusively in large markets
The remaining foreign banks are concentrated in a
few countries and operate mainly in the corporate
segment. Nonetheless, they too have followed the pattern
of integrating businesses that until recently were
independent (investment funds, pension funds and
insurance companies).
The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation
(HSBC) is one of the biggest financial institutions in the
world, with operations in over 80 countries. Although
its activities in Latin America are on a small scale, since
the mid-1990s HSBC has been strengthening its presence
in the region. Initially, this strategic reorientation resulted
in three acquisitions: 10% of Banco del Sur in Peru,
19.9% of the Serfin financial group in Mexico and various
assets belonging to Banco Bemerindus do Brasil. These
operations were complemented by some smaller-scale
activities in Argentina and Chile.
The firm's business areas are subdivided so as to
provide a full range of banking, financial and insurance
services to different market segments. These areas include
personal banking, commercial banking, private banking
and corporate banking (including investment banking).
At the present time, HSBC operates mainly in five regions
or territories: Europe, Hong Kong SAR, the rest of Asia-
Pacific (in addition to Africa and the Middle East), North
America and Latin America. The group's current strategy
aims at cost-cutting, the development of new sources of
income and commissions in developing countries, the
development of a single corporate image, and alignment
of its corporate and investment banking arms.
In terms of assets, liabilities and profits, the most
important regions or territories for the firm's global
position are Europe and Hong Kong SAR, in each of
which over 37% of the group's assets are concentrated.
In contrast, Latin America accounts for only a minimal
fraction of its global activities. It is interesting to note
how profits are distributed across regions and lines of
business. In Europe, profits are sourced as follows:
personal banking, 16%; commercial banking, 28%; and
corporate and investment banking, 37%. In Hong Kong
SAR and North America, the firm's main activity is
personal banking, which accounts for 45% and 51% of
profits in these markets, respectively. In Latin America,
on the other hand, earnings are heavily concentrated in
corporate and investment banking (52%), followed by
commercial banking (33%) and personal banking (11%).
The firm's main business in the region consists of
banking and financial services for large firms (corporate
banking), with recent diversification into services for
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medium-sized firms and consumer banking. In addition,
HSBC engages in some activities in the insurance sector
and, to a lesser extent, in pension funds.
Another transnational bank that operates in just a
few of the region's markets, but with a significant share
of their total assets, is ABN AMRO of the Netherlands.
This bank has an overt corporate-client focus, having
recently defined a global strategy of vigorously pursuing
a major banking presence in three markets, namely the
Netherlands, the United States and Brazil, in that order.
Like other global banks in the region, ABN AMRO
provides services that include financial intermediation,
leasing, insurance and private pension saving, in addition
to commercial banking.
3. Costs and benefits of expansion in Latin America
The costs and benefits of expansion in Latin America
depend on the relative importance of a foreign bank's
business in the region within its global strategy (see table
III.11). At one extreme are the Spanish banks, whose
Latin American assets account for a high proportion of
the total, 29% in the case of SCH and just over 26% for
BBVA as of late 2001. At the other extreme are banks
that expanded in the investment-banking segment only,
with the result that they have hardly any assets in the
region. The intermediate range runs from 13% in the case
of FleetBoston to nearly 7% in the case of Citibank, and
about 2% among banks whose strategies target niche
segments (including corporate banking, for example,
given its orientation towards large markets).
Table III.11
COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN BANK ASSETS, 2001
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Assets in Latin Global assets Latin America/total Argentina/Latin Argentina/Total
America America
SCH 92 067 315 623 29.2 10.1 3.0
BBVA 71 171 272 535 26.1 11.8 3.1
FLEETBOSTON 27 453 203 638 13.5 30 4.0
SCOTIABANK 16 881 173 394 9.7 16.2 1.6
CITIGROUP 70 418 1 051 450 6.7 10.2 0.7
ABN AMRO 17 910 526 450 3.4 0 0.0
HSBC 17 419 696 381 2.5 27 0.7
LLOYDS 5 919 275 780 2.2 13.5 0.3
Source: ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, on the basis of data from The Banker, "Top 1000 World Banks",
London, July 2002; and Latin Banking Guide & Directory (www.latinfinance.com), August 2002.
In the late 1990s, expectations of rapid growth in
Latin America were rudely disappointed, and the region's
economies are now either stalled or in outright recession.
In addition, they have been rendered more vulnerable
by the reversal of net capital flows and the resulting
increase in exchange-rate volatility. In a context of
domestic stagnation and external vulnerability, pessimism
arose as to the future profitability of investments, and
hopes of continuing to attract capital to the region, and
particularly to the financial sector, quickly faded.
Argentina's recent experience has had a profound
effect on banks' strategies in the region. The abandonment
of convertibility and the way in which dollarization was
unwound in Argentina changed the rules of the game in
the business world, generating a crisis in the financial
system from which the country has yet to recover. This
situation also stirred fears for the future of investments
in neighbouring countries.
The consequences of this crisis, which hit a large
number of banks, cannot yet be fully evaluated, but one
result is certain to be that foreign firms in future will be
much more cautious about investing in the region, since
the risk appears to be much greater and less manageable
than previously imagined. Such fears cause investors to
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mistrust corporations with high volumes of assets in the
region. Figure III.5 shows the extent to which SCH and
BBVA share prices have suffered for that reason, even
though their rates of return on assets held up well in 2001
(in both cases profits were the same or higher than at the
start of the expansion; see table III.12).
In addition, given that shareholders tend to prize
profitability above any other criterion, a number of
banks hurt by the Argentine crisis and oriented mainly
towards niche segments drastically altered their strategy.
In general, this resulted in their withdrawal from
Argentina and in some cases from the region as a whole.
Banks that pulled out of Argentina include Canada's
Scotiabank (formerly the owner of Banco Quilmes),
France's Crédit Agricole and the Republic of Korea's
Kookmin. In addition, Italy's IntesaBci group, one of
the most powerful financial institutions in its home
country and owner of the Sudameris banks in Argentina
and Brazil. At the end of 2002, it sold 80% of its
subsidiary in Argentina.
Table III.12
PROFITABILITY IN LATIN AMERICA VS. PROFITABILITY WORLDWIDE, 1999-2001
(Percentages)
Return on assets Return on assets in Return on equity Return on equity in
 worldwide  Latin America worldwide Latin America
December 1999
SCH 1.1 1.1 12.0 11.6
BBVA 1.2 0.9 11.3 11.1
CITIGROUP 2.2 1.6 12.4 14.6
BANKBOSTON 1.8 0.6 11.4 9.4
ABN AMRO 0.9 1.1 10.9 10.1
HSBC 1.4 0.8 13.2 15.8
SCOTIABANK 1.2 0.2 11.9 3.0
LLOYDS 2.4 2.1 15.1 15.4
December 2001
SCH 1.2 1.3 12.8 13.4
BBVA 1.2 0.9 12.6 7.6
CITIGROUP 2.1 1.8 10.9 16.7
BANKBOSTON 0.8 0.8 11.0 10.0
ABN AMRO 0.6 1.2 10.9 17.2
HSBC 1.2 0.4 13.0 6.6
SCOTIABANK 1.2 1.0 13.0 11.0
LLOYDS 1.9 -0.1 9.2 -3.9
Source: ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, on the basis of data from The Banker, "Top 1000 World Banks",
London, July 2002; and Latin Banking Guide & Directory (www.latinfinance.com), August 2002.
Following the outbreak of the Argentine crisis, the
banks that had been most active in penetrating the
Latin American market in the 1990s embarked upon a
consolidation strategy based, among other things, on
the decision to invest only in projects perceived as
having great market and profit potential. For example,
executives of BBVA, one of the most dynamic players
in recent years, state that the bank's expansion in Latin
America is now virtually complete, with the region
currently accounting for 27% of the group's earnings.
While it is still planning further expansion in Mexico,
this is only because of that country's strategic
importance, in view of NAFTA, to the bank's medium-
term expansion to the United States. The same is true
of SCH, which was hard hit by the Argentine crisis
and now intends only to consolidate its activities in
Latin America –especially in Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Mexico, Puerto Rico and Venezuela (the region
currently provides 37% of its earnings). The group
plans to redirect its investments towards the United
States and Europe in order to achieve greater
geographical diversification of its assets and reduce
its exposure in Latin America. This aim became clear
when it cancelled its participation in the takeover of
the Mexican bank Bital, which was finally purchased
by HSBC.
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Citigroup's problems with its global strategy in the
second half of 2002 and its losses in Argentina, which
produced a negative result at the regional level,15 have
led it to view the future with great caution, putting its
investments in Brazil on hold while it awaits greater
regional stability.
The biggest financial market in the region that has
been penetrated the least by foreign banks, even though
it offers the greatest potential, is Brazil. Yet there are
two major obstacles to any such initiatives in the short
run: firstly, the line to be taken by the newly elected
government; and secondly, strong competition from the
large local banks. The foreign banks that have entered
the country in the past five years, such as HSBC, BBVA
and ABN AMRO, have found it hard to compete and
carve out an identity in the market. Nonetheless, analysts
claim that there are highly profitable niches available.16
The recent crisis involving large United States
corporations has generated uncertainty as to the future
of universal banking in developed countries, but has not
yet affected the strategy of such institutions in Latin
America. Nonetheless, the region's capital market cannot
fulfil its development potential at present because the
international financial market has yet to regain the level
of liquidity it enjoyed in the 1990s. This is likely to result
in a period of consolidation (concentration and possible
retrenchment) in the region's financial market, as well as
a reorientation towards commercial banking.
D. FOREIGN BANKS: MICROECONOMIC EFFICIENCY VERSUS
MACROECONOMIC EFFECTIVENESS
The foregoing sections analysed the forces that led
foreign banks to expand into the region and the effects
of their strategies on corporate performance. This section
analyses the impact that foreign banks have had at the
microeconomic and macroeconomic levels, particularly
in terms of solving the problems that have traditionally
afflicted the Latin American financial system. This
obviously has implications for the financial constraints
facing firms and the stability of the regional banking
system.
The microeconomic indicators presented here are
not very different from those used in other studies, since
they compare the performance of foreign and local banks
in terms of profitability, efficiency and liquidity. To
simplify, this is referred to here as the microeconomic
efficiency of the banking system. Despite their limitations,
these indicators are often used to evaluate the way in
which banks are operating and their degree of risk
exposure. The counterpart at the aggregate level would
be macroeconomic effectiveness. This aspect will be
studied by means of an analysis of access to credit by
the productive sector and families, together with the
corresponding interest rates and spreads, and the banking
system's contribution to stability.
As is true of most economic analyses, the step from
micro- to macroeconomic performance is not a direct
one. Nonetheless, some of the results presented below
suggest that the microeconomic efficiency of the regional
banking system increased during the 1990s, thanks partly
to the role played by foreign banks. In the
macroeconomic domain, however, the cost and
accessibility of credit failed to improve, as did
macroeconomic stability. The analysis in this section
attempts to explain this paradox.
1. Microeconomic efficiency
Three indicators in particular can be used to compare
the performance of banking institutions: profitability,
efficiency and liquidity. Given that foreign banks did not
gain a strong presence in Latin America until the late
1990s, the analysis covers the period 1997-2001. The
data refer to the 20 largest banks in terms of total assets
in the countries where the operations of transnational
banks were concentrated: Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. Overall, these
20 banks encompass more than 80% of the system.
In evaluating microeconomic performance, it must
be borne in mind that the local banking system has faced
15
 For more information, see Citigroup (undated) and Business Week (2002).
16
 For further information, see Latin Finance (2000).
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17
 This is measured by the probability of overlap between the confidence intervals of the means. The confidence interval considers the
standard deviation with respect to the mean for each group, so that the comparison takes into account not only the mean value, but also its
dispersion.
18
 At the country level, however, the correlation is very low for Argentina and negative for Peru. Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and
Venezuela, meanwhile, register correlations ranging from 0.46 to 0.92.
strong competition from foreign banks in their drive to
gain market share. This has certainly forced the local
players, especially the larger ones, to become more
efficient. In this regard, it is interesting to consider not
only the average performance trend for the two groups,
but also deviations from the mean, since they may
indicate cases where small entities, too, may have
demonstrated a capacity to incorporate new technologies
and enhance their performance in a more competitive
environment.
(a) Indicators of profitability
For Latin America as a whole, local and foreign
banks show no statistically significant differences in
profitability17  (see table III.13), whether measured as
the return on assets (ROA) (see figure III.6) or the return
on equity (ROE). A similar analysis for each individual
country confirms this result.
After acquiring local institutions, foreign banks took
a series of measures which will undoubtedly enhance
efficiency and profitability in the future, though they may
have raised costs in the short run. In strategic terms, these
banks are just beginning to progress from a positioning
phase to an increase in profitability.
Additional confirmation of the scant difference in
profitability between local and foreign banks, whether
measured in relation to assets or capital, is found in their
similar period-to-period trends, which display a very high
correlation -0.74 on average for the entire set of countries.
Nonetheless, variance analysis reveals that there is less
dispersion among foreign banks than among local ones;
in other words, profitability varies more among local
institutions than among their foreign competitors, as is
borne out by the available statistics, especially in
Argentina, Chile and Mexico. This is probably because
local banks are considerably more heterogeneous than
their foreign counterparts in terms of size, liquidity, target
markets and managerial and technological structures.
Table III.13
LATIN AMERICA: INDICATORS OF THE PROFITABILITY OF LOCAL AND FOREIGN BANKS, 1997-2001
(Percentages)
Country
Return on assets Return on equity
Local banks Foreign banks Local banks Foreign banks
1997- 1997 2001 1997- 1997 2001 1997- 1997 2001 1997-2001 2001 2001 2001 1997 2001
Argentina 0.8 0.3 1.8 0.3 -0.7 0.3 3.1 2.5 5.9 6.0 2.1 7.4
Brazil 0.9 1.0 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.6 12.3 13.1 5.3 8.5 6.0 7.2
Chile 0.8 1.9 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.7 13.1 12.4 15.8 10.5 6.3 14.2
Colombia -0.1 1.3 1.0 -0.6 -0.1 0.2 7.4 8.2 9.8 1.4 -2.7 0.2
Mexico 1.2 0.6 2.5 1.2 1.1 1.8 6.9 0.5 9.4 11.2 7.6 14.7
Peru 0.8 0.7 1.2 0.4 -0.2 0.2 7.8 10.6 6.9 4.5 11.0 5.1
Venezuela 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.9 2.1 - 14.9 20.7 2.6 16.2 15.7 .
Average for
Latin America 0.9 1.0 1.5 0.6 0.4 0.6 9.4 9.7 7.9 8.3 6.6 8.1
Source: ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, on the basis of Latin Banking Guide & Directory (www.latinfinance.com),
August 2002.
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Source: ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, on the basis of Latin Banking Guide & Directory 2002.
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(b) Indicators of efficiency
The analysis in this case is based on two indicators
normally used by banking regulators: (i) operating
expenses in relation to total income, and (ii) overdue loans
as a percentage of the total loan portfolio. The first of
these indicators measures operational efficiency, while
the second is a fairly crude approximation to the quality
of risk management (see table III.14).
Table III.14
 LATIN AMERICA: INDICATORS OF THE EFFICIENCY OF LOCAL AND FOREIGN BANKS, 1997-2001
(Percentages)
Country
Overdue loans/total loans Operating expenses/total income
Local banks Foreign banks Local banks Foreign banks
1997- 1997 2001 1997- 1997 2001 1997- 1997 2001 1997-2001 2001 2001 2001 1997 2001
Argentina a 10.9 13.0 12.1 5.9 5.8 6.0 79.9 102.1 21.9 85.1 163.9 19.1
Brazil 10.3 5.8 14.1 4.7 1.9 7.4 79.7 84.4 76.3 93.1 115.9 67.2
Chile 1.6 1.0 1.8 1.0 0.4 1.3 82.8 77.9 69.8 65.0 63.7 62.9
Colombia 8.0 5.5 4.0 6.1 4.9 3.7 102.8 82.1 64.6 125.3 92.4 74.5
Mexico 6.2 6.2 6.4 2.0 1.5 2.1 108.6 102.4 73.2 90.3 86.0 63.7
Peru 6.8 4.6 7.7 6.4 4.9 6.4 91.7 83.7 78.2 114.8 106.4 84.9
Venezuela 7.0 3.4 12.2 6.6 2.1 - 73.9 65.3 70.9 75.3 72.0 -
Average for
Latin America 7.2 5.7 8.3 4.7 3.1 4.5 88.5 85.4 65.0 92.7 100.0 62.0
Source: ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, on the basis of Latin Banking Guide & Directory
(http:www.latinfinance.com), August 2002.
a In the case of Argentina, the figures are for 2000.
Analysis of the data reveals an interesting initial
result, namely a general improvement in the operational
efficiency of banks during the period studied. In six of
the seven countries, both foreign and local banks
significantly reduced their ratio of operating expenses
to total expenditure.19 Most of this efficiency
improvement has occurred since 2000, which suggests
that it may be linked to the banking industry's current
processes of rationalizing operations, optimizing human
resources and incorporating new technologies and
technological platforms. In Argentina, notwithstanding
the current financial crisis, local and foreign banks alike
achieved steady gains in efficiency between 1997 and
2001. In Brazil, on the other hand, the efficiency of local
banks remained relatively unchanged, with only a slight
increase in 1999-2001, while foreign banks registered a
more substantial improvement. In Colombia, Mexico and
Peru, efficiency trended steadily upward in both types
of bank starting in 1999.
Although there are no statistically significant
differences in risk management between local and foreign
banks in terms of overlapping confidence intervals, the
coefficient is always lower among the latter. Unlike their
local counterparts, foreign banks maintained a relatively
healthy loan portfolio on average throughout the period
under analysis. This should not be surprising, because most
foreign banks were embarked upon an aggressive policy
of loan restructuring when they began activities in Latin
America, as a key element of their positioning strategy in
the region. The policies of SCH and BBVA in Argentina,
Brazil, Chile and Mexico are clear examples of this.
When the data are compared over time, however,
the percentage of overdue loans in each country's total
portfolio shows no sign of decreasing. This is true of
national and foreign banks alike and is explained by the
region's worsening macroeconomic situation, as a result
of which many firms and families have fallen into
payment arrears, despite the banks' efforts to improve
risk management.
19 In Chile, foreign banks have been much more efficient than their local counterparts. Nonetheless, competition in the market has forced
local banks to cut costs, with the result that this indicator has shown a persistent narrowing of the gap in recent years, to the point where the
difference in 2001 was no longer statistically significant.
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(c) Indicators of liquidity
The liquidity indicator chosen here is the effective
availability of loanable funds as a percentage of total
deposits, where effective availability is understood to
mean the difference between gross loans and loan loss
reserves. The larger this percentage, the greater the risk
being incurred by the bank; conversely, the smaller the
percentage, the more cautious the strategy being pursued.
This is because the indicator serves to measure the bank's
level of indebtedness. A larger reserve against loan loss
reduces the indicator's numerator, suggesting either that
the bank is subject to more stringent regulatory
constraints or simply that it expects loan recovery to be
more difficult.
The liquidity situation differs across countries (see
figure III.7). In Brazil, for example, foreign banks
were more liquid than local ones throughout the
period, and increasingly so in 2000 and 2001. The
opposite is true in Chile and Mexico, since local banks
have a liquidity index that is both higher and more
stable (smaller standard deviation) than that of foreign
banks.
Another interesting phenomenon is the sharp drop
in liquidity registered among foreign banks following
the Asian and Russian crises (see table III.15). In
Argentina the liquidity indicator for all banks declined
steadily between 1997 and 1999, and the trend continued
until 2001 in the case of foreign banks. Given that, in
general, all banks have seen their loan portfolios
deteriorate, it is hardly surprising that they have adopted
a more prudent policy. Rather than changes in ownership,
this attitude seems to reflect a more uncertain economic
climate. This leads up to the final point in the analysis,
namely the macroeconomic effectiveness of foreign
banks in the region.
Table III.15
LIQUIDITY INDICATOR: EFFECTIVE AVAILABILITY OF LOANABLE FUNDS IN RELATION
TO TOTAL DEPOSITS, 1997-2001
(Ratio)
Local banks Foreign banks
1997-2001 1997 2001 1997-2001 1997 2001
Argentina 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8
Brazil 1.0 1.0 0.7 1.4 1.4 1.1
Chile 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.4 0.9
Colombia 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.9 1.1 2.1
Mexico 1.1 1.1 1.3 0.7 0.9 0.4
Peru 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.0
Venezuela 0.7 0.7 1.1 0.7 0.7 -
Average for
Latin America 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0






















































Source: ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, on the basis of Latin Banking Guide & Directory, 2002.
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2. Macroeconomic impact
The microeconomic analysis shows that, while foreign
banks do not differ significantly from local ones in an
operational sense, they do act much more prudently in
assessing and managing risk, as shown by the fact that
they make significantly higher provision against losses
than local banks. This is a genuine benefit for the region.
Nonetheless, a microeconomically sounder banking
system is not necessarily more conducive to economic
development. Greater macroeconomic effectiveness
would serve this purpose only if foreign banks were
indeed helping to improve (or mitigate) bad credit
conditions in other words, if they improved the existing
supply, cost and maturity conditions of financing. Despite
constraints in relation to the availability of data and the
period of analysis, an attempt will be made to evaluate
this in the present section.
(a) Foreign banks and the aggregate supply of
credit
The late 1990s, when international banks
strengthened their position in Latin America, were
particularly inhospitable years for the expansion of
banking activities as a result of the slower growth and
instability that followed in the wake of the Asian crisis.
Powerful external shocks (financial problems and a
loss of trade momentum), compounded by the
corresponding domestic responses, nearly always
resulted in monetary tightening. Given the wider
spreads and higher capital costs that such policies
usually entail, a vicious circle tends to be generated
in terms of credit risk (because of greater insolvency)
and the attitude taken by the banks, which necessarily
become more conservative. In some countries, such
as Argentina and Ecuador, the period was also
characterized by banking crises.
It is no surprise, therefore, that in many Latin
American countries the process of credit deepening
(extension of higher volumes to broader sectors of the
population) has stalled since 1997. As shown in figure
III.8, which considers seven countries, in all of them
except Chile the ratio of private credit to GDP was lower
in 2001 than it had been in 1998, when it was already
quite low.
Figure III.8
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): RATIO OF CREDIT TO GDP,
1991-2001
(Percentages)
Source: ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, on the basis of International Monetary Fund (IMF), International
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In fact, the credit standstill seems even more
troubling in view of the average interest rates being
charged on loans in those countries (see table III.16),
because part of the variation in loans is accounted for by
the renewal of existing credit (rollover). A situation where
the rate of variation in loans is less than the average
interest rate charged in the system could suggest that the
supply of credit has effectively contracted; in other words,
the volume being rolled over does not include the
payment needed for debt service, so the effective
availability of financing for expenditure is
correspondingly less. In 2001 there were signs of this
phenomenon in several countries of the region (see
ECLAC, 2002).
Table III.16
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): VARIATION IN LENDING TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN CONSTANT 1998
VALUES, AND REAL INTEREST RATES, 1997-2001
(Percentages)
Real variation in credit Real interest rates on loans
1997-2000 2000-2001 1997-2000 2000 2001
Argentina 1.4 -17.6 11.0 12.7 29.0
Brazil 11.4 14.4 66.6 48.1 46.4
Chile 6.8 9.1 11.0 9.7 9.5
Colombia -1.5 12.9 16.1 9.5 11.9
Mexico -4.2 -7.5 9.6 9.4 8.6
Peru 4.2 -2.6 23.8 23.2 21.4
Venezuela 0.2 26.4 6.1 11.2 9.0
Source: ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, on the basis of International Monetary Fund (IMF), International
Financial Statistics, Washington, D.C., June 2002.
In some countries the situation is particularly
alarming. In Mexico, for example, the real supply of
credit has fallen almost continuously since the "tequila"
crisis of 1994, dropping from 35% of GDP in that year
to about 10% in 2001, as the banks have been engaged
in an ongoing process of writing off the large number of
impaired loans (see IMF, 2001, pp. 29-45). A substantial
proportion of the financing for domestic activity in
Mexico consists of supplier credits and external loans.
Moreover, the restructuring of the banking system led to
the vigorous entry of foreign banks (see box III.6), with
the result that foreign banks now have a bigger share of
the market in Mexico than in any other country of the
region. Even so, given the negative impact of the
retrenchment in the United States economy, bank credit
has not yet shown signs of recovery.
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The Mexican banking sector was
reprivatized in the early 1990s, in a
process that involved Mexican
shareholders. As foreign ownership of
banks was limited by law to no more
than 20% at that time, transnational
financial corporations chose to
maintain a presence exclusively
through representation offices. The new
owners of the banks came from the
management of Mexican stock market
firms, and had virtually no experience
in lending and risk analysis. This,
combined with regulatory and
supervisory shortcomings, magnified
the financial crisis and economic
recession that befell the country in late
1994 and 1995.
The need to recapitalize the banking
system, together with the signing of
NAFTA, prompted major institutional
changes in the Mexican financial
system, including the removal of
obstacles to the entry of foreign banks.
By signing NAFTA, Mexico had
undertaken to open up the financial
sector to international competition
(albeit in different ways for different
intermediaries), and this meant
allowing participation by foreign capital
in local banking institutions. The
process occurred in two stages: up to
1998, foreign ownership of a bank's
Box III.6
FOREIGN BANKS DOMINATE THE MEXICAN BANKING SYSTEM,
BUT CREDIT FAILS TO RECOVER
equity was limited to 50%, but the limit
was completely lifted thereafter, fully
liberalizing the sector.
This liberalization occurred as part of
an overall restructuring of the banking
sector, which had been severely
weakened by the "tequila" crisis and by
a massive non-performing portfolio. To
promote capitalization of the banking
sector, the State took over the non-
performing portfolio, amounting to some
US$ 120 billion. This was managed by
the Bank Savings Protection Fund
(FOBAPROA), which later became the
Bank Savings Protection Institute
(IPAB). The fund was recognized as
public debt guaranteed by the State, on
which the latter has paid interest on the
order of 40% a year up to the present
time –first to local banks and then to
foreign ones.
The sale of local banks to foreign banks
involved large sums of money. In 2000,
BBVA paid US$ 1.75 billion to acquire
Bancomer. Its rival SCH purchased
Serfin for US$ 1.56 billion in 2001, and
Citigroup paid a colossal US$ 12.5
billion for Banco Nacional de México
(BANAMEX). The final entrant, HSBC
Holdings, paid US$ 1.14 billion in
August 2002 for the Bital financial
group, the fourth-largest player in the
Mexican financial system. As these
amounts went straight into the hands of
the banks' former shareholders, the
process did nothing to reduce the banks'
debt, which the State had to assume in
order to bail out the system.
Foreign banks have had access to
cheaper funds than local banks, but this
has not resulted in a credit expansion or
lower costs for Mexican firms. The fact
that domestic banks have been acquired
by foreign ones has not altered their
oligopolistic position or their risk
aversion, and they continue mainly to
live off the high yields obtained on risk-
free assets such as public bonds. This
means that their rent-seeking
relationship with the State has not
changed.
The banks' profits grew rapidly following
their acquisition by foreign institutions
(see figures III.9 and III.10). Although the
yield on public bonds has fallen sharply
(in 2002 it dropped below 10%), the
banks, instead of lending to firms or
families, have raised their service
commissions to shore up their
profitability. Their unwillingness to
expand credit is based on their fear of
bankruptcies and their doubts that
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The situation in Argentina was highly unsatisfactory
even before the upheaval of 2001. Lending began to stall
in the period between the Asian and Russian crises, and
the situation worsened in the ensuing years. Between
2000 and 2001 lending fell by nearly 18%, and the system
collapsed completely following the abolition of the
convertibility regime and the implementation of the freeze
on bank deposits known as the “corralito” (little fence).
In general, the credit standstill is directly related to
the more cautious attitude being taken by banks,
especially foreign ones. Viewed in the light of the
portfolio distribution of banks in the region, the credit
crunch is not surprising: in three countries (Argentina,
Brazil and Chile), there has been a reduction in the share
of loans in total bank assets, local and foreign alike,
reflecting the fact that banks have sought lower-risk
assets, such as government bonds. In Mexico and
Colombia, loans declined in relation to total assets in
local banks, but not in their foreign counterparts.
(b) Spreads and the cost of credit
With regard to bank intermediation, although
spreads narrowed between 1997 and 2002 in nearly all
the Latin American countries (see table III.17), spreads
have remained large, resulting in average interest rates
that are far above international levels. In Brazil, for
example, spreads remain above 30%, with lending rates
of over 40%, even though the Central Bank has
implemented an explicit policy since 1999 to reduce
spreads through lower compulsory reserve requirements
and measures to increase competitiveness and
transparency, among others. Despite the significant
increase in foreign-bank participation in the region, only
two of the seven countries analysed (Chile and
Venezuela) had spreads of 6% or less in 2002, but even
this was far above the average in OECD and Asian
countries (see table III.17).
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Table III.17
LATIN AMERICA (15 COUNTRIES): BANK INTERMEDIATION SPREADS, 1997-2002
(Percentages)
Deposit rates Spreads Lending rates
1997 2002 1997 2002 1997 2002
Argentina 7.0 40.9 2.1 10.8 9.2 56.2
Bolivia 14.7 9.3 30.8 10.5 50.1 20.8
Brazil 24.4 18.6 43.3 36.2 78.2 61.5
Chile 12.0 3.9 3.3 3.8 15.7 7.9
Colombia 24.1 9.2 8.1 6.8 34.2 16.5
Costa Rica 13.0 11.3 8.4 13.5 22.5 26.3
Ecuador 28.1 5.4 11.7 9.2 43.0 15.1
Guatemala 5.8 7.0 12.1 9.3 18.6 16.9
Honduras 21.3 14.1 8.9 7.7 32.1 22.9
Mexico 14.7 2.9 8.6 6.3 24.5 9.3
Panama 7.0 5.0 3.4 5.2 10.6 10.5
Paraguay 13.0 22.5 13.1 9.4 27.8 34.0
Peru 15.0 4.1 13.0 10.2 30.0 14.7
Uruguay 19.6 33.5 43.3 64.9 71.6 120.1
Venezuela 14.7 29.3 7.8 5.9 23.7 36.9
Simple average
Latin America 15.6 14.5 14.5 14.0 32.8 31.3
Weighted average
Latin America 18.6 14.6 21.6 18.4 45.0 36.3
Simple average OECDa 0.1 3.7 3.8
Simple average Asiab 1.9 3.5 5.4
Source: ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, on the basis of International Monetary Fund (IMF) International
Financial Statistics, Washington, D.C., June 2002.
a 
 Sample consists of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and United States.
b
  Sample consists of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand.
Except in the case of Brazil, there are no available
data that distinguish between foreign and local banks in
terms of spreads, although there are signs that they are
quite similar. In Brazil, the spreads of local and foreign
banks not only are very similar, but also follow the same
trend over time.
While it is significant that spreads have tended to
narrow in recent years, their magnitude is still out of
proportion to changes in costs as a result of portfolio
risk. One indicator of this –the ratio between provisions
for doubtful loans and non-performing loans– rose only
slightly (by 0.5 percentage points, on average) between
1997 and 2001, despite the Argentine crisis and its
potential for spreading contagion.
Table III.18
LATIN AMERICA: RATIO BETWEEN PROVISIONS FOR DOUBTFUL LOANS AND
NON-PERFORMING LOANS, 1997-2001
(Percentages)
Local banks Foreign banks
1997-2001 1997 2001 1997-2001 1997 2001
Argentina 2.7 0.7 4.2 1.9 0.8 5.1
Brazil 1.4 1.7 0.7 1.6 1.8 0.6
Chile 2.1 2.7 1.8 2.7 2.9 1.6
Colombia 0.8 0.5 2.1 1.0 0.5 1.8
Mexico 1.8 1.3 2.8 2.5 1.0 1.6
Peru 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.0 1.4
Venezuela 1.7 2.5 1.4 1.8 2.0 -
Average for
Latin America 1.7 1.5 2.0 1.8 1.4 2.0
Source: ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, on the basis of Latin Banking Guide & Directory (www.latinfinance.com),
2002.
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To summarize, the entry of foreign banks has not
had a significant effect on the cost of capital, since, in all
banks, this cost responds more to the macroeconomic
climate than to differences in cost management. Foreign
banks seem to be adapting to regional circumstances
rather than imposing their own dynamic on the
determination of capital costs.
(c) Stability of the banking sector
In evaluating the impact of foreign banks on the
macroeconomic effectiveness of the region's banking
systems, it is also useful to employ a different criterion,
namely the variable represented by stability. Before the
arrival of foreign banks, much was said about their
probable benefits in terms of making the local financial
system less fragile. At least three arguments were
deployed: (i) foreign banks would have more
sophisticated risk-management systems as a result of the
more rigorous supervision in force in their countries of
origin; (ii) they would be less vulnerable to domestic
cycles in the region because their effective exposure to
them would be relatively small in relation to their broad
global diversification; and (iii) local subsidiaries of
foreign banks could always rely on their parent
companies in the event of abrupt swings in liquidity.
Considering only indicators of risk management and
provision against losses, it is clear that the foreign banks
have helped to create a sounder banking system.
Nonetheless, as Stallings and Studart (2001) argue, the
violent macroeconomic shocks of recent years rendered
even the most sophisticated monitoring and risk
management systems ineffective. In fact, in highly
unstable macroeconomic situations, such systems may
even aggravate risk, given their well-known procyclical
properties.20 Accordingly, it is not surprising that foreign
banks, which generally have more sophisticated (and
more conservative) risk evaluation systems than their
local counterparts, have reacted much more strongly than
the latter to economic cycles.
As regards the argument that the global
diversification of foreign banks has a positive effect on
stability, the other side of the coin is that these banks are
much more sensitive than local ones to expectation
shocks originating in the advanced economies. For this
reason, to the extent that transnational banks have
increased their exposure to the region's economies (BIS,
2000), their local subsidiaries have adopted an
increasingly cautious stance.
Lastly, in response to the argument that foreign banks
can count on unconditional support from their parent
companies at times of liquidity loss, two comments need
to be made. Firstly, the parent company's capacity to
support its subsidiaries is compromised by the fact that
it has to maintain, in its country of origin, a level of capital
compatible with the weighted risk of its assets. This is
because episodes of financial crisis in an emerging
country are usually reflected in its "country-risk" rating,
and any contribution from the parent company has to
represent an expansion of its global capital. As seen
recently in the Argentine crisis, this severely restricts the
ability of parent companies to supply funds at times of
major macroeconomic uncertainty and/or liquidity crisis
in emerging economies.
Secondly, there are provisions in financial system
regulations that do not allow banks to support the liquidity
of an ailing subsidiary under certain circumstances. For
example, United States legislation, provides that a bank
is not required to repay any deposit made in a foreign
branch of the bank if the branch cannot do so due to: (i)
an act of war, insurrection or civil strife; or (ii) an action
by the government of the host country, unless the bank
has expressly agreed in writing to repay the deposit under
those circumstances. This law was added to existing
legislation in 1994, after Citibank was taken to court by
depositors in the Philippines and Vietnam and lost the
respective cases.
In short, the banking system's macroeconomic
effectiveness has been profoundly impaired by the current
macroeconomic climate, which is extremely
unfavourable for banking activity. This climate has given
rise to a more cautious attitude on the part of the banks,
which, in turn, has led to a credit standstill, the
maintenance of very large spreads and a shortening of
loan maturities. In order to avoid greater losses as a result
of macroeconomic instability in the region (especially
in countries that have suffered currency crises similar to
that of Argentina), foreign banks have adopted a more
conservative stance, as shown by their maintenance of
high liquidity and, therefore, relatively low lending levels.
20 As Borio, Farfine and Lowe (2001) show, the banking system's procyclical nature stems from the fact that most risk evaluation systems
work with a time horizon that is too short to allow them to accurately determine default risks and correctly value the financial and real
assets used as collateral. Accordingly, at times of economic retrenchment, risk indicators tend to rise very sharply, while the value of assets
posted in guarantee declines. As a result of these two movements, the banking system as a whole tends to behave more cautiously, giving
rise to a contraction in credit or a slowdown in its growth, which, in turn, ultimately generates a vicious circle. As the macroeconomic
situation becomes more volatile, credit risk is evaluated more cautiously, so that the system's procyclical nature is intensified.
Foreign investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2002 143
E. CONCLUSIONS
The major presence of transnational banks in Latin
America in the 1990s was due partly to their strategy of
seeking markets throughout the world and partly to
changes in the region's economic climate and institutional
context. Regional penetration has produced costs and
benefits for both investor banks and the financial systems
concerned.
The macroeconomic stability prevailing in the region
in the first half of the 1990s, together with low rates of
inflation and first-generation reforms, especially in the
financial system and the capital market, attracted banks
that needed to generate economies of scale and grow on
a global basis. In addition, the "tequila" crisis and its
contagion to several of the region's countries forced
governments to tighten regulation and supervision. This
led to the establishment of regulatory frameworks that
were similar to those existing in developed countries,
thereby facilitating dialogue between the authorities and
foreign banks.
Governments believed the entry of foreign banks
would afford an opportunity to capitalize the system and,
at the same time, would act as a bulwark against systemic
risk. Foreign banks were thought to be better equipped
than local ones to face future crises or contagion
processes because they had portfolios that were
diversified across different regions and continents,
together with strong capital support from the parent
companies. They would also give greater security to
depositors, who would flock to them in a "flight to
quality" in times of crisis. Of course, technological
advances, both in management and in dealing with risk,
were also considered important for enhancing the
efficiency of the region's financial system.
This liberalization process coincided with the
globalization on which transnational banks were already
embarked, under either universalization or investment-
banking strategies. Although the regional capital market
was extremely underdeveloped, the reform and
privatization process of the 1990s lured transnational
financial firms, which created a demand for new products
(such as securitized instruments and derivatives). In
addition, pension-system reforms generated excellent
profit opportunities in fund management.
This new climate encouraged the entry of foreign
banks, which came to dominate the region's financial
markets within the short span of five years. The global
institutions that expanded in the region were not those
that had historical roots there, however. A notable feature
of the process was the scant interest shown by United
States banks in entering the region –in contrast to
European banks, particularly Spanish ones. Several
factors help explain this: firstly, the consolidation process
in which the United States banking system was engaged;
secondly, the emphasis placed on expansion strategies
in the European Union; and thirdly, the uncertainty
caused by the region's historical instability. This
contrasted with the Spanish banks' urgent need to expand
in order to strengthen their competitive capacity, take
advantage of economies of scale and defend themselves
against hostile attacks from rival banks. Entry barriers
prevented them from achieving this in Europe, but Latin
America gave them the opportunity they needed.
Nonetheless, the aggressive entry of Spanish banks
and the success of their incursions into new market
segments that had not yet been explored by the local
banking system encouraged banks from the United States,
especially Citigroup, to expand their participation in the
region. This process began in 2001 with the acquisition
of BANAMEX, one of Mexico's largest banks.
By early 2002, three large foreign players –SCH,
BBVA and Citigroup– were operating in the medium-
sized and large countries of the region, covering all
segments of the financial market by providing universal
services, and jointly accounting for 64% of foreign-bank
activity in Latin America. The remaining firms were
concentrated solely in large markets, or else operated
exclusively in the corporate segment and the capital
market.
Regional expansion yielded numerous benefits for
foreign banks, but it also entailed costs. In terms of
benefits, up until 2001, when the Argentine crisis broke
out, foreign banks grew steadily and gained a significant
share of local banking systems, which ranged from 34%
in Colombia to 90% in Mexico in 2001. A decade earlier,
Chile had been the country with the greatest foreign
participation, which, however, had accounted for less than
20% of the market at that time. In addition, the
profitability of foreign banks' activities in the region,
whether measured by the return on assets or the return
on equity, grew steadily and in some cases exceeded the
bank's overall profitability. At the same time, foreign
banks expanded their participation in the capital market,
especially in pension fund management, one of the most
attractive businesses for financial institutions.
Costs arose from various sources, including the
region's instability and its vulnerability to external shocks
and currency crises. Moreover, in many cases, notably
that of Brazil, foreign banks underestimated the local
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competition. The Argentine crisis clearly marked a
turning point in foreign banks' expansion strategy,
although the cost of this crisis for each bank depended
on the importance of Latin America, and particularly
Argentina, in its global business. At one extreme were
the Spanish banks, whose interests in the region
represented between 26% and 29% of their total assets;
at the other were banks that only expanded in the treasury
management or corporate banking segments; and in the
middle was Citigroup, whose global diversification
prevented it from being seriously affected by the
deterioration in regional conditions, even though its
interests in the region amounted to a not insignificant
7% of its total assets.
Excluding losses in Argentina, which cannot be
evaluated as yet, the deterioration in regional conditions
has had a series of consequences for foreign banks, which
can be measured by a number of factors. In the first place,
there was a drop in profitability, although it was only
significant in banks that had major investments in
Argentina and little regional diversification. Secondly,
future business prospects changed drastically; as
expectations of rapid growth faded and exchange rates
became more volatile, projections of future profitability
slumped. This effect was compounded by political
instability in several countries of the region. Lastly,
Argentina's difficulties led to a breakdown in the rules
of the game in that country and raised the spectre of
regional contagion, all of which served to heighten
investment risk.
This prompted banks to exercise much more caution
in taking decisions or, in extreme cases -particularly those
of banks without major investments in the region- to pull
out of Latin America entirely. Nonetheless, the large
investors, especially SCH, BBVA and Citigroup, maintain
a long-term vision whose prospects have persuaded them
to defend the market positions they have gained thus far
by rationalizing spending (for which purpose, in
particular, they have pressed ahead in implementing
regional technological platforms) and awaiting the
consolidation and greater concentration of the regional
banking system. All of this reflects their conviction that
expansion in Latin America, crises notwithstanding, has
been positive for their global growth strategy.
The analysis also shows that, while foreign banks
do not differ significantly from local ones in terms of
operational efficiency, they do act more cautiously in
evaluating and managing risk. Nonetheless, the fact that
there is no statistically significant efficiency gap between
local and foreign banks does not mean that the latter have
had no positive impact in the region. Clearly, the
competition generated by the entry of foreign banks has
galvanized efforts by local banks to cut costs and enhance
profitability in order to protect themselves from being
driven out of the market. In fact, despite the oligopolistic
nature of the industry, competition nowadays between
large local banks and foreign ones is very strong. An
interesting feature of the financial sector is that all
competitors have access to state-of-the-art technology.
Because it is relatively cheap, it is not exclusive to foreign
banks, thanks to the progress made in information and
communication technology, which the financial system
uses particularly intensively. Nonetheless, in all but a few
countries –Chile, for example– the cost reduction
generated by technological progress has not been passed
on in the form of cheaper financial services for either
firms or individuals. Worse still, it has not given firms
easier access to credit.
Accordingly, the positive outcome for the region in
terms of microeconomic efficiency stands in contrast to
the macroeconomic impact –i.e., the effectiveness of
foreign-bank participation in the system–, as measured
by the conditions under which credit is extended, the
availability of business financing and the stability of the
system. From this analysis, it may be concluded that
foreign banks have not had a significant effect in this
regard: they are more cautious than their local
counterparts when extending credit, and their response
to crises is clearly procyclical, all of which intensifies
the effects of monetary tightening. Despite these banks'
managerial efficiency, interest-rate spreads narrowed in
only four of the seven countries analysed, and even in
those four they remained extremely high -far above those
in Asia and, of course, those in the OECD countries.
Spreads have reacted more to the macroeconomic
environment than to differences in cost management, and
foreign banks seem to be adapting to regional
circumstances in this regard, rather than imposing their
own dynamic on the processes that determine the cost of
capital.
Lastly, in terms of reactions to systemic crises, the
experience of recent years has shown that the behaviour
of transnational corporations towards their subsidiaries
and branches depends on a number of factors: the
institutional framework in the corporation's country of
origin, the institutional framework in the host country
and the steps taken by local authorities to deal with crises.
In practice, the parent companies of foreign banks cannot
be considered lenders of last resort; their behaviour in
times of crisis has depended on the nature of the problems
faced by banks in the host country and the type of
establishment in question.
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Table III.A.1
THE 50 LARGEST BANKS IN LATIN AMERICA, RANKED BY ASSETS, 2001
(Percentages)






  1 BANCO DO BRASIL Brazil State 0.7 12.4 5.6
  2 BRADESCO Brazil Local private 2.0 22.2 3.9
  3 BANCOMER BBVA Mexico Foreign private 1.4 40.8 4.8
  4 CAIXA ECONÓMICA FEDERAL Brazil State -4.6 -120.5 12.5
  5 BANAMEX CITIBANK Mexico Foreign private 0.1 3.3 5.5
  6 ITÁU Brazil Local private 2.9 31.5 5.0
  7 SANTANDER/(SCH) Chile Foreign private 0.7 25.5 1.4
  8 UNIBANCO Brazil Local private 1.7 16.0 5.9
  9 NACIÓN Argentina State -0.2 -1.9 27.7
10 SERFIN SANTANDER Mexico Foreign private 2.4 30.2 0.7
11 BITAL Mexico Foreign private 0.3 27.3 7.3
12 SANTIAGO Chile Foreign private 1.3 28.3 1.4
13 REAL ABN-AMRO Brazil Foreign private 2.5 20.8 4.3
14 BANCOESTADO Chile State 0.4 11.0 1.7
15 PROVINCIA DE BUENOS AIRES Argentina State 0.1 0.9 0.4
16 SANTANDER BANESPA Brazil Foreign private 3.7 36.4 15.0
17 SAFRA Brazil Local private 1.4 22.2 2.5
18 J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK Chile Foreign private 0.0 0.7 …
19 SANTANDER MEXICANO Mexico Foreign private 1.4 15.3 0.5
20 MERCANTIL DEL NORTE (BANORTE) Mexico Local private 0.5 9.2 3.1
21 GALICIA Y BUENOS AIRES Argentina Foreign private 1.2 9.1 6.8
22 CHILE Chile Local private 1.2 27.9 2.4
23 SANTANDER BRASIL Brazil Foreign private -0.3 -5.1 5.7
24 BANKBOSTON Chile Foreign private 0.1 8.5 …
25 HSBC Brazil Foreign private 0.4 8.5 9.6
26 CITIBANK N.A Brazil Foreign private 2.7 21.1 3.9
27 NOSSA CAIXA Brazil State 1.4 22.5 5.8
28 RÍO DE LA PLATA, SANTANDER Argentina Foreign private -0.1 -1.0 2.4
29 SCOTIABANK INVERLAT Mexico Foreign private 0.7 22.7 9.8
30 BCI Chile Local private 0.9 23.8 1.5
31 CITIBANK Chile Foreign private 0.6 15.1 …
32 FRANCÉS BBVA Argentina Foreign private -0.1 -0.9 4.0
33 SUDAMERIS Brazil Foreign private 0.9 13.9 8.6
34 CITIBANK S.A. Brazil Foreign private 0.8 10.8 1.1
35 CRÉDITO NACIONAL Brazil Local private 1.6 22.2 …
36 BANKBOSTON Argentina Foreign private -0.3 -3.6 8.2
37 CITIBANK Argentina Foreign private 0.0 0.4 16.2
38 A. EDWARDS Chile Local private 0.2 4.4 …
39 BBA-CREDINTANSTALT Brazil Local private 1.3 16.3 1.9
40 BANKBOSTON S.A Brazil Foreign private 3.5 36.6 2.6
41 BLADEX Panama Local private 0.0 0.4 8.9
42 BBVA Brazil Foreign private 0.2 2.4 3.6
43 INBURSA Mexico Local private 2.2 9.1 2.4
44 BBVA (BHIF) Chile Foreign private 0.4 6.5 2.1
45 VOTORANTIM Brazil Local private 1.4 24.8 0.0
46 HSBC Argentina Foreign private -0.7 -10.6 12.5
47 BANCO DE CRÉDITO Peru Local private 1.1 9.8 7.2
48 ABN AMRO Chile Foreign private 0.5 28.4 …
49 BANKBOSTON N.A Brazil Foreign private 1.8 37.9 0.8
50 BANCO DO NORDESTE, BNB Brazil State -24.3 -247.1 39.2
Source: ECLAC,  Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies,  on the basis of Latin Trade magazine,  September 2002 (figures as
of 31 December 2001),  as regards the ratio between profits and assets and between profits and equity; and on the basis of
América Economía magazine,  1-14 November 2002 (data as of June 2002),  as regards the ratio between non-performing
loans and the total loan portfolio.
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 Table III.A.2
FOREIGN BANK SHARE OF THE LEADING LATIN AMERICAN FINANCIAL MARKETS, 2001
(Percentages)
CITIBANK SANTANDER BBVA SCOTIABANK FLEET- HSBC ABN AMRO OTHER TOTALBOSTON SUDAMERIS FOREIGN
SHARE OF TOTAL FINANCIAL ASSETS
Argentina 6.2 8.2 7.0 2.6 7.6 4.3 1.6 23.9 61.3
Brazil 2.0 3.8 2.3 1.5 3.0 3.6 0.1 32.2 48.5
Chile 5.1 11.6 4.3 2.3 6.2 0.5 2.4 0.6 29.3 62.3
Colombia 5.0 4.2 7.5 1.2 1.2 1.2 13.3 33.6
Mexico 25.5 14.6 25.9 2.7 0.8 0.3 0.0 20.1 90.0
Peru 3.9 6.7 14.7 3.1 1.6 21.4 9.6 61.0
Venezuela 3.0 22.3 14.4 3.1 15.9 58.7
Average
(7 countries) 7.3 10.2 10.9 2.8 3.2 2.0 1.8 5.0 20.6 63.6
SHARE OF TOTAL LOANS
Argentina 6.2 8.3 4.3 2.2 5.8 0.0 1.8 14.3 42.8
Brazil 1.2 2.5 1.2 1.8 2.5 4.0 2.0 9.3 24.6
Chile 3.9 17.8 3.7 3.4 1.7 0.2 0.9 0.3 4.2 36.0
Colombia 5.5 0.0 6.2 0.7 0.9 1.4 4.8 19.6
Mexico 25.0 14.5 13.7 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.0 1.7 55.8
Peru 4.4 7.4 5.5 1.2 1.9 9.5 8.0 37.9
Venezuela 5.0 17.0 9.5 1.2 5.3 37.9
Average
(7 countries) 7.3 9.6 6.3 1.7 2.0 0.7 1.5 3.0 6.8 39.0
SHARE OF TOTAL DEPOSITS
Argentina 5.0 8.6 5.9 2.1 5.7 3.6 2.0 10.0 42.8
Brazil 0.0 3.0 1.2 0.0 2.8 2.4 1.3 5.9 16.5
Chile 3.8 18.2 3.2 3.2 1.8 0.2 0.9 0.4 7.8 39.6
Colombia 4.4 2.0 6.1 0.6 0.9 0.6 2.5 17.1
Mexico 25.7 14.5 14.1 0.3 0.9 0.3 0.0 2.5 58.4
Peru 3.6 5.7 7.9 0.7 1.0 9.7 8.62 37.2
Venezuela 0.0 18.8 9.1 1.0 7.5 36.4
Average
(7 countries) 6.1 10.1 6.3 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.1 2.8 6.3 37.6
SHARE OF TOTAL CAPITAL
Argentina 4.7 7.3 4.5 1.1 4.6 2.4 1.4 14.2 40.3
Brazil 0.7 5.8 0.8 0.5 1.7 0.4 1.4 18.5 29.8
Chile 6.6 16.8 0.0 2.6 2.1 0.8 2.5 0.6 14.4 46.4
Colombia 5.9 2.1 7.5 0.9 0.8 0.7 3.7 21.5
Mexico 31.5 9.8 12.9 3.6 0.5 0.5 0.0 4.7 63.5
Peru 0.5 6.4 5.3 0.7 1.3 10.1 12.1 36.4
Venezuela 3.8 22.1 8.2 0.9 6.3 41.3
Average
(7 countries) 7.7 10.0 5.6 1.8 1.2 0.7 1.0 2.8 10.6 41.3
Source: Salomon Smith Barney, Foreign Financial Institutions in Latin America,  2001 Update,  New York,  November 2001.
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Table III.A.3
MAIN ACQUISITIONS IN THE LATIN AMERICAN FINANCIAL SECTOR
(Percentages and millions of dollars)
Date Bank acquired Country % Amount
ABN AMRO Bank, Netherlands
1998 Banco Real Brazil 40 2 100
1998 Banco Mercantil de Pernambuco Brazil 100 153.6
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA), Spain
2002 Grupo Financiero Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Bancomer (BBVA Bancomer) Mexico 3 216
2002 BBVA Banco Uruguay (BBVA Banco Francés Uruguay) Uruguay 60 55
2001 Grupo Financiero Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Bancomer (BBVA Bancomer) Mexico 7 546
2001 BBVA Banco Ganadero Colombia 14.4 70
2001 Grupo Financiero Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Bancomer (BBVA Bancomer) Mexico 9 548
2000 Grupo Financiero Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Bancomer (BBVA Bancomer) Mexico 32.2 1 850
1999 CorpBanca Argentina Argentina 100 84
1998 BBV Excel Económico Brazil 100 878
1998 BBVA Banco BHIF Chile 55.52 350
1998 BBVA Banco Ganadero Colombia 15 177
1998 Banco Providencial SAICA Venezuela 100 103.2
1997 Banco de Crédito Argentino Argentina 72 560
1996 BBVA Banco Francés Argentina 30 350
1995 BBVA-Probursa Mexico 47.9 350
1993 BBVA-Probursa Mexico 10 53
1992 BBVA-Probursa Mexico 10 71
Banco Santander Central Hispano (SCH), Spain
2002 Grupo Financiero Bital Mexico 4.7 ...
2002 Banco Santiago Chile 35.45 682
2002 Grupo Financiero Bital Mexico 13.3 85
2001 Banco do Estado de São Paulo S.A. (BANESPA) Brazil 63.72 1 160.7
2000 Banco Caracas Venezuela 27.09 116
2000 Banco Caracas Venezuela 66 200
2000 Conglomerado Financiero Meridional Brazil 97 1 000
2000 Banco Santander Mexicano Mexico 16 76
2000 Banco Río de la Plata Argentina 28.2 975
2000 Grupo Financiero Serfin Mexico 100 1 560
2000 Banco do Estado de São Paulo S.A. (BANESPA) Brazil 30 3 580.5
1999 Banco Santiago Chile 21.75 600
1999 Banco Tornquist Argentina 50 ...
1999 Banco de Asunción Paraguay 38.5 ...
1999 O'Higgins Central Hispano Chile 100 600
1999 Banco del Sur (Bancosur) Peru 44 ...
1998 Banco Noroeste S.A. Brazil 76 564
1998 Banco Santander Brasil (formerly Banco Geral do Comercio) Brazil 50 216
1998 Banco Santa Cruz Bolivia 90 180
1998 Banco Río de la Plata Argentina 16 180
1998 Banco de Galicia y Buenos Aires S.A. Argentina 9.97 100
1998 Banco Santander Chile Chile 12 168
1997 Banco Río de la Plata Argentina 35 656
1997 Banco Santander Chile Chile 3.5 62
1997 Banco Santander Brasil (formerly Banco Geral do Comercio) Brazil 50 150
1997 Banco Santander Colombia (formerly Bancoquia) Colombia 60 155
1996 Banco Santander Chile Chile 24.7 438
1996 Banco del Sur (Bancosur) Peru 44 ...
Banco Sudameris, France
1999 Banco Wiese Sudameris Perú Peru 64.8 180
1998 Banco America do Sul Brazil 26.8 191
BankBoston Corp., United States
1997 Deutsche Bank Argentina S.A. Argentina 100 255
Scotiabank, Canada
2001 Scotiabank (formerly Sudamericano) Chile 0.03 ...
2000 Scotiabank (formerly Sudamericano) Chile 9.9 28
2000 Scotiabank (formerly Sudamericano) Chile 16.4 ...
2000 Scotiabank (formerly Sudamericano) Chile 11.6 ...
2000 Grupo Financiero Scotiabank Inverlat Mexico 45 40
1999 Scotiabank (formerly Sudamericano) Chile 33 116
1998 Banco del Caribe Venezuela 26.6 87.9
1997 Banco Sudamericano Peru 100 14.6
Citibank, United States
2001 Grupo Financiero Banamex Accival (Banacci) Mexico 100 12 500
2000 Afore Garante Mexico 9 33
2000 Afore Garante Mexico 51 179
1998 Banco Confia Mexico 100 199
Crédit Suisse First Boston, United States
1998 CSFB Garantia (formerly Banco de Investimentos Garantia) Brazil 100 675
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. Holdings, United Kingdom
2000 Chase Manhattan Bank Panamá Panama 100 ...
1997 HSBC Brasil Multiplo Brazil 100 1 000




BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA (BBVA): PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL AFFILIATES
IN LATIN AMERICA, 2001
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Country Firm Sector Partners Ownership Year of
Direct Indirect Total  entry
BBVA Banco Banking ... 67.0 0.0 67.0 1996
Francés
AFPJ Consolidar Pensions and BBVA Banco 45.9 35.6 81.5
insurance Francés
CorpBanca Banking Chase Manhattan 90.0 0.0 90.0 1999
Argentina
Banco Exterior Banking ... 100.0 ... 100.0
de América
Banco de Crédito Banking ... 72.0 0.0 72.0
Argentino
Previsión BBVA Pensions and ... 72.0 0.0 72.0
Bolivia insurance
Futuro de Bolivia Pensions and ... 57.0 0.0 57.0
insurance
Brazil BBVA Brasil Banking ... 100.0 0.0 100.0
BBVA Banco BHIF Banking Grupo Said-Massú 55.5 0.0 55.5
(30%)
Chile AFP Provida Pensions and ... 49.8 0.0 49.8
insurance
Colombia Banco Ganadero Banking ... 99.5 0.0 99.5 1996
AFP Porvenir Pensions and AFP Provida (20%) 0 10.0 10.0
insurance
Mexico BBVA Probursa Banking ... 67.9 0.0 67.9 1995BBVA Bancomer Banking BBV Probursa (41%); 7.0 28.0 35.0 2000
State (13%)
BBVA Banco Banking ... 50.0 0.0 50.0 1995
ContinentalPeru AFP Horizonte Pensions and AFP Provida (16%); 24.8 35.1 59.9
insurance Banco Continental
(54%)
Puerto Rico BBVA Puerto Rico Banking ... 100.0 0.0 100.0 ...
BBVA Banco Banking ... 100.0 0.0 100.0 1995
Uruguay Uruguay
(Banco Francés)
Venezuela Banco Provincial Banking ... 53.4 0.0 53.4 1997
Previsión Pensions and ... 100.0 0.0 100.0
insurance
El Salvador Porvenir Pensions and ... 100.0 0.0 100.0
insurance
Máxima Pensions and ... 100.0 0.0 100.0
insurance
Ecuador AFP Génesis Pensions and AFP Provida (100%) 0.0 49.0 49.0
insurance
Source: ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, on the basis of Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA), Informe
anual 2001 (www.bbva.es), 2002; and Alvaro Calderón Hoffmann and Ramón Casilda Béjar, "The Spanish banks' strategies
in Latin America", CEPAL Review, No. 70 (LC/G.2095-P), Santiago, Chile, April 2000.
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 Table III.A.5
BANCO SANTANDER CENTRAL HISPANO (SCH): PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL AFFILIATES
IN LATIN AMERICA, 2001
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Country Firm Sector Partners
Ownership Year of
Direct Indirect Total entry
Banco Tornquist Banking Banco Río de la Plata 0.0 97.8 97.8
(100%)
Banco Río de la Plata Banking ... 97.7 0.0 97.7 1997
Argentina AFJP Orígenes Banking ... 49.0 0.0 49.0 ...
Banco de Galicia y Banking Grupo Financiero Galicia 10.0 0.0 10.0 1998
Buenos Aires (90%)
AFJP Previnter Pensions and AFJP Orígenes (55%);
insurance BankBoston (45%) 0.0 27.0 27.0 ...
Bolivia Banco Santa Cruz Banking ... 90.0 0.0 90.0 1998
BANESPA Banking ... 97.1 0.0 97.1 2000
Banco Santander Brasil Banking ... 100.0 0.0 100.0 1997
Banco Noroeste Banking Banco Santander Brasil 0.0 76.0 76.0
(100%)
Brazil Conglomerado Finan. Banking Banco Santander Brasil
Meridional (97%) 0.0 97.0 97.0
Banco Santander Chile Banking ... 90.2 0.0 90.2
Banco Santiago Banking Morgan Guaranty 79.0 0.0 79.0
Trust (4%); others (7%)
Chile AFP Summa Bansander Pensions and ... 99.9 0.0 99.9 1998
insurance
Banespa Chile Banking BANESPA (100%) 0.0 97.2 97.2
Fondo de Pens. Pensions and ... 100.0 0.0 100.0 2000
Santander insuranceColombia Banco Santander Banking ... 60.0 0.0 60.0 1997
Colombia
Grupo Financiero Banking ... 1 100.0 0.0 100.0 2000
Serfín
Mexico Banco Santander Banking ... 100.0 0.0 100.0 1996Mexicano
Grupo Financiero Bital Banking ING (18%); Banco Com. 12.7 0.0 12.7 1993
Portugués (13%)
Banco Santander Perú Banking ... 100.0 0.0 100.0 1997
AFP Nueva Vida Pensions and ... 100.0 0.0 100.0
insurance
Peru Bancosur Banking Banco Santander Perú 99.8 99.8
(100%)
AFP Unión Pensions and AFP Nueva Vida (100%) 100.0 100.0
insurance
Uruguay Banco Santander Banking ... 100.0 0.0 100.0Uruguay
Eurobanco Banking ... 100.0 0.0 100.0
Venezuela Banco de Venezuela Banking ... 97.6 0.0 97.6
Banco Caracas Banking Banco de Venezuela 90.9 90.9
(93%)
Source: ECLAC, Unit on Investment and Corporate Strategies, on the basis of Banco Santander Central Hispano (SCH), Informe
Anual 2001 (www.gruposantander.com/es/grupo/inversores/), 2002; and Alvaro Calderón Hoffmann and Ramón Casilda
Béjar, "The Spanish banks' strategies in Latin America", CEPAL Review, No. 70 (LC/G.2095-P), Santiago, Chile, April 2000.
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Table III.A.6
RANKING OF THE WORLD'S LARGEST BANKS, 2001
(Millions of dollars)
                                  TOP 25 BY CAPITAL                     TOP 25 BY TOTAL ASSETS
Rank Bank Country First-tier Rank Bank Country Total
capital assets
  1 Citigroup USA 58 448 1 Mizuho Financial Group Japan 1 178 285
  2 Bank of America Corp. USA 41 972 2 Citigroup USA 1 051 450
  3 Mizuho Financial Group Japan 40 498 3 Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Japan 840 281
Corporation
  4 J.P. Morgan Chase Co. USA 37 713 4 Deutsche Bank Germany 809 220
  5 UFJ Holding Japan 23 815 5 Mitsubishi Tokyo Japan 751 480
Financial Group
  6 Sumitomo Mitsui Japan 29 952 6 UBS Switzerland 747 211
Banking Corporation
  7 Crédit Agricole France 28 876 7 BNP Paribas France 727 325
  8 Mitsubishi Tokyo Japan 25 673 8 HSBC Holdings UK 696 381
Financial Group
  9 UFJ Holding Japan 23 815 9 J.P. Morgan Chase Co. USA 693 575
10 Industrial and Commercial China 23 107 10 HypoVereinsbank Germany 641 729
Bank of China
11 Bank of China China 22 085 11 Bank of America Corp. USA 621 764
12 Deutsche Bank Germany 21 859 12 UFJ Holding Japan 616 485
13 Royal Bank of Scotland UK 21 830 13 Crédit Suisse Group Switzerland 609 618
14 Bank One Corporation USA 21 749 14 ABN AMRO Netherlands 526 450
15 BNP Paribas France 21 748 15 Industrial and Commercial China 524 235
Bank of China
16 HypoVereinsbank Germany 19 154 16 Royal Bank of Scotland UK 519 991
17 Wachovia Corporation USA 18 999 17 Barclays Bank UK 505 408
18 Wells Fargo Co. USA 18 247 18 Crédit Suisse Group France 496 421
19 HBOS UK 18 086 19 Norinchukin Bank Japan 462 593
20 Barclays Bank UK 18 046 20 Société Générale France 451 660
21 UBS Switzerland 17 482 21 Dresdner Bank Germany 446 535
22 ABN AMRO Netherlands 16 942 22 Commerzbank Germany 441 801
23 Agricultural Bank of China China 15 971 23 Bank of China China 406 150
24 Santander Central Hispano Spain 15 209 24 HBOS UK 401 268
25 ING Bank Netherlands 15 070 25 ING Bank Netherlands 390 725
Source: The Banker, "Top 1000 World Banks", London, July 2002.
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